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T
his article suggests that w
e m
ay construct an account of constitutional doctrine in w
hich courts 
im
plem
ent 
a 
handful 
of 
abstract 
norm
s—
for 
exam
ple: 
“states 
m
ay 
not underm
ine 
the 
constitutional structure”—
w
ith different doctrinal structures that vary w
ith the practical problem
s 
attending im
plem
entation in different contexts. T
he central insight is that w
e can identify patterns 
in the m
ass of convoluted constitutional rules, tests and standards that courts use to decide cases. 
T
hese patterns suggest deep consensuses on fundam
ental constitutional requirem
ents.  W
e can 
explain a great deal of constitutional doctrine w
ith these basic norm
s and jettison standard 
justifications 
that 
m
ake 
m
any 
of 
these 
doctrines 
seem
 
controversial. 
T
his 
runs 
against 
the conventional scholarly account of constitutional practice as dom
inated by debates betw
een 
incom
m
ensurable theories of interpretation or value. T
his sim
pler account is preferable according 
to w
ell-accepted criteria for assessing com
peting theories developed in the philosophy of science: It is 
consistent w
ith our best general theory of law
; it can advance constitutional theory beyond the 
interpretive debates in w
hich the research program
 is presently m
ired; and it is sim
pler, m
ore 
capacious, and m
ore fruitful for future research than conventional accounts. It seem
s as if w
e 
are fundam
entally divided on nearly every constitutional question, but this approach can provide 
an alternative to constitutional theory’s traditional focus on interpretive and value controversies 
and counter the increasing politicization of constitutional questions w
ith proof that w
e actually 
agree on a num
ber of im
portant constitutional m
atters. 
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C
on
stitution
al th
eory is prim
arily n
orm
ative. 1  T
h
e research
 pro-
gram
 accordin
gly lin
es up w
ell w
ith
 public view
s th
at con
stitution
al 
issues are grist for deep disagreem
en
ts about even
 th
e m
ost basic 
con
stitution
al question
s. 2  W
h
at gets lost in
 all th
is arguin
g about 
w
h
at sh
ould be don
e or h
ow
 th
in
gs sh
ould ch
an
ge is th
e basic truth
 
th
at, despite all our disagreem
en
ts, w
e h
ave a stable an
d durable con
-
stitution
al system
. 3  W
e n
eed an
 accoun
t of our con
stitution
alism
 th
at 
recon
ciles th
e existen
ce of deep an
d w
ide-ran
gin
g division
 over basic 
political 
an
d 
m
oral 
m
atters 
th
at bear 
on
 
con
stitution
al 
decision
-
m
akin
g w
ith
 our system
’s un
den
iable stability.  I explore th
e con
cep-
tual foun
dation
s for such
 an
 accoun
t h
ere.  B
roadly form
ulated, m
y 
m
ain
 claim
 is th
at, despite th
e overw
h
elm
in
g em
ph
asis of sch
olarly 
an
d 
public 
debates 
on
 
con
stitution
al 
con
troversies 
an
d 
disagree-
m
en
ts, th
ere is also eviden
ce of broad an
d durable con
sen
sus am
on
g 
legal officials about im
portan
t structural con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at 
tran
scen
d differen
ces of party, in
terpretive disciplin
e, an
d view
s on
 
political m
orality.  A
n
d th
e existen
ce of broad con
sen
sus support m
ay 
establish
 th
e legal validity of som
e structural con
stitution
al n
orm
s.  
T
h
e n
ew
 em
ph
asis I w
ill suggest for con
stitution
al th
eory advan
ces 
our substan
tive un
derstan
din
g of con
stitution
al law
 an
d provides a 
firm
er foun
dation
 for n
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eory, w
h
ose goal, 
after all, is to “im
prove th
e fun
ction
in
g of a m
assively com
plex system
 
of govern
an
ce.”
4  T
o im
prove a system
, w
e n
eed a realistic picture of 
th
e system
 as it stan
ds.  H
igh
ligh
tin
g m
atters of con
stitution
al con
-
sen
sus is a w
elcom
e corrective in
 w
h
at som
etim
es seem
s like a deeply 
divided polity en
gaged in
 disputes about even
 our m
ost basic con
sti-
tution
al organ
izin
g prin
ciples.  O
r so I w
ill argue. 
  
1 
See generally L
A
U
R
A
 K
A
L
M
A
N
, T
H
E
 S
T
R
A
N
G
E
 C
A
R
E
E
R
 O
F L
E
G
A
L
 L
IB
E
R
A
L
ISM
 (1996) (givin
g an
 
in
tellectual h
istory of con
stitution
al th
eory); D
an
iel B
. R
odriguez, State C
onstitutionalism
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 Perh
aps m
ost im
portan
t am
on
g th
e oversigh
ts resultin
g from
 con
-
stitution
al sch
olarsh
ip’s overw
h
elm
in
gly n
orm
ative an
d in
terpretive 
focus is th
at, so far, w
e h
ave n
ot th
orough
ly grappled w
ith
 th
e follow
-
in
g question
:  H
ow
 can
 w
e best iden
tify th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s w
e 
actually have, given
 th
e practices w
e observe an
d regardless of th
e 
com
petin
g view
s about w
h
at our n
orm
s or practices should be?  I d
o 
n
ot m
ean
 th
at w
e can
n
ot w
rite a treatise syn
th
esizin
g from
 judicial 
decision
s w
h
at th
e con
stitution
al law
 is; I m
ean
 th
at w
e still fun
da-
m
en
tally 
disagree 
about 
th
e 
basic 
proposition
s 
of 
con
stitution
al 
m
ean
in
g th
at explain
 an
d justify th
e rules applied in
 th
ose judicial 
decision
s. 
O
n
e m
an
ifestation
 of th
is division
 is th
e debate betw
een
 com
pet-
in
g th
eories of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
, w
h
ich
 in
creasin
gly dom
-
in
ates con
stitution
al sch
olarsh
ip. 5  T
h
is con
flict h
as taken
 on
 th
e cast 
of a fun
dam
en
tal disagreem
en
t betw
een
 com
petin
g vision
s of th
e sys-
tem
 th
at differ all th
e w
ay dow
n
 to th
e basic con
ten
t of th
e law
. 6  T
h
is 
 
and the D
om
ain of N
orm
ative T
heory, 37 S
A
N
 D
IE
G
O
 L
. R
E
V. 523, 523–25 (n
otin
g th
e over-
w
h
elm
in
g n
orm
ative ben
t of con
stitution
al sch
olarsh
ip produced by legal academ
ics). 
 
2 
See, e.g., Sam
uel Freem
an
, Political L
iberalism
 and the Possibility of a Just D
em
ocratic C
onstitu-
tion, 69 C
H
I. K
E
N
T
 L
. R
E
V. 619, 648–51 (1994) (question
in
g th
e possibility of public-values 
con
stitution
alism
 in
 ligh
t of “w
idespread disagreem
en
t” about both
 political m
orality an
d 
con
stitution
al n
orm
s).  Politics gen
erally is in
creasin
gly polarized.  See T
H
O
M
A
S E
. M
A
N
N
 
&
 N
O
R
M
A
N
 J. O
R
N
ST
E
IN
, 
IT’S E
V
E
N
 W
O
R
SE
 T
H
A
N
 IT
 L
O
O
K
S: 
 H
O
W
 
T
H
E
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
N
 
C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 S
YST
E
M
 C
O
L
L
ID
E
D
 W
IT
H
 T
H
E
 N
E
W
 P
O
L
IT
IC
S O
F E
X
T
R
E
M
ISM
 44 (2012) 
(can
vassin
g th
e n
egative effects of polarization
 for govern
an
ce); G
eoffrey C
. L
aym
an
 et 
al., Party Polarization in A
m
erican Politics:  C
haracteristics, C
auses, and C
onsequences, 9 A
N
N
. 
R
E
V. P
O
L. S
C
I. 83, 85–96 (2006) (fin
din
g a substan
tial in
crease in
 polarization
 alon
g party 
lin
es sin
ce th
e 1970s); R
ich
ard H
. Pildes, W
hy the C
enter D
oes N
ot H
old:  T
he C
auses of H
y-
perpolarized D
em
ocracy in A
m
erica, 99 C
A
L. L
. R
E
V. 273, 273–74 (2011) (suggestin
g th
at a 
“defin
in
g attribute” of A
m
erican
 dem
ocracy is partisan
 polarization
).  A
s con
stitution
al 
question
s becom
e in
creasin
gly politicized, th
ey are sucked in
to an
 in
creasin
gly divided 
an
d divisive public political discourse.  See A
. C
h
ristoph
er B
ryan
t, C
onstitutional Forbear-
ance, 46 U
. R
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 695, 711–18 (2012) (can
vassin
g exam
ples of political polariza-
tion
 in
 con
stitution
al law
). 
 
3 
See, e.g., H
erbert G
. M
cC
losky, C
onsensus and Ideology in A
m
erican Politics, 58 A
M
. P
O
L. S
C
I. 
R
E
V. 361, 371–82 (1964) (con
cludin
g from
 survey results th
at “a dem
ocratic society can
 
survive despite w
idespread popular m
isun
derstan
din
g an
d disagreem
en
t about basic 
dem
ocratic 
an
d 
con
stitution
al 
values,” 
an
d 
callin
g 
for 
exploration
 
of 
h
ow
 
stability 
th
rough
 such
 disagreem
en
t is possible). 
 
4 
A
n
drew
 C
oan
, T
ow
ard a R
eality-B
ased C
onstitutional T
heory, 89 W
A
SH
. U
. L
. R
E
V. 273, 274 
(2011). 
 
5 
See Steph
en
 M
. G
riffin
, W
hat is C
onstitutional T
heory?  T
he N
ew
er T
heory and the D
ecline of the 
L
earned T
radition, 62 S. C
A
L. L
. R
E
V. 493, 494–95 (1989) (n
otin
g th
at con
stitution
al in
ter-
pretation
 an
d th
e coun
term
ajoritarian
 difficulty h
ave been
 th
e tw
o cen
tral preoccupa-
tion
s of con
stitution
al th
eory). 
 
6 
See, e.g., M
itch
ell N
. B
erm
an
 &
 K
evin
 T
oh
, O
n W
hat D
istinguishes N
ew
 O
riginalism
 from
 O
ld:  
A
 Jurisprudential T
ake, 82 F
O
R
D
H
A
M
 L
. R
E
V. 545, 572 (2013) (assertin
g th
at in
terpretive 
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debate is im
portan
t, but it m
ay be in
soluble an
d as it becom
es m
ore 
con
ten
tious it in
creasin
gly stalls progress. 7  O
n
e can
n
ot en
gage an
 is-
sue of con
stitution
al law
 or th
eory w
ith
out coppin
g to in
terpretive 
priors; an
d an
y progress on
 such
 an
 issue is bracketed by th
e specter 
of coun
terargum
en
ts from
 com
petin
g in
terpretive th
eories.  In
ter-
pretive disagreem
en
t is if an
yth
in
g m
agn
ified in
 th
e structural con
-
text—
federalism
 an
d separation
-of-pow
ers doctrin
es are con
ven
tion
-
ally explain
ed by a series of con
testable in
terpretive in
feren
ces from
 
scattered con
stitution
al provision
s an
d organ
ization
al ch
aracteristics 
of th
e text; un
surprisin
gly, th
is gen
erates sign
ifican
t in
terpretive disa-
greem
en
t in
 structural cases.  W
e n
eed a w
ay aroun
d th
is con
trover-
sy—
n
ot to ign
ore it, but to m
ake progress on
 oth
er fron
ts possible 
w
ith
out h
avin
g to resolve w
h
at m
ay be an
 irresolvable question
.  W
e 
sh
ould be able to iden
tify th
ose con
stitution
al proposition
s on
 w
h
ich
 
w
e agree regardless of our in
terpretive view
s.  T
h
is A
rticle suggests a 
w
ay to do th
at. 
W
e sh
ould accordin
gly w
an
t to atten
d to th
e positive con
stitution
-
al th
eory question
—
w
h
at n
orm
s do w
e h
ave?—
an
d sh
ow
in
g th
at 
th
ere is value in
 doin
g so, th
is A
rticle con
tributes to a peren
n
ial an
d 
fun
dam
en
tal debate about th
e kin
ds of th
eories th
at are w
orth
 pursu-
in
g—
a debate th
at  
. . . exten
ds far beyon
d D
w
orkin
 an
d Posn
er an
d h
as a ven
erable an
d 
an
cien
t h
istory th
at run
s th
rough
 Plato an
d T
h
ucydides, K
an
t an
d 
N
ietzsch
e, H
egel an
d M
arx, as w
ell as R
aw
ls an
d G
euss . . . a dispute 
betw
een
 M
oralists an
d R
ealists, betw
een
 th
ose w
h
ose startin
g poin
t is 
a th
eory of h
ow
 th
in
gs (m
orally) ough
t to be versus th
ose w
h
o begin
 
w
ith
 a th
eory of h
ow
 th
in
gs really are. 8   
I argue th
at w
ork iden
tifyin
g w
h
at con
stitution
al n
orm
s w
e actually 
h
ave in
 our system
 is, in
 fact, w
orth
 pursuin
g for a variety of reason
s. 
M
y th
esis is th
at w
e can
 explain
 structural con
stitution
al doctrin
es 
applied in
 con
stitution
al cases as th
e products of pragm
atic reason
in
g 
about h
ow
 to im
plem
en
t a h
an
dful of abstract an
d un
con
troversial 
con
stitution
al n
orm
s—
w
e m
igh
t call th
em
 skeletal n
orm
s because 
th
ey are both
 th
in
 an
d fun
dam
en
tal to th
e structure of th
e overall sys-
 
th
eorists h
ave begun
 arguin
g th
at th
e con
ten
t of th
e law
 is determ
in
ed by th
eir favored 
m
eth
odologies). 
 
7 
T
h
e preoccupation
 w
ith
 in
terpretation
 h
as grow
n
:  A
 search
 of W
estlaw
’s L
aw
 R
eview
 &
 
Journ
als database in
 D
ecem
ber 2013 for articles featurin
g th
e keyw
ords “origin
alis!” or 
“livin
g con
stitution
!” publish
ed in
 th
e last decade yields 6,088 results; th
e sam
e search
 for 
th
e 
decade 
en
din
g 
12/12/2003 
yields 
3,118 
results; 
an
d 
for 
th
e 
decade 
en
din
g 
12/12/1993, it yields 1,016 results. 
 
8 
B
rian
 L
eiter, In Praise of R
ealism
 (and A
gainst “N
onsense” Jurisprudence), 100 G
E
O
. L
.J. 865, 
867 (2012). 
D
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tem
.  In
 Part I, I illustrate th
is idea’s plausibility w
ith
 a capacious ex-
am
ple.  A
ssum
e arguendo th
at on
e of our structural n
orm
s is th
at 
“states m
ay n
ot take action
s th
at un
derm
in
e th
e con
stitution
al struc-
ture of w
h
ich
 th
ey are parts.”  C
all th
is th
e State Preclusion
 T
h
esis 
(“SPT
”). 9  I argue th
at a n
um
ber of structural doctrin
es th
at are con
-
ven
tion
ally ch
aracterized as im
plem
en
tin
g distin
ct an
d m
ore particu-
larized 
n
orm
s—
in
cludin
g, 
for 
exam
ple, 
th
e 
dorm
an
t 
C
om
m
erce 
C
lause doctrin
e, dorm
an
t adm
iralty doctrin
e, dorm
an
t foreign
 affairs 
doctrin
es, doctrin
es of dorm
an
cy an
d preem
ption
 in
 im
m
igration
, 
an
d 
th
e 
obstacle 
preem
ption
 
doctrin
e—
all 
m
ay 
be 
explain
ed 
as 
m
ech
an
ism
s for im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
 in
 differen
t con
texts.  D
ecision
s 
developin
g an
d applyin
g th
ese doctrin
es form
 a pattern
 th
at suggests 
SPT
 is on
e of our con
stitution
al n
orm
s.  O
n
 th
is accoun
t—
w
h
ich
 
draw
s on
 th
e recen
t m
ove in
 con
stitution
al th
eory to distin
guish
 con
-
stitution
al n
orm
s from
 th
e doctrin
al rules w
ith
 w
h
ich
 courts im
ple-
m
en
t th
ose n
orm
s in
 con
crete disputes
10—
th
e specifics of th
e doctri-
n
al rules, tests, or stan
dards w
e observe in
 th
ese areas are attributable 
to pragm
atic con
sideration
s th
at relate to th
e process of judicial im
-
plem
en
tation
 of SPT
 an
d th
at vary from
 on
e con
text to an
oth
er. 
I th
en
 gen
eralize to look at th
e im
plication
s of buildin
g an
 ac-
coun
t in
 w
h
ich
 m
ost of th
e structural doctrin
es w
e observe can
 be 
explain
ed as im
plem
en
tin
g a few
 abstract n
orm
s like SPT
 in
 differin
g 
w
ays depen
din
g on
 th
e con
text.  C
all th
is th
e Skeletal-N
orm
s accoun
t 
(“SN
”).  W
e can
 debate th
e reason
s w
h
y officials accept n
orm
s like 
SPT
 an
d w
h
eth
er th
ey sh
ould do so; w
e can
 debate th
e pragm
atic ra-
tion
ales for its various im
plem
en
tin
g doctrin
es; an
d so forth
—
SN
 just 
recom
m
en
ds th
at w
e first ackn
ow
ledge eviden
ce of official con
sen
-
suses th
at certain
 basic structural n
orm
s are part of our con
stitution
al 
system
.  SN
 is preferable to con
ven
tion
al view
s about h
ow
 w
e sh
ould 
iden
tify th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e h
ave, n
ot least because it is 
  
9 
I h
ave discussed th
is h
ypoth
etical n
orm
 at len
gth
 elsew
h
ere.  See G
arrick B
. Pursley, D
or-
m
ancy, 100 G
E
O
. L
.J. 497, 512–25 (2012). 
 10 
See M
itch
ell N
. B
erm
an
, C
onstitutional D
ecision R
ules, 90 V
A. L
. R
E
V. 1, 4–6 (2004) (can
vass-
in
g th
e “m
etadoctrin
alist” literature); K
erm
it R
oosevelt III, C
onstitutional C
alcification:  
H
ow
 the L
aw
 B
ecom
es W
hat the C
ourt D
oes, 91 V
A. L
. R
E
V. 1649, 1658 (2005) (discussin
g “de-
cision
 rules” an
d w
h
y th
e C
ourt “m
igh
t ch
oose decision
 rules th
at differ substan
tially from
 
th
e operative position
s th
ey are in
ten
ded to im
plem
en
t”); cf. R
oderick M
. H
ills, Jr., T
he 
Pragm
atist’s View
 of C
onstitutional Im
plem
entation and C
onstitutional M
eaning, 119 H
A
R
V. L
. 
R
E
V. F. 173, 176 (2006), (arguin
g th
at con
stitution
al m
ean
in
g is alw
ays in
fluen
ced by in
-
strum
en
tal con
cern
s); D
aryl J. L
evin
son
, R
ights Essentialism
 and R
em
edial Equilibration, 99 
C
O
L
U
M
. L
. R
E
V. 857 (1999) (arguin
g again
st a prim
arily in
terpretive stage of doctrin
al 
form
ulation
).  See generally L
aw
ren
ce B
. Solum
, T
he Interpretation-C
onstruction D
istinction, 27 
C
O
N
ST. C
O
M
M
E
N
T. 95 (2010) (elaboratin
g furth
er on
 th
e “differen
ce betw
een
 lin
guistic 
m
ean
in
g an
d legal effect”).   
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sim
pler, elim
in
atin
g th
e n
eed to in
fer a w
ide variety of n
orm
s from
 
our 
sparse 
con
stitution
al 
text 
to 
explain
 
th
e 
structural 
doctrin
es 
judges apply.  It is also m
ore con
sisten
t w
ith
 our best gen
eral th
eory 
of law
—
legal positivism
—
an
d m
ay even
 provide th
e begin
n
in
g of a 
w
ay to an
sw
er Judge R
ich
ard Posn
er’s ch
allen
ge th
at con
stitution
al 
th
eory sh
ould eith
er provide som
e em
pirically falsifiable claim
s or 
close up sh
op. 11 
E
xpan
din
g 
our 
m
eth
ods 
for 
determ
in
in
g 
w
h
ich
 
con
stitution
al 
n
orm
s w
e actually have im
m
ediately raises tw
o related con
ceptual is-
sues:  First, because com
plex con
stitution
al practices m
ay h
ave m
ore 
th
an
 on
e plausible explan
ation
, w
e n
eed criteria for assessin
g com
-
petin
g explan
ation
s.  Presen
tly, w
e lack criteria even
 for assessin
g 
com
petin
g n
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s, at least if valid cri-
teria sh
ould be in
depen
den
t of th
e n
orm
ative com
m
itm
en
ts of th
e 
com
petin
g claim
s.  T
o dem
on
strate th
e SN
’s com
parative m
erit, in
 
Part II I begin
 fillin
g th
is gap by explorin
g criteria for assessin
g com
-
petin
g accoun
ts of th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e actually h
ave.  
T
h
ese criteria are draw
n
 from
 th
e ph
ilosoph
y of scien
ce, w
h
ich
 h
as 
lon
g focused on
 issues of th
eory com
petition
 an
d assessm
en
t. 12  O
f 
course, law
s an
d legal ph
en
om
en
a are artifacts of h
um
an
 practices, 
an
d explan
ation
s of th
ose artifacts differ from
 scien
tific explan
ation
s 
of n
atural ph
en
om
en
a. 13  B
ut m
y con
ceptual an
d n
orm
ative claim
 is 
th
at it is n
everth
eless useful to assess claim
s about th
e con
ten
t of con
-
stitution
al n
orm
s—
claim
s about w
h
at th
e law
 is—
accordin
g to criteria 
used to evaluate th
eories across disciplin
es in
 w
h
ich
 facts about w
h
at 
is th
e case are th
e cen
tral object of in
quiry.  SN
 outperform
s altern
a-
tives—
n
otably th
eories th
at iden
tify th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e 
h
ave accordin
g to eith
er a value criterion
 (e.g., claim
s th
at our actual 
con
stitution
al n
orm
s are th
ose th
at prom
ote social justice, liberty, 
dem
ocracy, or som
eth
in
g else)
14 or an
 in
terpretive m
eth
od (e.g., 
  11 
See R
ich
ard A
. Posn
er, A
gainst C
onstitutional T
heory, 73 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 1, 3–4 (1998). 
 12 
See generally T
H
O
M
A
S K
U
H
N
, O
bjectivity, Value Judgm
ent and T
heory C
hoice, in T
H
E
 E
SSE
N
T
IA
L
 
T
E
N
SIO
N
:  S
E
L
E
C
T
E
D
 S
T
U
D
IE
S IN
 S
C
IE
N
T
IFIC
 T
R
A
D
IT
IO
N
 A
N
D
 C
H
A
N
G
E 320, 321–322 (1977) 
(explain
in
g th
e con
sen
sus scien
tific th
eory assessm
en
t criteria); Paul R
. T
h
agard, T
he B
est 
Explanation:  C
riteria for T
heory C
hoice, 75 J. P
H
IL. 76 (1978) (explain
in
g con
sen
sus scien
-
tific th
eory assessm
en
t criteria). 
 13 
A
lex L
an
glin
ais &
 B
rian
 L
eiter, T
he M
ethodology of L
egal Philosophy, (in T
H
E
 O
X
FO
R
D
 
H
A
N
D
B
O
O
K
 O
F P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
IC
A
L
 M
E
T
H
O
D
O
L
O
G
Y 5
 (T
. G
en
dler, et al., eds.)(forth
com
in
g), 
h
ttp://papers.ssrn
.com
/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2167498 (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 14 
C
f. R
ich
ard Fallon
, H
ow
 to C
hoose a C
onstitutional T
heory, 87 C
A
L. L
. R
E
V. 535, 549–50 
(1999) (arguin
g th
at n
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eorists con
verge on
 advan
cin
g th
ree 
prin
cipal values—
justice, th
e rule of law
, an
d dem
ocracy).  See generally R
O
N
A
L
D
 D
W
O
R
K
IN
, 
L
A
W
’S E
M
PIR
E (1986) (arguin
g th
at valid legal prin
ciples are derived from
 a m
oralistic in
-
terpretive process). 
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claim
s th
at our actual con
stitution
al n
orm
s are th
ose derived by 
proper origin
alist in
terpretation
)
15—
on
 th
ese th
eory selection
 crite-
ria.  SN
 is sim
pler th
an
 th
ese altern
atives because it can
 explain
 n
u-
m
erous doctrin
es w
ith
 a sin
gle, un
con
troversial n
orm
 rath
er th
an
 
w
ith
 m
ultiple n
orm
s derived by con
testable in
terpretive or value-
based argum
en
ts.  It recon
ciles th
e stability of th
e con
stitution
al sys-
tem
 w
ith
 th
e appearan
ce of w
idespread disagreem
en
t on
 various is-
sues by suggestin
g th
at w
h
at w
e disagree about are th
e im
plem
en
tin
g 
rules, n
ot th
e m
ore basic un
derlyin
g con
stitution
al requirem
en
ts th
e 
rules are design
ed to en
force.  A
n
d it is con
sisten
t w
ith
 our oth
er 
w
ell-foun
ded view
s about th
e w
orld, in
cludin
g legal positivism
. 
Secon
d, w
e n
eed to develop a w
ay to determ
in
e w
h
eth
er a n
orm
 
proposed to explain
 a set of con
stitution
al doctrin
es is, in
 fact, a valid 
n
orm
 of con
stitution
al law
—
th
at is, w
h
eth
er our best explan
atory ac-
coun
t actually reflects reality.  T
h
is creates an
 im
portan
t opportun
ity 
to begin
 recon
cilin
g con
stitution
al th
eory w
ith
 gen
eral th
eories of 
law
.  In
 Part III, I draw
 on
 on
e gen
eral th
eory of th
e n
ature of law
—
legal positivism
16—
to argue th
at n
orm
s about w
h
ich
 th
ere is robust 
an
d durable con
sen
sus am
on
g legal officials m
ay be valid in virtue of 
that consensus.  O
n
e of positivism
’s core claim
s is th
at th
e con
ten
t of 
th
e law
 of an
y given
 legal system
—
in
cludin
g its con
stitution
al law
—
is 
ultim
ately a m
atter of social fact.  N
orm
s are valid law
s in
 a legal sys-
tem
 if th
ey satisfy th
e criteria of legal validity th
at th
e system
’s legal 
officials accept as obligatory. 17  Positivism
 leaves room
 for all kin
ds of 
validity criteria, in
cludin
g criteria th
at validate n
orm
s, because th
ey 
are accepted by m
ost judges, legal officials, or m
em
bers of th
e pub-
lic—
custom
ary n
orm
s, for exam
ple, are validated in
 th
is w
ay. 18  O
n
 
th
is view
, eviden
ce of w
idespread official con
sen
sus on
 th
e validity of 
a n
orm
 like SPT
 m
ay be eviden
ce of th
at n
orm
’s actual legal validi-
ty—
its existen
ce as a n
orm
 of th
e system
.  T
h
is kin
d of view
 m
igh
t 
even
 give w
ay to som
e em
pirically testable h
ypoth
eses about th
e con
-
ten
t of our con
stitution
al law
, as Judge Posn
er dem
an
ded. 
  15 
See, e.g., Steven
 G
. C
alabresi &
 Saikrish
n
a B
. Prakash
, T
he President’s Pow
er to Execute the 
L
aw
s, 104 Y
A
L
E
 L
.J. 541, 552 (1994) (suggestin
g th
at th
e con
ten
t of con
stitution
al law
 just 
depen
ds on
 h
ow
 th
e texts “w
ere objectively un
derstood by th
e people w
h
o en
acted or rat-
ified th
em
”). 
 16 
See generally H
.L
.A
. H
A
R
T, T
H
E
 C
O
N
C
E
PT
 O
F L
A
W
 (2d ed. 1994) (describin
g th
e th
eory of 
legal positivism
); B
rian
 L
eiter, W
hy L
egal Positivism
 (A
gain)?, at 9–13 (U
n
iv. of C
h
i. Sch
. of 
L
aw
 
Pub. 
L
aw
 
&
 
L
egal 
T
h
eory 
W
orkin
g 
Paper 
G
rp., 
Paper 
N
o. 
442, 
2013) 
h
ttp://w
w
w
.law
.uch
icago.edu/files/ file/442-bl-w
h
y-again
.pdf (arguin
g th
at legal positiv-
ism
 is our best gen
eral th
eory of law
). 
 17 
H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 94–110. 
 18 
Frederick Sch
auer, T
he Jurisprudence of C
ustom
, 48 T
E
X
. IN
T’L
 L
.J. 523, 531–34 (2013). 
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 Part III th
en
 return
s to disagreem
en
ts about th
e proper th
eory of 
con
stitution
al in
terpretation
, w
h
ich
 som
e ch
aracterize as th
eoretical 
disagreem
en
ts am
on
g legal officials about our system
’s criteria of le-
gal validity.  If it’s correct, th
at observation
 m
ay un
derm
in
e eith
er th
e 
positivist claim
 th
at law
s are valid in
 virtue of con
sen
sus or, if positiv-
ism
’s gen
eral accoun
t is righ
t, disprovin
g th
e existen
ce of con
sen
sus 
validity criteria for m
ost con
stitution
al law
. 19  T
o bracket th
ese in
ter-
pretive debates an
d develop claim
s about con
stitution
al practice in
-
depen
den
t of con
testable in
terpretive assum
ption
s, I argue th
at w
e 
sh
ould 
assum
e 
th
at 
structural 
n
orm
s 
are 
sim
ple 
proposition
s 
on
 
w
h
ich
 in
terpreters of every view
 could agree.  T
h
is allow
s us to set 
aside th
e in
terpretive th
eory debate—
judges m
ay h
ave differen
t rea-
son
s for acceptin
g th
ose skeletal n
orm
s, but eviden
ce th
at th
ey are 
accepted h
as in
depen
den
t im
portan
ce—
an
d take up, for exam
ple, 
question
s about th
e n
orm
s’ im
plem
en
tation
.  SN
 also sh
ow
s on
e w
ay 
in
 w
h
ich
 con
stitution
al n
orm
s m
igh
t be validated by con
sen
sus even
 
in
 th
e m
idst of w
idespread in
terpretive disagreem
en
t. 
C
on
stitution
al th
eory an
d doctrin
e are com
plex an
d con
fusin
g; 
con
stitution
al debates—
both
 public an
d academ
ic—
portray th
e sys-
tem
 as fun
dam
en
tally divided an
d dish
arm
on
ious; an
d th
e reason
s 
judges give for particular structural case outcom
es are often
 vague, 
con
tradictory, or h
otly disputed by oth
er m
em
bers of th
e court.  B
ut 
th
e strikin
g upsh
ot of th
e th
eses I develop h
ere is th
at despite all th
is, 
th
ere is eviden
ce th
at, w
h
en
 exam
in
ed w
ith
 n
ew
 con
ceptual tools, 
suggests 
sign
ifican
t 
agreem
en
t 
on
 
basic 
structural 
con
stitution
al 
com
m
itm
en
ts like SPT
.  In
terpretive debate, m
ultifarious decision
al 
in
fluen
ces, an
d oth
er dyn
am
ics ren
der judicial explan
ation
s eith
er 
un
reliable or scattered if taken
 at face value; but w
h
at judges say m
ay 
be less im
portan
t in
 th
is con
text th
an
 w
h
at th
ey do—
th
e pattern
s 
form
ed by th
eir actual decision
s over th
e lon
g term
 are eviden
ce of 
th
e n
orm
s th
at our courts accept, an
d perh
aps better eviden
ce, all 
else equal, th
an
 w
h
at th
ey say by w
ay of form
al explan
ation
.  A
n
d in
 
politically an
d socially divided tim
es, developin
g a m
eth
od for w
ork-
in
g rigorously th
rough
 th
ese question
s h
elpfully m
oves back to th
e 
foregroun
d th
e im
portan
t idea—
often
 occluded by m
odern
 th
eory—
th
at con
stitution
s are products of con
sen
sus. 
  19 
See D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 4–6 (articulatin
g th
is as a critique of legal positivism
); B
ri-
an
 L
eiter, Explaining T
heoretical D
isagreem
ent, 76 U
. C
H
I. L
. R
E
V. 1215, 1239–40 (2009) 
(recon
cilin
g positivism
 w
ith
 th
eoretical disagreem
en
t by suggestin
g th
at in
stan
ces of disa-
greem
en
t sim
ply sh
ow
 an
 absen
ce of existin
g facts of th
e m
atter about w
h
at th
e law
 is). 
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I.  C
O
M
PL
E
X
 D
O
C
T
R
IN
E, S
IM
PL
E
 N
O
R
M
S 
I h
ave argued at len
gth
 elsew
h
ere th
at th
e State Preclusion
 T
h
esis 
(“SPT
”) is supported by th
e con
stitution
al text, h
istory, straigh
tfor-
w
ard con
stitution
al purposes, an
d th
e pragm
atic n
ecessaries of m
od-
ern
 con
stitution
al practice. 20  Perh
aps th
e clearest an
d sim
plest rea-
son
 to accept it is th
at SPT
 is th
e kin
d of n
orm
 you w
ould adopt if you 
w
ere tryin
g to structure a durable federalist con
stitution
al system
.  
G
en
erally speakin
g, th
e few
er specification
s you m
ake about th
e 
structure, th
e low
er th
e risk of m
ajor push
es to aban
don
 th
e C
on
sti-
tution
 in
 order to restructure th
e govern
m
en
t.  It is SPT
’s appeal to 
com
m
on
 sen
se th
at I rely upon
 h
ere.  T
h
e poin
t is to h
ypoth
esize th
at 
SPT
 is a valid n
orm
 in
 our system
 an
d th
en
 see h
ow
 m
uch
 of th
e deci-
sion
al ph
en
om
en
a it can
 explain
.  In
 th
is Part, I offer a n
ew
 accoun
t 
of 
th
e 
con
stitution
al 
foun
dation
 
of 
im
m
igration
 
an
d 
obstacle 
preem
ption
 doctrin
es, arguin
g th
at th
ey m
ay be view
ed as im
ple-
m
en
tin
g SPT
 in
 differen
t w
ays depen
din
g on
 in
strum
en
tal (pragm
at-
ic) adjudicatory con
cern
s th
at differ w
ith
 th
e con
text.  In
 th
e process, 
I explain
 h
ow
 th
is kin
d of accoun
t can
 h
elp resolve several curiosities 
an
d con
troversies surroun
din
g th
ese doctrin
es to set th
e stage for th
e 
m
ore gen
eral case for th
is kin
d of re-th
eorizin
g th
at I m
ake in
 Parts II 
an
d III.  In
 th
ose Parts, I defen
d th
e view
 th
at th
is approach
 to 
dem
on
stratin
g th
e existen
ce of a con
stitution
al n
orm
—
gath
erin
g ev-
iden
ce of pattern
s in
 con
stitution
al practice th
at suggest th
e n
orm
 is 
at w
ork—
is preferable to con
ven
tion
al accoun
ts th
at derive n
orm
s by 
in
terpretive m
eth
od (origin
alism
, etc.) or by th
e application
 of value 
criteria (justice, etc.).  A
m
on
g oth
er reason
s, th
is approach
 is prefer-
able because it is m
ore con
sisten
t w
ith
 our best gen
eral th
eory of law
, 
legal positivism
, an
d h
elps resolve som
e of th
e m
ost persisten
t prob-
lem
s of con
stitution
al th
eory. 
T
h
rough
out th
is Part, I draw
 h
eavily on
 th
e “tw
o-output th
esis,” 
viz.:  “‘[T
]h
ere exists a con
ceptual distin
ction
 betw
een
 tw
o sorts of 
judicial w
ork product each
 of w
h
ich
 is in
tegral to th
e fun
ction
in
g of 
con
stitution
al adjudication
,’ n
am
ely judge-in
terpreted con
stitution
al 
m
ean
in
g an
d judge-crafted tests bearin
g an
 in
strum
en
tal relation
sh
ip 
to th
at m
ean
in
g.”
21  T
o avoid con
fusin
g th
is con
ception
 w
ith
 on
e w
ith
 
w
h
ich
 som
e particular th
eory of in
terpretation
 is required, I call 
statem
en
ts of judge- in
terpreted con
stitution
al m
ean
in
g “con
stitu-
  20 
See, e.g., Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 523–28 (m
akin
g various in
terpretive cases for th
e State 
Preclusion
 T
h
esis). 
 21 
M
itch
ell N
. B
erm
an
, A
spirational R
ights and the T
w
o-O
utput T
hesis, 119 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. F. 220, 
220–21 (2006) (footn
ote om
itted) (quotin
g B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 10, at 36). 
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tion
al 
operative 
proposition
s,” 
usin
g 
B
erm
an
’s 
in
ten
tion
ally 
n
on
-
com
m
ittal term
s. 22  T
h
e judge-crafted rules, tests, an
d stan
dards are 
th
e “decision
 rules” by w
h
ich
 courts determ
in
e w
h
eth
er con
duct falls 
w
ith
in
 th
e scope of a con
stitution
al proh
ibition
 or perm
ission
 an
d are 
separate from
 th
e con
stitution
al operative proposition
s th
em
selves. 23  
T
h
e in
strum
en
tal relation
sh
ip betw
een
 th
e operative proposition
s 
an
d th
e decision
 rules is th
at th
e latter im
plem
en
t th
e form
er—
th
ey 
facilitate 
th
e 
application
 
of 
broad 
proposition
s 
of 
con
stitution
al 
m
ean
in
g to resolve disputes in
 con
crete cases. 24  D
ecision
 rules are 
sh
aped both
 by th
e operative proposition
s th
at th
ey im
plem
en
t an
d 
by in
strum
en
tal or pragm
atic con
sideration
s relevan
t to im
plem
en
t-
in
g th
e operative proposition
 in
 con
crete con
texts.  R
elevan
t prag-
m
atic con
sideration
s in
clude th
in
gs like com
parative in
stitution
al ca-
pacity deficits; adjudicatory efficien
cy; th
e risk, likely rate, an
d costs 
of adjudicatory errors; risks of creatin
g in
terbran
ch
 friction
; repeat-
player con
sideration
s atten
dan
t to adoptin
g form
alistic rath
er th
an
 
flexible decision
 rules, an
d th
e like. 25  T
h
ese con
sideration
s vary by 
con
text; accordin
gly, th
e decision
 rules im
plem
en
tin
g a sin
gle n
orm
 
like SPT
 in
 th
e in
terstate com
m
erce, adm
iralty, foreign
 affairs, im
m
i-
gration
, an
d gen
eral preem
ption
 con
texts—
subject m
atter areas th
at 
are th
em
selves vast an
d differ from
 each
 oth
er in
 substan
tial w
ays—
w
ill diverge. 
A
.  Standard D
orm
ancy D
octrines 
T
h
e 
dorm
an
t 
C
om
m
erce 
C
lause, 
dorm
an
t 
adm
iralty, 
an
d 
dorm
an
t foreign
 affairs doctrin
es
26—
w
h
at w
e m
igh
t call th
e “stan
d-
ard” dorm
an
cy rules—
are at best difficult to derive th
e con
stitution
al 
text.  C
on
ven
tion
ally, th
ey are said to subten
d “n
egative aspects” of 
n
ation
al govern
m
en
t pow
ers, but th
e relevan
t con
stitution
al pow
er-
con
ferrin
g provision
s say n
oth
in
g about precludin
g state action
 as th
e 
dorm
an
cy doctrin
es do. 27  T
h
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e 
  22 
B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 10, at 57–58 &
 n
.192 
 23 
Id. at 32–36 (describin
g “im
plem
en
tation
” of con
stitution
al n
orm
s by con
stitution
al 
rules); see also R
IC
H
A
R
D
 H
. F
A
L
L
O
N
, JR., IM
PL
E
M
E
N
T
IN
G
 T
H
E
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 37–44 (2001) 
(sim
ilar). 
 24 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 504–08 (discussin
g th
e relation
sh
ip betw
een
 th
e operative 
proposition
s an
d th
e decision
 rules). 
 25 
See id. at 506–12; R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 10, at 1658–60. 
 26 
See, e.g., S. Pac. C
o. v. Jen
sen
, 244 U
.S. 205 (1917) (dorm
an
t adm
iralty doctrin
e); 
Z
sch
ern
ig v. M
iller, 389 U
.S. 429 (1968) (dorm
an
t foreign
 affairs doctrin
e); C
ity of Ph
ila-
delph
ia v. N
ew
 Jersey, 437 U
.S. 617 (1978) (dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause). 
 27 
C
f. A
llan
 E
rbsen
, H
orizontal Federalism
, 93 M
IN
N
. L
. R
E
V. 493, 530–33 &
 n
.128 (2008) (n
ot-
in
g “atextuality” critiques of dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e). 
D
ec. 2015] 
SK
EL
ET
A
L
 N
O
R
M
S 
363 
 
subjects state action
s th
at discrim
in
ate again
st out-of-state com
m
ercial 
activity—
for exam
ple, by favorin
g local over out-of-state en
tities—
to 
strict scrutin
y th
at am
oun
ts in
 practice to a “virtually per se rule of in
-
validity;”
28 an
d evaluates n
on
discrim
in
atory state action
s accordin
g to 
w
h
eth
er th
e burden
s th
ey im
pose on
 in
terstate com
m
erce are “clearly 
excessive in
 relation
 to th
e putative local ben
efits.”
29  T
h
e dorm
an
t 
adm
iralty doctrin
e in
validates state action
 th
at “w
orks m
aterial preju-
dice to th
e ch
aracteristic features of th
e gen
eral m
aritim
e law
, or in
-
terferes w
ith
 th
e proper h
arm
on
y an
d un
iform
ity of th
at law
 in
 its in
-
tern
ation
al an
d in
terstate relation
s.”
30  T
h
ere are m
ultiple dorm
an
t 
foreign
 affairs doctrin
es; th
e best establish
ed are th
e backgroun
d rule 
th
at 
“state 
in
volvem
en
t 
in
 
foreign
 
affairs 
an
d 
in
tern
ation
al 
rela-
tion
s . . . is forbidden
;”
31 th
e dorm
an
t Foreign
 C
om
m
erce C
lause rule 
precludin
g 
state 
action
s 
th
at 
affect 
in
tern
ation
al 
com
m
erce 
in
 
a 
m
an
n
er likely to provoke in
tern
ation
al retaliation
32—
w
ith
 a categori-
cal preclusion
 of state action
s th
at facially discrim
in
ate again
st for-
eign
 com
m
ercial actors th
at m
irrors th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause’s 
virtually per se in
validity rule
33—
or th
at “preven
ts th
e Federal G
ov-
ern
m
en
t from
 ‘speakin
g w
ith
 on
e voice w
h
en
 regulation
 com
m
ercial 
relation
s w
ith
 foreign
 govern
m
en
ts’”
34; an
d, som
ew
h
at less th
an
 clear, 
th
e G
aram
endi doctrin
e precludin
g state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 executive-
bran
ch
 foreign
 affairs activities. 35 
A
lth
ough
 th
eir dram
atic differen
ces m
ake a un
ifyin
g explan
ation
 
of th
ese dorm
an
cy doctrin
es seem
 un
likely, th
ey do h
ave som
eth
in
g 
in
 com
m
on
:  T
h
ey all preclude state action
 th
at in
terferes w
ith
 th
e 
con
stitution
al structure an
d th
us m
ay be ch
aracterized as im
plem
en
t-
in
g SPT
.  I h
ave argued th
is poin
t at len
gth
 elsew
h
ere
36 an
d w
ill on
ly 
briefly reh
earse it h
ere:  In
 com
m
erce, state action
s th
at un
derm
in
e 
  28 
U
n
ited H
aulers A
ss’n
 v. O
n
eida-H
erkim
er Solid W
aste M
gm
t. A
uth
., 550 U
.S. 330, 338–39 
(2007) (quotin
g C
ity of Philadelphia, 437 U
.S. at 624). 
 29 
Pike v. B
ruce C
h
urch
, In
c., 397 U
.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 30 
Jensen, 244 U
.S. at 216. 
 31 
Zschernig, 389 U
.S. at 436. 
 32 
See, e.g., B
arclays B
an
k PL
C
 v. Fran
ch
ise T
ax B
d., 512 U
.S. 298, 327–28 (1994); W
ardair 
C
an
., In
c. v. Fla. D
ep’t of R
even
ue, 477 U
.S. 1, 7–8 (1986). 
 33 
See K
raft G
en
. Foods, In
c. v. Iow
a D
ep’t of R
even
ue &
 Fin
., 505 U
.S. 71, 81 (1992) (“A
b-
sen
t a com
pellin
g justification
, h
ow
ever, a State m
ay n
ot advan
ce its legitim
ate goals by 
m
ean
s th
at facially discrim
in
ate again
st foreign
 com
m
erce.”). 
 34 
Japan
 L
in
e, L
td. v. C
n
ty. of L
os A
n
geles, 441 U
.S. 434, 451 (1979). 
 35 
See A
m
. In
s. A
ss’n
 v. G
aram
en
di, 539 U
.S. 396, 401, 423–24 (2003) (h
oldin
g th
at a C
ali-
forn
ia statute w
as in
valid because it “un
dercut[] th
e Presiden
t’s diplom
atic discretion
 an
d 
th
e ch
oice h
e . . . m
ade exercisin
g it”); see also Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 553–54 (assessin
g 
readin
gs of G
aram
endi’s h
oldin
g). 
 36 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 537–61 (iden
tifyin
g th
ree subject m
atter areas w
h
ere con
stitu-
tion
al dorm
an
cy operates an
d th
eir im
portan
ce). 
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th
e n
ation
al econ
om
y (an
d th
us, poten
tially, th
e stability of th
e en
tire 
system
 of govern
m
en
t) are targeted; in
 adm
iralty, dorm
an
cy in
vali-
dates application
s state law
 th
at un
derm
in
e th
e un
iform
ity of m
ari-
tim
e law
 an
d, th
us, th
e fun
ction
in
g of adm
iralty jurisdiction
; an
d in
 
foreign
 affairs, dorm
an
cy precludes state action
s th
at in
terfere w
ith
 
federal con
trol of in
tern
ation
al relation
s.  T
h
ese doctrin
es th
us all 
m
ay be view
ed as im
plem
en
tin
g th
e sim
ple structural proposition
 th
at 
states are con
stitution
ally precluded from
 actin
g in
 a m
an
n
er th
at 
un
derm
in
es th
e larger con
stitution
al structure of w
h
ich
 th
ey are a 
part. 37 
T
h
us, if w
e assum
e arguendo th
at courts accept it, SPT
 provides a 
sin
gle con
stitution
al groun
din
g for all th
e stan
dard dorm
an
cy doc-
trin
es.  O
f course, th
ese rules differ substan
tially from
 SPT
 an
d, ac-
cordin
gly, en
force SPT
 in
 differen
t w
ays.  T
h
is is un
surprisin
g—
rules, 
tests, an
d stan
dards of con
stitution
al doctrin
e often
 differ in
 con
ten
t 
from
 th
e un
derlyin
g con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
ey im
plem
en
t; th
at vari-
an
ce m
ay be explain
ed, again
, in
 term
s of th
e pragm
atic con
cern
s 
about th
e process of con
stitution
al adjudication
 in
 th
e relevan
t con
-
text. 38  T
h
e stan
dard dorm
an
cy doctrin
es’ differen
ces th
us m
ay be at-
tributable to pragm
atic reason
s for courts to en
force SPT
 in
 differen
t 
w
ays or w
ith
 differin
g degrees of strin
gen
cy in
 differen
t con
texts.  
T
h
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause precludes relatively little state action
 
an
d in
corporates substan
tial deferen
ce to C
on
gress because, in
 prin
-
ciple, 
C
on
gress 
h
as 
greater 
capacity 
on
 
econ
om
ic 
question
s 
an
d 
courts, accordin
gly, face sign
ifican
t risks of adjudicatory error. 39  T
h
e 
dorm
an
t adm
iralty an
d foreign
 affairs doctrin
es, by con
trast, pre-
clude a w
ider array of state action
s an
d in
corporate less deferen
ce 
because, am
on
g oth
er th
in
gs, in
 th
ose con
texts th
e poten
tial n
egative 
con
sequen
ces of state in
terferen
ce are m
ore sign
ifican
t an
d th
e risk 
of adjudicatory error is reduced by th
e existen
ce of decen
t proxies 
for state in
terferen
ce (th
e w
aterlin
e or th
e relatively readily discern
i-
ble in
dicia of in
tern
ation
al effect). 40 
A
n
 explan
atory accoun
t on
 w
h
ich
 th
ese stan
dard dorm
an
cy doc-
trin
es all im
plem
en
t SPT
 is preferable to con
ven
tion
al accoun
ts for 
  37 
See id. at 500 (arguin
g th
at state preclusion
 is im
portan
t to m
ain
tain
 con
stitution
al in
teg-
rity). 
 38 
See B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 10, at 35–36, 61–72.  C
f. P
H
IL
IP C
. B
O
B
B
IT
T, C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 
F
A
T
E:  T
H
E
O
R
Y O
F T
H
E
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 74–92 (1984) (discussin
g structural argum
en
ts). 
 39 
See W
illiam
 W
. B
uzbee &
 R
obert A
. Sch
apiro, L
egislative R
ecord R
eview
, 54 S
T
A
N
. L
. R
E
V. 87, 
143–44 (2001) (n
otin
g th
e C
ourt’s w
arin
ess about displacin
g legislative judgm
en
ts); 
B
ran
n
on
 P. D
en
n
in
g, R
econstructing the D
orm
ant C
om
m
erce C
lause D
octrine, 50 W
M
. &
 M
A
R
Y 
L
. R
E
V. 417, 494 (2008) (n
otin
g courts’ in
stitution
al capacity deficits). 
 40 
Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 534–54. 
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several reason
s.  First an
d m
ost obviously, it explain
s several com
plex 
lin
es of doctrin
e w
ith
 a sin
gle, sim
ple n
orm
ative predicate rath
er 
th
an
 by positin
g a distin
ct n
orm
 of con
testable validity for each
 area. 41  
Secon
d, th
e SPT
 accoun
t explain
s a n
um
ber of exception
s an
d oth
er 
features of th
ese doctrin
es th
at are puzzles for con
ven
tion
al accoun
ts.  
I h
ave discussed th
ese in
 detail elsew
h
ere; h
ere I w
ill em
ph
asize just a 
couple of exam
ples:  C
on
ven
tion
al explan
ation
s of th
e dorm
an
t 
C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e groun
d th
e doctrin
e eith
er on
 th
e text of 
th
e C
om
m
erce C
lause or on
 som
e im
plied free-m
arket or in
terstate-
h
arm
on
y prom
otin
g n
orm
. 42  T
h
e first accoun
t is problem
atic be-
cause th
e C
om
m
erce C
lause is a gran
t of pow
er to C
on
gress an
d, fa-
cially, seem
s un
related to precludin
g state action
; 43 th
e secon
d kin
d of 
accoun
t is problem
atic because th
e econ
om
ic n
orm
s adduced rely on
 
m
ultiple con
testable in
terpretive in
feren
ces. 44  SPT
 suffers n
eith
er 
problem
—
it is, like th
e doctrin
e it explain
s, directly con
cern
ed w
ith
 
precludin
g state action
 an
d it is fairly un
con
troversial as a m
atter of 
structural in
feren
ce.  Sim
ilarly, th
e SPT
 accoun
t is preferable to th
e 
con
ven
tion
al con
stitution
al view
 th
at th
e dorm
an
t adm
iralty doctrin
e 
is groun
ded on
 th
e con
stitution
al provision
 of adm
iralty an
d m
ari-
tim
e jurisdiction
 to th
e federal courts—
a textual provision
 th
at h
as 
even
 less to do w
ith
 precludin
g state action
 th
an
 does th
e C
om
m
erce 
C
lause, if th
at is possible; an
d predictably accoun
ts of th
e doctrin
e as 
predicated on
 th
e A
dm
iralty C
lause are con
tested. 45 
  41 
See generally infra Part II.B
 (arguin
g th
at sim
pler explan
ation
s of legal ph
en
om
en
a are 
preferable to m
ore com
plex on
es). 
 42 
See, e.g., G
ibbon
s v. O
gden
, 22 U
.S. (9 W
h
eat.) 1, 209 (1824) (suggestin
g th
e com
m
erce 
pow
er is to som
e exten
t exclusive, or at th
e least, th
at direct state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 its ex-
ercise is precluded); R
ich
ard B
. C
ollin
s, Econom
ic U
nion as a C
onstitutional Value, 63 N
.Y.U
. 
L
. R
E
V. 43, 63–64 (1988) (discussin
g h
arm
on
y ration
ale); Julian
 N
. E
ule, L
aying the 
D
orm
ant C
om
m
erce C
lause to R
est, 91 Y
A
L
E
 L
.J. 425, 429–35 (1982) (discussin
g free m
arket 
ration
ale). 
 43 
See E
rn
est A
. Youn
g, M
aking Federalism
 D
octrine:  Fidelity, Institutional C
om
petence, and C
om
-
pensating A
djustm
ents, 46 W
M
. &
 M
A
R
Y L
. R
E
V. 1733, 1785 (2005) (n
otin
g th
e discon
n
ect 
betw
een
 th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e an
d th
e con
stitution
al text). 
 44 
See W
est L
yn
n
 C
ream
ery, In
c. v. H
ealy, 512 U
.S. 186, 217 (1994) (R
eh
n
quist, C
.J., dissen
t-
in
g) (callin
g th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause an
 artifact of “a grim
 sin
k-or-sw
im
 policy of 
laissez-faire econ
om
ics”).  See generally M
ark T
ush
n
et, R
ethinking the D
orm
ant C
om
m
erce 
C
lause, 1979 W
IS. L
. R
E
V. 125 (1979) (can
vassin
g criticism
s an
d discussin
g various, an
d 
som
etim
es com
petin
g, tests th
at th
e Suprem
e C
ourt h
as em
ployed an
d/or sh
ould em
ploy 
in
 its dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause cases). 
 45 
See, e.g., D
avid J. B
ederm
an
, U
niform
ity, D
elegation and the D
orm
ant A
dm
iralty C
lause, 28 J. 
M
A
R. L
. &
 C
O
M
M
. 1, 7–14 (1997) (discussin
g th
e developm
en
ts in
 dorm
an
t A
dm
iralty 
C
lause doctrin
e after Jensen); Jon
ath
an
 M
. G
utoff, Federal C
om
m
on L
aw
 and C
ongressional 
D
elegation:  A
 R
econceptualization of A
dm
iralty, 61 U
. P
IT
T. L
. R
E
V. 367, 376–78 (2000) (out-
lin
in
g con
flictin
g perspectives on
 th
e “federal com
m
on
 law
 of adm
iralty” an
d its legitim
a-
cy post-Erie); E
rn
est A
. Youn
g, Preem
ption at Sea, 67 G
E
O
. W
A
SH
. L
. R
E
V. 273, 274, 277 
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 In
 th
e foreign
 affairs con
text, th
e con
ven
tion
al extern
al sover-
eign
ty/plen
ary pow
er ration
ale for preclusion
 doctrin
es is difficult to 
recon
cile w
ith
 th
e observable sh
ift in
 judicial decision
s aw
ay from
 ap-
plyin
g th
e broad Zschernig dorm
an
cy rule to a greater relian
ce on
 th
e 
n
arrow
er 
dorm
an
t 
Foreign
 
C
om
m
erce 
C
lause, 
G
aram
endi, 
an
d 
preem
ption
 doctrin
es. 46  W
h
y an
alyze state action
s touch
in
g on
 for-
eign
 affairs for con
flicts w
ith
 positive federal en
actm
en
ts if th
e en
tire 
field is off lim
its to th
e states?  A
 sim
ilar tran
sition
 h
as occurred in
 th
e 
im
m
igration
 con
text, as w
e w
ill see below
. 47  T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t m
ore 
easily explain
s th
is sh
ift:  C
ourts could correctly con
clude th
at it is 
difficult to en
force a gen
eral preclusion
 of state action
 touch
in
g on
 a 
subject like foreign
 affairs w
h
ile also givin
g due atten
tion
 to th
e fed-
eralism
-based reason
s to leave in
tact state action
s th
at w
ould oth
er-
w
ise clearly fall w
ith
in
 th
e police pow
er.  A
pplyin
g such
 a doctrin
e in
-
volves 
a 
com
plex 
balan
cin
g 
of 
poten
tially 
in
com
m
en
surable 
con
stitution
al values an
d a h
igh
 risk of poten
tially costly adjudicatory 
errors.  Federal en
actm
en
ts, h
ow
ever, crystallize broad gran
ts of poli-
cym
akin
g discretion
—
th
ey dem
on
strate w
h
at th
e political bran
ch
es 
th
in
k th
ey can
 an
d sh
ould be doin
g in
 foreign
 affairs—
an
d accord-
in
gly provide useful sign
als from
 m
ore expert in
stitution
s to courts 
regardin
g w
h
ich
 state action
s sh
ould be precluded an
d w
h
ich
 sh
ould 
be allow
ed to stan
d.  Sh
iftin
g to usin
g preem
ption
 doctrin
e in
 th
ese 
con
texts is a reason
able doctrin
al strategy for in
corporatin
g th
ese 
sign
als in
to judicial decision
-m
akin
g an
d, perh
aps, reducin
g th
e po-
ten
tial for error. 
A
 variety of addition
al ben
efits support th
e SPT
 accoun
t of th
e 
stan
dard dorm
an
cy doctrin
es over con
ven
tion
al view
s.  If SPT
 can
 
explain
 still oth
er categories of structural doctrin
e, th
en
 th
e case for 
th
in
kin
g it an
d sim
ilar n
orm
s provide a better explan
ation
 for th
is 
segm
en
t of our con
stitution
al practice is furth
er stren
gth
en
ed. 
 
(1999) (describin
g an
d criticizin
g con
ven
tion
al justification
s for federal preem
ption
 in
 
adm
iralty law
). 
 46 
See, e.g., C
rosby v. N
at’l Foreign
 T
rade C
oun
cil, 530 U
.S. 363, 374 n
.8 (2000) (decidin
g a 
foreign
 affairs case solely on
 preem
ption
 groun
ds despite th
e low
er court’s dorm
an
cy 
clause h
oldin
g); see also R
obert J. R
ein
sten
, T
he L
im
its of Executive Pow
er, 59 A
M
. U
. L
. R
E
V. 
259, 332–33 (2009) (n
otin
g th
e sh
ift aw
ay from
 Zschernig). 
 47 
See infra n
otes 113–14 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
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B
.  Im
m
igration Pow
er D
octrine 
T
h
e doctrin
e govern
in
g th
e con
stitution
ality of state in
volvem
en
t 
in
 im
m
igration
 regulation
 is com
plex an
d con
troversial. 48  For n
early 
a cen
tury, courts h
ave treated im
m
igration
 as a m
atter for exclusively 
federal regulation
. 49  B
ut state an
d local govern
m
en
t in
volvem
en
t in
 
im
m
igration
 regulation
 h
as in
creased dram
atically in
 recen
t years. 50  
Sin
ce th
e federal govern
m
en
t, so far, h
as n
ot respon
ded to calls for 
im
m
igration
 reform
 in
 a system
atic w
ay, state an
d local govern
m
en
ts 
h
ave m
oved in
 to fill th
e perceived vacuum
. 51  T
h
is recen
t surge in
 
state an
d local action
—
m
ostly aim
ed at deterrin
g or pun
ish
in
g un
au-
th
orized im
m
igration
—
h
as been
 con
troversial.  A
side from
 political, 
practical, an
d m
oral debates, th
ese state im
m
igration
 law
s raise diffi-
cult question
s about th
e con
stitution
al allocation
 of pow
er betw
een
 
th
e federal an
d state govern
m
en
ts. 52  If federal im
m
igration
 pow
er is 
supposed to be plen
ary an
d exclusive, h
ow
 can
 states en
act w
ide-
bodied 
law
s 
design
ed 
to 
force 
“attrition
” 
of 
un
auth
orized 
im
m
i-
gran
ts?
53  I argue th
at refocusin
g debates about structural im
m
igra-
  48 
See, e.g., Steph
en
 H
. L
egom
sky, Im
m
igration L
aw
 and the Principle of Plenary C
ongressional 
Pow
er, 1984 S. C
T. R
E
V. 255, 256, 260 (1984) (describin
g im
m
igration
 as “m
ultidim
en
-
sion
al” an
d n
ot boun
d by th
e n
orm
al rules of con
stitution
al law
); H
irosh
i M
otom
ura, Im
-
m
igration L
aw
 A
fter a C
entury of Plenary Pow
er:  Phantom
 C
onstitutional N
orm
s and Statutory In-
terpretation, 
100 
Y
A
L
E
 L
.J. 
545, 
549, 
560 
(1990) 
(describin
g 
im
m
igration
 
law
 
as 
an
 
aberration
 of th
e typical relation
sh
ip betw
een
 statutory in
terpretation
 an
d con
stitution
al 
law
); Peter H
. Sch
uck, T
he T
ransform
ation of Im
m
igration L
aw
, 84 C
O
L
U
M
. L
. R
E
V. 1, 2–3 
(1984) (arguin
g th
e epiph
en
om
en
al n
ature of im
m
igration
 law
). 
 49 
C
om
pare C
h
ae C
h
an
 Pin
g v. U
n
ited States, 130 U
.S. 581, 609 (1889) (h
oldin
g th
at “th
e 
pow
er of exclusion
” is “an
 in
ciden
t of sovereign
ty belon
gin
g to th
e govern
m
en
t of th
e 
U
n
ited States”), w
ith D
e C
an
as v. B
ica, 424 U
.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Pow
er to regulate im
-
m
igration
 is un
question
ably an
 exclusively federal pow
er.”). 
 50 
See N
ation
al C
on
feren
ce of State L
egislatures, Im
m
igration Policy Project:  2010 Im
m
igration-
R
elated L
aw
s and R
esolutions in the States (January 1–M
arch 31, 2010), A
pr. 27, 2010, at 1–2, 
h
ttp://w
w
w
.n
csl.org/ default.aspx?tabid=21857 (listin
g various bills an
d resolution
s relat-
in
g to im
m
igration
 th
at states h
ad in
troduced durin
g th
e first quarter of 2010, as w
ell as 
in
creases in
 previous years). 
 51 
See E
rin
 F. D
elan
ey, N
ote, In the Shadow
 of A
rticle I:  A
pplying a D
orm
ant C
om
m
erce C
lause 
A
nalysis to State L
aw
s R
egulating A
liens, 82 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 1821, 1822–23 (2007) (arguin
g 
th
at th
e reason
 for th
e recen
t in
crease in
 state action
 is C
on
gress’s failure to act, n
otw
ith
-
stan
din
g im
m
igration
 policy bein
g w
ith
in
 th
e purview
 of th
e Federal G
overn
m
en
t); N
at’l 
C
on
f. of State L
egis., B
roken Federal Im
m
igration Policy L
eaves States In A
 L
urch:  W
ith N
o Fed-
eral L
egislation, State L
egislatures M
ove T
o Enact L
ocal Solutions, N
SC
L
 N
E
W
S (Jan
. 13, 2011), 
h
ttp://w
w
w
.n
csl.org/default.aspx?T
abId=21843) (describin
g th
e efforts of forty-six state 
legislatures an
d th
e D
istrict of C
olum
bia to en
act law
s addressin
g im
m
igration
 reform
). 
 52 
C
lare H
un
tin
gton
, T
he C
onstitutional D
im
ension of Im
m
igration Federalism
, 61 V
A
N
D
. L
. R
E
V. 
787, 790 (2008). 
 53 
See generally R
ick Su, T
he States of Im
m
igration, 54 W
M
. &
 M
A
R
Y L
. R
E
V. 1339 (2013) (givin
g a 
h
istory of state in
volvem
en
t w
ith
 im
m
igration
 an
d a survey of th
e m
an
y curren
t state ac-
tion
s). 
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tion
 doctrin
e aroun
d SPT
, rath
er th
an
 a con
stitution
al provision
 for 
an
 exclusively federal im
m
igration
 pow
er, w
ill clarify an
d advan
ce 
th
ese debates an
d, im
portan
tly, better explain
 im
m
igration
 pow
ers 
doctrin
e as it stan
ds. 
T
h
e Suprem
e C
ourt h
as repeatedly h
eld th
at th
e n
ation
al gov-
ern
m
en
t’s im
m
igration
 pow
er is both
 plen
ary an
d exclusive. 54  T
h
e 
exclusivity h
oldin
g m
ean
s, as w
ith
 th
e stan
dard dorm
an
cy doctrin
es, 
th
at certain
 state action
s touch
in
g on
 im
m
igration
 are precluded by 
“th
e C
on
stitution
 of its ow
n
 force”—
th
at is, ex an
te—
w
ith
out regard 
to th
e existen
ce of positive federal im
m
igration
 law
. 55  C
ourts h
ave 
m
ade clear th
at th
is “dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 doctrin
e” at least bars 
state en
actm
en
t of so-called “pure” im
m
igration
 law
, viz.:  L
aw
s “de-
term
in
in
g w
h
at alien
s sh
all be adm
itted to th
e U
n
ited States, th
e pe-
riod th
ey m
ay rem
ain
, regulation
 of th
eir con
duct before n
aturaliza-
tion
, an
d th
e term
s an
d con
dition
s of th
eir n
aturalization
.”
56  T
h
e 
con
ven
tion
al justification
 for th
is ex an
te preclusion
 in
volves a com
-
plex com
bin
ation
 of th
e N
aturalization
 C
lause, th
e Foreign
 A
ffairs 
C
lauses, th
e Foreign
 C
om
m
erce C
lause, an
d an
 extra-con
stitution
al 
th
eory of [pow
ers] in
h
eren
t [in
] n
ation
al sovereign
ty. 57 
A
lon
g w
ith
 its con
testable foun
dation
 in
 th
e con
stitution
al text 
an
d h
istory of acceptan
ce in
 judicial practice, th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igra-
  54 
See, e.g., Fon
g Yue T
in
g v. U
n
ited States, 149 U
.S. 698, 724 (1893); N
ish
im
ura E
kiu v. 
U
n
ited States, 142 U
.S. 651, 659 (1892); C
hae C
han Ping, 130 U
.S. at 609; see also C
ristin
a 
M
. R
odriguez, T
he Significance of the L
ocal in Im
m
igration R
egulation, 106 M
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 567, 
570 (2008) (describin
g  th
e “exclusivity prin
ciple” as “deeply en
tren
ch
ed in
 con
stitution
al 
an
d political rh
etoric”); Peter H
. Sch
uck, T
aking Im
m
igration Federalism
 Seriously, 2007 U
. 
C
H
I. L
E
G
A
L
 F. 57, 57 (2007) (“Probably n
o prin
ciple in
 im
m
igration
 law
 is m
ore firm
ly es-
tablish
ed, or of greater an
tiquity, th
an
 th
e plen
ary pow
er of th
e federal govern
m
en
t to 
regulate im
m
igration
.”); Peter J. Spiro, T
he States and Im
m
igration in an Era of D
em
i-
Sovereignties, 35 V
A. J. IN
T’L
 L
. 121, 138–9 (1994) (n
otin
g federal exclusivity as required in
 
im
m
igration
 law
). 
 55 
D
e C
an
as v. B
ica, 424 U
.S. 351, 355 (1976). 
 56 
T
akah
ash
i v. Fish
 &
 G
am
e C
om
m
’n
, 334 U
.S. 410, 419 (1948).  See also H
un
tin
gton
, supra 
n
ote 52, at 807 (discussin
g exclusivity w
ith
 respect to pure im
m
igration
 law
); M
ich
ael J. 
W
ish
n
ie, L
aboratories of B
igotry?  D
evolution of the Im
m
igration Pow
er, Equal Protection, and Fed-
eralism
, 76 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 493, 502 (2001) (n
otin
g th
e accepted defin
ition
 of im
m
igration
 
law
 as th
e regulation
 of “th
e adm
ission
 an
d expulsion
 of n
on
citizen
s”). 
 57 
See A
rizon
a v. U
n
ited States, 132 S. C
t. 2492, 2498 (2012) (explain
in
g th
at federal im
m
i-
gration
 pow
er “rests in
 part on
 th
e N
ation
al G
overn
m
en
t’s pow
er to ‘establish
 a un
iform
 
rule of n
aturalization
,’ an
d its in
h
eren
t pow
er as sovereign
 to con
trol relation
s w
ith
 for-
eign
 n
ation
s”); see also Sarah
 H
. C
levelan
d, Pow
ers Inherent in Sovereignty:  Indians, A
liens, 
T
erritories, and the N
ineteenth C
entury O
rigins of Plenary Pow
er over Foreign A
ffairs, 81 T
E
X
. L
. 
R
E
V. 1, 81–83 (2002) (arguin
g th
at auth
ority to regulate im
m
igration
 is n
ot expressly ad-
dressed in
 con
stitution
al text, but com
es from
 th
e N
aturalization
 C
lause, th
e M
igration
 
C
lause, an
d th
e T
axation
 C
lause);W
ish
n
ie, supra n
ote 56, at 529–30 (review
in
g th
e Su-
prem
e C
ourt’s com
m
en
ts on
 devolvability an
d exam
in
in
g th
e devolvability of th
e sources 
of th
e un
en
um
erated pow
er to regulate im
m
igration
)  
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tion
 doctrin
e draw
s support from
 th
e con
n
ection
 betw
een
 im
m
igra-
tion
 an
d foreign
 affairs.  T
h
e latter con
text h
as broad doctrin
es pre-
cludin
g state in
terferen
ce, in
cludin
g th
e Zschernig backgroun
d rule 
th
at state in
volvem
en
t in
 “foreign
 affairs an
d in
tern
ation
al relation
s is 
. . . forbidden
”
58 an
d th
e dorm
an
t Foreign
 C
om
m
erce C
lause rule 
precludin
g 
state 
action
s 
th
at 
un
derm
in
e 
th
e 
n
ation
’s 
ability 
to 
“speak[] w
ith
 on
e voice” in
 foreign
 affairs. 59  T
h
ese doctrin
es straigh
t-
forw
ardly im
plem
en
t SPT
:  Foreign
 policy is crucial to n
ation
al stabil-
ity an
d is un
derm
in
ed w
h
en
 n
ation
al an
d state govern
m
en
ts sen
d 
m
ixed or con
flictin
g sign
als; th
us state action
 affectin
g foreign
 affairs 
w
ill frequen
tly th
reaten
 th
e con
stitution
al structure an
d is th
erefore 
properly presum
ed in
valid. 60  T
h
e substan
tial con
n
ection
 betw
een
 
im
m
igration
 an
d foreign
 relation
s m
ean
s th
at state action
 on
 im
m
i-
gration
 w
ill alm
ost alw
ays h
ave som
e effect on
 foreign
 affairs. 61  A
rizo-
n
a’s S.B
. 1070, for exam
ple, sparked a diplom
atic uproar an
d con
-
dem
n
ation
 from
 foreign
 govern
m
en
ts. 62  D
espite stron
g reason
s to 
favor a un
iform
 federal im
m
igration
 law
, th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 
doctrin
e is less th
an
 an
 absolute preclusion
 of state action
 in
 prac-
tice. 63  T
h
ere are tw
o fairly w
ell-establish
ed exception
s:  First, w
h
ile 
th
e C
ourt h
as expressly h
eld th
at states do n
ot possess auth
ority to di-
rectly regulate im
m
igration
, 64 it h
as also ackn
ow
ledged th
at th
e states’ 
police pow
ers en
com
pass som
e action
s th
at affect im
m
igran
ts in
 th
e 
course of advan
cin
g “tradition
al” state in
terests like “education
, crim
e 
con
trol, an
d th
e regulation
 of h
ealth
, safety an
d w
elfare.”
65  T
h
ese de-
cision
s draw
 a rough
 distin
ction
 betw
een
 im
m
igran
t “selection
” an
d 
“regulation
” 
rules. 
 
Selection 
rules—
or 
rules 
of 
“en
tran
ce 
an
d 
abode”
66—
“h
a[ve] to do w
ith
 sortin
g” im
m
igran
ts across geograph
ic 
  58 
Z
sch
ern
ig v. M
iller, 389 U
.S. 429, 436 (1968). 
 59 
Japan
 L
in
e, L
td. v. C
n
ty. of L
os A
n
geles, 441 U
.S. 434, 451 (1979). 
 60 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 500. 
 61 
H
arisiades v. Sh
augh
n
essy, 342 U
.S. 580, 588–89 (1952). 
 62 
See U
n
ited States v. A
rizon
a, 641 F.3d 339, 353–4 (9th
 C
ir. 2011). 
 63 
See D
e C
an
as v. B
ica, 424 U
.S. 351, 355 (1976) (“B
ut th
e C
ourt h
as n
ever h
eld th
at every 
state en
actm
en
t w
h
ich
 in
 an
y w
ay deals w
ith
 alien
s is a regulation
 of im
m
igration
 as th
us 
per se pre-em
pted by th
is con
stitution
al pow
er . . . .”); G
rah
am
 v. R
ich
ardson
, 403 U
.S. 
365, 372–73 (1971) (n
otin
g state law
s directed at n
on
-residen
ts th
at w
ere uph
eld over 
con
stitution
al ch
allen
ge). 
 64 
See T
oll v. M
oren
o, 458 U
.S. 1, 11 (1982) (“[T
h
e states] can
 n
eith
er add to n
or take from
 
th
e con
dition
s law
fully im
posed by C
on
gress upon
 adm
ission
, n
aturalization
, an
d resi-
den
ce of alien
s in
 th
e U
n
ited States or th
e several states.”). 
 65 
R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 571.  R
odriguez also argues th
at th
at “im
m
igration
 regula-
tion
 sh
ould be in
cluded in
 th
e list of quin
tessen
tially state in
terests.”  Id. 
 66 
See, e.g., T
ruax v. R
aich
, 239 U
.S. 33, 42 (1915) (statin
g th
at “th
ey [alien
s] can
n
ot live 
w
h
ere th
ey can
n
ot w
ork”). 
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areas an
d are con
sidered th
e core of th
e federal im
m
igration
 pow
er. 67  
A
ccordin
gly, states are precluded from
 en
actin
g th
eir ow
n
 im
m
i-
gran
t-selection
 m
easures an
d from
 in
terferin
g w
ith
 federal selection
 
law
. 68  Im
m
igran
t regulation rules, on
 th
e oth
er h
an
d, “h
a[ve] to do 
w
ith
 th
e process of determ
in
in
g h
ow
 im
m
igran
ts residin
g in
 th
e 
U
n
ited States live th
eir lives;” an
d th
is category of im
m
igration
 rules, 
w
h
ile clearly w
ith
in
 th
e federal im
m
igration
 pow
er, h
as received 
m
ore con
foun
din
g treatm
en
t in
 im
m
igration
-pow
er doctrin
e. 69  In
 
prin
ciple at least, state regulatory rules n
eed n
ot be categorically pre-
cluded because th
ey on
ly in
directly affect im
m
igran
t selection
. 70 
A
 sim
ple dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 rule w
ould dictate clear results in
 
a vacuum
—
absen
t positive federal im
m
igration
 law
, state law
s touch
-
in
g on
 im
m
igration
 are w
h
olly precluded.  T
h
in
gs becom
e m
ore 
com
plicated w
h
en
 positive federal law
 en
ters th
e picture, both
 be-
cause federal im
m
igration
 law
s are com
plex
71 an
d because th
ey m
ay 
con
tain
 sign
als of federal view
s about th
e perm
issibility of state action
 
in
 th
e field.  In
 its m
ost recen
t im
m
igration
 pow
er case—
th
e decision
 
in
validatin
g m
ost of th
e ch
allen
ged provision
s of A
rizon
a’s con
trover-
sial S.B
. 1070—
th
e Suprem
e C
ourt both
 reaffirm
ed th
e prim
acy of 
federal im
m
igration
 pow
er an
d dem
on
strated th
at th
e volum
e of ex-
istin
g positive im
m
igration
 law
 m
akes preem
ption
 doctrin
e a useful 
substitute for th
e broader dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 rule in
 con
tem
po-
rary cases. 72  C
on
gress m
ay, for exam
ple, preem
pt state im
m
igration
 
regulatory action
s even
 if th
ey w
ould be oth
erw
ise perm
issible, as in
 
  67 
See A
dam
 B
. C
ox, Im
m
igration L
aw
’s O
rganizing Principles, 157 U
. P
A. L
. R
E
V. 341, 345–46 
(2008) (n
otin
g th
at “selection
” is con
cern
ed w
ith
 sortin
g, w
h
ile regulation
 is con
cern
ed 
w
ith
 th
e determ
in
ation
 of h
ow
 im
m
igran
ts in
 th
e U
n
ited States lead th
eir lives). 
 68 
Id. at 354; see also H
un
tin
gton
, supra n
ote 52, at 807–20 (n
otin
g th
at “[a] self defin
ition
 
view
 of im
m
igration
 law
 does n
ot allow
 a role for states an
d localities because self-
defin
ition
 is un
derstood as a n
ation
al process”). 
 69 
C
ox, supra n
ote 67, at 345–46; see also id. at 353–55 (statin
g th
at “[c]ourts h
ave been
 deep-
ly divided over w
h
ich
 sorts of rules states h
ave th
e pow
er to pass”). 
 70 
See C
ox, supra n
ote 67, at 351–53 (explain
in
g th
e difficulty in
 review
in
g “alien
age rules,” 
w
h
ich
 on
ly in
directly im
pact im
m
igration
); H
un
tin
gton
, supra n
ote 52, at 807–17 (an
alyz-
in
g federal exclusivity over im
m
igration
 an
d n
otin
g th
at recen
t state in
volvem
en
t “falls 
sh
ort of pure im
m
igration
 law
”); M
. Isabel M
edin
a, Sym
posium
 on Federalism
 at W
ork:  State 
C
rim
inal L
aw
, N
oncitizens, and Im
m
igration-R
elated A
ctivity—
A
n Introduction, 12 L
O
Y. J. P
U
B. 
IN
T. L
. 265 (2011), h
ttp://papers.ssrn
.com
/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_ id=1843401 (dis-
cussin
g w
h
en
 federal preem
ption
  of state regulation
s affectin
g im
m
igration
 m
ay or m
ay 
n
ot be appropriate); R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 571–72 (arguin
g th
at th
ere is a “struc-
tural n
eed for federal, state, an
d local participation
 in
 im
m
igration
 regulation
”). 
 71 
A
rizon
a v. U
n
ited States, 132 S. C
t. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 72 
Id. at 2510 (h
oldin
g th
ree of four provision
s of A
rizon
a’s S.B
. 1070 preem
pted an
d 
reem
ph
asizin
g federal prim
acy in
 im
m
igration
 an
d im
m
igration
’s relation
 to foreign
 af-
fairs). 
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th
e Im
m
igration
 R
eform
 an
d C
on
trol A
ct (“IR
C
A
”)
73 provision
 ex-
pressly preem
ptin
g state law
s im
posin
g pen
alties on
 em
ployers w
h
o 
h
ire un
auth
orized im
m
igran
ts. 74  Judicial recogn
ition
 of con
gression
-
al prim
acy on
 im
m
igration
 also, h
ow
ever, gives rise to th
e secon
d ex-
ception
 to th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 rule—
just as state action
s th
at 
w
ould 
oth
erw
ise 
fall 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
police 
pow
er 
exception
 
to 
th
e 
dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 rule m
ay be preem
pted by statute, 75 state ac-
tion
s th
at w
ould oth
erw
ise be precluded can
 be authorized by statute. 76  
States m
ay exercise auth
ority pursuan
t to express or im
plied delega-
tion
s from
 th
e federal govern
m
en
t to regulate im
m
igration
 th
em
-
selves
77 or en
force federal im
m
igration
 law
s. 78  Federal statutes th
at 
expressly delegate im
m
igration
 auth
ority to state govern
m
en
ts in
-
clude, for exam
ple, an
 Im
m
igration
 an
d N
ation
ality A
ct (“IN
A
”) pro-
vision
 perm
ittin
g states to decide w
h
eth
er to provide public ben
efits 
to un
auth
orized im
m
igran
ts; 79 an
 IR
C
A
 provision
 allow
in
g states to 
san
ction
 h
irin
g of un
auth
orized im
m
igran
ts “th
rough
 licen
sin
g an
d 
sim
ilar law
s;”
80 an
d Section
 287(g) of th
e IN
A
, auth
orizin
g states to 
en
ter in
to agreem
en
ts w
ith
 th
e Justice D
epartm
en
t for cooperative 
en
forcem
en
t of federal im
m
igration
 law
. 81 
G
iven
 th
e substan
tial deferen
ce courts accord th
e federal political 
bran
ch
es on
 im
m
igration
 issues, 82 it is n
ot surprisin
g th
at courts treat 
con
gression
al sign
als about state action
’s perm
issibility as dispositive 
m
ost of th
e tim
e.  B
ut plum
bin
g for th
ese sign
als com
plicates judicial 
application
 of th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 rule.  T
h
e search
 for con
-
gression
al 
perm
ission
 
in
 
federal 
im
m
igration
 
statutes 
requires 
a 
preem
ption
-like in
quiry in
to th
e existen
ce of express or im
plied con
-
gression
al perm
ission
, strikin
gly like th
e search
 for con
gression
al 
perm
ission
s un
der th
e parallel exception
 to th
e dorm
an
t Foreign
 
  73 
Pub. L
. N
o. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), codified at 8 U
.S.C
. § 1324a et seq. (2008). 
 74 
8 U
.S.C
. § 1324a(b)(2) (2008).  T
h
is provision
 effectively overrules D
e C
anas.  See C
h
am
-
ber of C
om
m
erce v. W
h
itin
g, 131 S. C
t. 1968, 1974–75 (2011) (discussin
g IR
C
A
 an
d n
ot-
in
g th
at after its passage, “state law
s im
posin
g civil fin
es for th
e em
ploym
en
t of un
auth
or-
ized w
orkers like th
e on
e w
e uph
eld in
 D
e C
anas are n
ow
 expressly preem
pted”). 
 75 
See, e.g., U
n
ited States. v. A
rizon
a, 641 F.3d 339, 365 (9th
 C
ir. 2011). 
 76 
H
un
tin
gton
, supra n
ote 52, at 805–07. 
 77 
See T
oll v. M
oren
o, 458 U
.S. 1, 12 (1982); Sch
uck, supra n
ote 54, at 57. 
 78 
H
un
tin
gton
, supra n
ote 52, at 807. 
 79 
8 U
.S.C
. § 1621(d) (2010). 
 80 
8 U
.S.C
. § 1324a(h
)(2) (2008); see also C
h
am
ber of C
om
m
erce v. W
h
itin
g, 131 S. C
t. 1968, 
1975 (2011) (discussin
g th
is provision
). 
 81 
See 8 U
.S.C
. § 1357(g) (2010). 
 82 
See M
ath
ew
s v. D
iaz, 426 U
.S. 67, 81–82 (1976). 
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C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e. 83  A
 represen
tative articulation
 is foun
d 
in
 T
oll v. M
oreno. 84  T
h
e in
quiry resem
bles preem
ption
 an
alysis in
sofar 
as th
e C
ourt exam
in
es relevan
t federal en
actm
en
ts for sign
als regard-
in
g th
e perm
issibility of th
e ch
allen
ged state law
; but th
is is, in
 an
 im
-
portan
t sen
se, th
e reverse of con
ven
tion
al preem
ption
 an
alysis.  T
h
e 
search
 is n
ot for con
gression
al in
ten
t to preem
pt state law
 again
st a 
default rule of state pow
er in
 th
e absen
ce of such
 in
ten
t as in
 a con
-
ven
tion
al preem
ption
 case; 85 in
stead, it is a search
 for con
gression
al 
perm
ission
 for state action
 again
st a default rule th
at states lack pow
-
er w
ith
out con
gression
al perm
ission
. 86 
O
bservin
g th
at m
uch
 poten
tial state in
terferen
ce does n
ot clearly 
resem
ble th
e exercise of a pow
er to directly regulate im
m
igration
 
th
at is dedicated exclusively to th
e federal govern
m
en
t h
igh
ligh
ts th
e
 
w
eakn
ess of th
e con
ven
tion
al exclusive-federal-pow
er explan
ation
 of 
th
e doctrin
e.  E
ven
 if precludin
g th
ese oth
er form
s of state in
terfer-
en
ce is con
stitution
ally n
ecessary or oth
erw
ise desirable, judicial use 
of a form
alistic distin
ction
 betw
een
 exercises of im
m
igration
 pow
er 
an
d con
ven
tion
al state pow
ers m
akes it difficult to reach
 th
at result:  
State police pow
er auth
orizes a variety of action
s th
at raise th
e sam
e 
con
cern
s as direct state exercise of th
e federal im
m
igration
 pow
er, 
but such
 action
s can
n
ot readily be ch
aracterized as direct usurpation
s 
of federal pow
er.  D
ecidin
g im
m
igration
 pow
er question
s accordin
g 
to th
e category of pow
er un
der w
h
ich
 state action
 is taken
 th
us w
ill 
allow
 a substan
tial volum
e of state in
terferen
ce to slip th
rough
 th
e 
proverbial doctrin
al cracks.  T
h
is “pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
” in
h
eres 
in
 m
ost judicial attem
pts to fash
ion
 rules th
at preclude state en
-
croach
m
en
t on
 fields of exclusive federal auth
ority. 87  Put differen
tly, 
a pow
er-focused doctrin
e m
agn
ifies th
e risk of adjudicatory error in
 a 
con
text in
 w
h
ich
 th
e foreign
 relation
s im
plication
s of im
m
igration
 
law
 
ratch
et 
up 
th
e 
poten
tial 
costs 
of 
adjudicatory 
errors 
th
at 
underenforce th
e con
stitution
al preclusion
 of state action
. 88 
  83 
E.g., B
arclays B
an
k PL
C
 v. Fran
ch
ise T
ax B
d.., 512 U
.S. 298, 323–25 (1994); Japan
 L
in
e, 
L
td. v. C
n
ty. of L
os A
n
geles, 441 U
.S. 434, 448 (1979).  For furth
er discussion
, see Pursley, 
supra n
ote 9, at 546–48. 
 84 
458 U
.S. 1 (1982). 
 85 
W
yeth
 v. L
evin
e, 555 U
.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 86 
T
oll, 458 U
.S. at 11 n
.16, 13 n
.18. 
 87 
Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 516–17 (discussin
g th
e pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
 gen
erally). 
 88 
See id. at 557 (arguin
g th
at adjudicatory error costs are h
eigh
ten
ed in
 foreign
-affairs relat-
ed doctrin
al con
texts); Spiro, supra n
ote 54, at 144 (arguin
g th
at in
 im
m
igration
 an
d for-
eign
 affairs “th
e stakes are of such
 m
agn
itude as to readily defeat th
e in
terests of federal-
ism
; ech
oes of ‘th
e C
on
stitution
 is n
ot a suicide pact’ h
aun
t an
y claim
 of state righ
t” 
(footn
ote om
itted) (quotin
g K
en
n
edy v. M
en
doza-M
artin
ez, 372 U
.S. 144, 160 (1963)). 
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 T
h
e C
ourt recogn
ized th
is problem
 early on
 in
 th
e im
m
igration
 
con
text: 
A
 law
 or rule em
an
atin
g from
 an
y law
ful auth
ority, w
h
ich
 prescribes 
term
s or con
dition
s on
 w
h
ich
 alon
e [a] vessel can
 disch
arge its passen
-
gers, is a regulation
 of com
m
erce an
d, in
 case of vessels an
d passen
gers 
com
in
g from
 foreign
 ports, is a regulation
 of com
m
erce w
ith
 foreign
 n
a-
tion
s . . . . B
ut assum
in
g th
at, in
 th
e form
ation
 of our govern
m
en
t, cer-
tain
 pow
ers n
ecessary to th
e adm
in
istration
 of th
eir in
tern
al affairs are 
reserved to th
e States, an
d th
at am
on
g th
ose pow
ers are th
ose for th
e 
preservation
 
of 
good 
order, 
of 
th
e 
h
ealth
 
an
d 
com
fort 
of 
th
e 
citi-
zen
s, . . . an
d oth
er m
atters of legislation
 of like ch
aracter, th
ey in
sist th
at 
th
e pow
er h
ere exercised falls w
ith
in
 th
is class, an
d belon
gs righ
tfully to 
th
e States.  T
h
is pow
er . . . h
as been
 . . . called th
e police pow
er.  It is n
ot 
n
ecessary for th
e course of th
is discussion
 to attem
pt to defin
e it m
ore 
accurately th
an
 it h
as been
 defin
ed already . . . because w
h
atever m
ay be 
th
e n
ature an
d exten
t of th
at pow
er, w
h
ere n
ot oth
erw
ise restricted, n
o 
defin
ition
 of it, an
d n
o urgen
cy for its use, can
 auth
orize a State to exer-
cise it in
 regard to a subject-m
atter w
h
ich
 h
as been
 con
fided exclusively 
to th
e discretion
 of C
on
gress by th
e C
on
stitution
. 89 
T
h
is suggests th
at doctrin
e m
igh
t avoid th
e pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
 
by focusin
g on
 th
e subject of state action
 rath
er th
an
 th
e pow
er un
der 
w
h
ich
 it is taken
.  D
eterm
in
in
g state action
’s true purpose is also dif-
ficult; but on
e w
ay to begin
 is by assessin
g th
e action
’s real effects.  
SPT
 is con
cern
ed, of course, precisely w
ith
 th
e effects of state action
 
on
 th
e stability of th
e con
stitution
al system
. 
SPT
 groun
ds an
 altern
ative accoun
t of im
m
igration
 pow
er doc-
trin
e th
at recon
ciles th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 doctrin
e w
ith
 its ex-
ception
s, w
ith
 courts’ con
tin
uin
g use of th
e slippery distin
ction
 be-
tw
een
 selection
 an
d regulatory rules in
 th
e im
m
igration
 field, an
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
sh
ift 
in
 
recen
t 
decades 
from
 
a 
dorm
an
cy 
an
alysis 
to 
a 
preem
ption
-first approach
. 90  Such
 an
 accoun
t dissolves th
e problem
 
of textual foun
dation
 by an
ch
orin
g th
e doctrin
e firm
ly to an
 un
con
-
troversial 
im
plied 
structural 
n
orm
. 91 
 
T
h
e 
h
ypoth
esis 
th
at 
SPT
 
groun
ds th
e doctrin
e im
m
ediately seem
s legitim
ate an
d w
orth
y of 
exploration
 because th
e reason
s con
ven
tion
ally cited by courts an
d 
com
m
en
tators in
 support of th
e dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 doctrin
e relate 
directly to th
e un
desirable con
sequen
ces of state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 
th
e federal im
m
igration
 system
.  For exam
ple, som
e argue th
at allow
-
in
g state im
m
igration
 regulation
 m
igh
t “erode th
e an
tidiscrim
in
ation
 
an
d an
ticaste prin
ciples th
at are at th
e h
eart of our C
on
stitution
 an
d 
  89 
H
en
derson
 v. M
ayor of N
ew
 York, 92 U
.S. 259, 271 (1876). 
 90 
See infra n
otes 115–17 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
 91 
See T
oll, 458 U
.S. at 13–20. 
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th
at lon
g h
ave protected n
on
citizen
s at th
e subfederal level.”
92  A
n
d, 
states em
pow
ered to regulate im
m
igration
 m
ay export th
e costs of 
im
m
igration
 on
to oth
er states by en
actin
g im
m
igration
 restriction
s 
design
ed to fun
n
el im
m
igran
ts aw
ay in
to oth
er, m
ore h
ospitable, 
state legal en
viron
m
en
ts, 93 w
h
ich
 m
igh
t fuel un
desirable races to th
e 
bottom
. 94 
T
h
e h
arder question
 is h
ow
 th
e doctrin
al exception
s perm
ittin
g 
state action
s affectin
g im
m
igration
 also m
ay fairly be ch
aracterized as 
im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
.  T
h
e first puzzle is th
e ten
sion
 betw
een
 judicial 
statem
en
ts about th
e prim
acy of federal im
m
igration
 pow
er an
d th
e 
reality of w
idespread state action
 affectin
g im
m
igration
.  T
h
e federal 
exclusivity, foreign
 affairs, an
d federal un
iform
ity ration
ales for th
e 
dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 doctrin
e apply in
 prin
ciple to every state action
 
th
at affects im
m
igran
ts, n
o m
atter h
ow
 in
directly or in
substan
tially. 95  
B
ut th
e cases dem
on
strate th
at a variety of state action
s are not pre-
cluded even
 th
ough
 th
ey m
ay in
terfere to som
e degree w
ith
 federal 
im
m
igration
 auth
ority; th
us, con
trary to th
e con
ven
tion
al accoun
t, it 
is difficult to square th
e existin
g doctrin
e w
ith
 th
e claim
 th
at federal 
im
m
igration
 
pow
er 
is 
categorically 
exclusive. 96 
 
O
n
 
an
 
exclusive-
federal-pow
er accoun
t, recon
cilin
g th
e n
orm
ative predicate w
ith
 th
e 
actual decision
 requires eith
er a coun
terin
tuitive con
ception
 of th
e 
scope of federal exclusivity or th
e con
clusion
 th
at federal exclusivity 
is sign
ifican
tly un
deren
forced by courts. 97  Som
e com
m
en
tators ar-
gue, in
stead, th
at th
e exception
s exist because states possess som
e 
m
easure of con
curren
t auth
ority to regulate im
m
igration
. 98  T
h
at m
ay 
  92 
W
ish
n
ie, supra n
ote 56, at 553.  T
h
ere h
ave, of course, been
 in
stan
ces of discrim
in
atory 
federal action
 based on
 alien
age an
d n
ation
ality as w
ell—
th
e C
hinese Exclusion C
ase an
d 
K
orem
atsu leap im
m
ediately to m
in
d.  See C
h
ae C
h
an
 Pin
g v. U
n
ited States, 130 U
.S. 581 
(1889); K
orem
atsu v. U
n
ited States, 323 U
.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also W
ish
n
ie, supra n
ote 
56, at 555–56, n
.328 (citin
g oth
er exam
ples of federal “restriction
ist legislation
”).  B
ut th
e 
states’ h
istory in
 th
is regard is com
paratively w
orse.  W
ish
n
ie, supra n
ote 56, at 556–57.  
T
h
is h
istory is part of th
e reason
 th
at state im
m
igration
-status distin
ction
s are subject to 
strict scrutin
y un
der th
e E
qual Protection
 C
lause.  See G
rah
am
 v. R
ich
ardson
, 403 U
.S. 
365, 371–72 (1971).  A
lien
age distin
ction
s in
 federal law
, by con
trast, are un
iform
ly sub-
ject to ration
al basis review
.  See M
ath
ew
s v. D
iaz, 426 U
.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
 93 
C
ox, supra n
ote 67, at 389–90. 
 94 
R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 639–40. 
 95 
See H
in
es v. D
avidow
itz, 312 U
.S. 52, 65–66 (1941) (suggestin
g th
at a con
stitution
al pre-
clusion
 predicated on
 an
 exclusively federal pow
er sh
ould, in
 prin
ciple, exten
d to any 
state regulation
 of im
m
igran
ts). 
 96 
See supra n
otes 63–81 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
 97 
O
n
 judicial un
deren
forcem
en
t of con
stitution
al n
orm
s, see L
aw
ren
ce G
en
e Sager, Fair 
M
easure:  T
he L
egal Status of U
nderenforced C
onstitutional N
orm
s, 91 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. 1212, 
1213–20 (1978) (discussin
g th
e requirem
en
t of exh
austion
.). 
 98 
E.g., R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 610, 617–23. 
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explain
 th
e doctrin
e, but it does n
ot explain
 a cen
tury of judicial 
rh
etoric em
ph
asizin
g th
e prim
acy of federal pow
er.  T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t 
explain
s both
. 
T
h
e h
igh
 cost of adjudicatory error in
 im
m
igration
 cases flow
s 
from
 th
eir con
n
ection
 to foreign
 affairs; th
e risk th
at an
y given
 state 
action
 affectin
g im
m
igran
ts w
ill in
terfere w
ith
 federal auth
ority on
 
im
m
igration
 is m
agn
ified by th
e pervasiven
ess of positive federal im
-
m
igration
 law
; 99 an
d th
e h
istory of m
in
im
al state in
volvem
en
t w
ith
 
im
m
igration
 m
akes even
 sm
all state forays in
to th
e field seem
 like 
large departures from
 stan
dard practice. 100  T
ogeth
er, th
ese in
stru-
m
en
tal con
sideration
s could m
ake reason
able a default presum
ption
 
th
at state action
 affectin
g im
m
igration
 likely w
ill in
terfere w
ith
 th
e 
con
stitution
al structure.  A
 state action
’s visible con
n
ection
 to im
m
i-
gration
, on
 th
is view
, is a proxy for a likely violation
 of SPT
. 101  T
h
ere 
is little risk of adjudicatory error in
 applyin
g th
is default rule, sin
ce 
m
ost state action
s’ im
m
igration
 effects, or lack th
ereof, w
ill be fairly 
obvious for th
e reason
s I h
ave m
en
tion
ed. 
T
h
e distin
ction
 betw
een
 selection
 an
d regulatory rules, h
ow
ever, 
bifurcates th
e gen
eral dorm
an
cy doctrin
e:  State action
s th
at am
oun
t 
to th
e im
position
 of selection
 rules are presum
ptively in
valid, but 
state action
s th
at fun
ction
 prim
arily as regulatory rules are evaluated 
m
ore case by case.  T
h
is is difficult to explain
 on
 th
e exclusive pow
er 
view
, but if th
e un
derlyin
g con
stitution
al n
orm
 is in
stead about as-
sessin
g th
e m
agn
itude of state in
terferen
ce, th
en
 an
 exception
 for 
state regulation
 of im
m
igration
 pursuan
t to police pow
er m
ay be jus-
tifiable as a w
ay to iden
tify an
d preserve again
st in
validation
 catego-
ries of state action
s th
at are valuable to states an
d un
likely to un
der-
m
in
e th
e system
.  N
ot every im
m
igration
 issue h
as sign
ifican
t foreign
 
affairs im
plication
s; 102 n
or does every state action
 affectin
g im
m
igra-
tion
 actually risk destabilizin
g th
e system
. 103  A
n
d, m
an
y state action
s 
affectin
g im
m
igration
 w
ill advan
ce substan
tial state in
terests of th
e 
kin
d th
at m
otivate judicial efforts to protect state auton
om
y from
 
  99 
See supra n
otes 23–5 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text (discussin
g in
strum
en
tal determ
in
an
ts of 
doctrin
e); see also A
rizon
a v. U
n
ited States, 132 S. C
t. 2492, 2499 (2012) (n
otin
g th
at 
“[f]ederal govern
an
ce of im
m
igration
 an
d alien
 status is exten
sive an
d com
plex” an
d de-
scribin
g various provision
s of im
m
igration
 law
 in
 effect). 
100 
See R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 611–14 (givin
g a h
istory of state in
volvem
en
t w
ith
 im
m
i-
gration
, n
otin
g th
at it van
ish
ed for m
ost of th
e cen
tury follow
in
g th
e C
ivil W
ar). 
101 
See Spiro, supra n
ote 54, at 156–57. 
102 
See D
elan
ey, supra n
ote 51, at 1830 n
.48. 
103 
R
odriguez, supra n
ote 54, at 615; Spiro, supra n
ote 54, at 161–63. 
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federal overreach
in
g. 104  C
ourts w
ill n
eed to w
eigh
 federalism
 con
-
cern
s again
st th
e reason
s for federal exclusivity.  T
h
e question
 for 
doctrin
e m
akers is:  W
h
at rule best accom
m
odates th
ese com
petin
g 
con
sideration
s? 
O
n
e 
in
strum
en
tally 
justifiable 
approach
 
is 
to 
use 
th
e 
selec-
tion
/regulation
 distin
ction
 as a fron
t-en
d filter to distin
guish
 state ac-
tion
s th
at sh
ould be presum
ed to th
reaten
 sign
ifican
t in
terferen
ce 
from
 th
ose th
at pose less system
ic risk an
d m
ay h
ave greater federal-
ism
 value.  C
ourts can
 iden
tify w
ith
 relative ease state action
s th
at are 
effectively selection
 rules, an
d it w
ould be reason
able in
 th
e ligh
t of 
th
e pragm
atic con
sideration
s for courts to presum
e th
at th
ose action
s 
likely w
ill be destabilizin
g in
 ligh
t of th
e com
preh
en
sive federal selec-
tion
 regim
e.  It is m
ore difficult to justify a categorical presum
ption
 
th
at state action
s w
ith
 on
ly in
direct effects on
 im
m
igration
 violate 
SPT
:  W
h
eth
er th
e con
stitution
al structure w
ill be better served by in
-
validatin
g such
 a m
easure or perm
ittin
g it to furth
er federalism
 val-
ues is less clear an
d w
ill vary from
 case to case.  For th
ese state ac-
tion
s, 
th
en
, 
courts 
m
igh
t 
reason
ably 
con
clude 
th
at 
SPT
 
is 
best 
im
plem
en
ted by a m
ore search
in
g in
quiry in
to th
e w
eigh
t of th
e rele-
van
t con
sideration
s in
 th
e particular case.  T
h
e distin
ction
 betw
een
 
selection
 an
d regulation
 th
us can
 be view
ed as a proxy iden
tifyin
g 
cases th
at presen
t th
e difficult question
 of w
h
ere federal im
m
igration
 
pow
er en
ds an
d legitim
ate state police pow
er begin
s—
a question
 th
at 
th
e C
ourt h
as n
ot yet th
orough
ly an
sw
ered. 105 
SPT
 also explain
s th
e con
gression
al perm
ission
 exception
 to th
e 
dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 doctrin
e—
an
 exception
 th
at is, as I n
oted, very 
difficult to recon
cile w
ith
 th
e idea th
at federal im
m
igration
 pow
er is 
exclusive by con
stitution
al m
an
date. 106  If th
ere is a core of n
on
-
delegable federal im
m
igration
 pow
er, th
en
 an
y attem
pt to delegate it 
to states perforce violates SPT
 by con
traven
in
g a m
an
datory structural 
 104 
See, e.g., A
rizona, 132 S. C
t. at 2500 (em
ph
asizin
g A
rizon
a’s in
terests in
 regulatin
g un
doc-
um
en
ted im
m
igration
 an
d n
otin
g th
at “[t]h
e pervasiven
ess of federal [im
m
igration
] reg-
ulation
 does n
ot dim
in
ish
 th
e im
portan
ce of im
m
igration
 policy to th
e States”).  For 
m
ore gen
eral discussion
s of th
ese federalism
 con
cern
s, see also A
lden
 v. M
ain
e, 527 U
.S. 
706, 713 (1999) (articulatin
g m
odern
 federalism
-based lim
itation
s on
 federal pow
er); 
N
ew
 York v. U
n
ited States, 505 U
.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“W
h
ile C
on
gress h
as substan
tial 
pow
ers to govern
 th
e N
ation
 directly . . . th
e C
on
stitution
 h
as n
ever been
 un
derstood to 
con
fer upon
 C
on
gress th
e ability to require States to govern
 accordin
g to C
on
gress’ in
-
struction
s.”); G
regory v. A
sh
croft, 501 U
.S. 452, 460 (1991) (n
otin
g th
at alth
ough
 “C
on
-
gress m
ay legislate in
 areas tradition
ally regulated by th
e States . . . [it] is an
 extraordin
ary 
pow
er in
 a federalist system
 . . . [an
d] w
e m
ust assum
e C
on
gress does n
ot exercise [th
at 
pow
er] ligh
tly”) . 
105 
See D
elan
ey, supra n
ote 51, at 1833. 
106 
See supra n
otes 76–81 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
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requirem
en
t (th
e exclusive provision
 of pow
er to C
on
gress). 107  E
ven
 
if federal im
m
igration
 pow
er in
cludes th
e discretion
 to delegate it as 
C
on
gress sees fit—
as on
e m
igh
t argue on
 a stron
g view
 of th
at pow
-
er’s un
con
dition
ality
108—
unauthorized state exercises of it w
ould still 
violate SPT
. 109  B
ut our focus is on
 th
e in
strum
en
tal determ
in
an
ts of 
doctrin
e, an
d regardless of th
e best an
sw
er to th
e delegability ques-
tion
, th
e pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
 w
ill m
ake it difficult to distin
guish
 
th
e state action
s th
at am
oun
t to im
perm
issible exercises of th
e exclu-
sive part of federal im
m
igration
 pow
er from
 th
ose th
at do n
ot. 110  
T
h
us it w
ill be h
ard to design
 doctrin
al rules th
at reliably in
validate 
im
perm
issible delegation
s of a n
on
-delegable federal im
m
igration
 
pow
er (or un
auth
orized state exercises of it, if it is delegable), an
d al-
so validate perm
issible delegation
s of state auth
ority to take oth
er 
kin
ds of im
m
igration
-related action
s.  A
n
d in
 an
y case, even
 if w
e re-
ject th
e exclusivity of federal pow
er, th
e com
plexity of existin
g feder-
al im
m
igration
 law
 an
d th
e foreign
 relation
s con
cern
s m
ake it diffi-
cult 
for 
courts 
to 
determ
in
e 
w
h
eth
er 
state 
action
 
w
ill 
in
terfere 
sufficien
tly w
ith
 th
e system
 to violate SPT
. 111 
T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t th
us explain
s th
e con
gression
al perm
ission
 ex-
ception
 regardless of our un
derlyin
g th
eory of th
e exclusivity or 
delegability of federal im
m
igration
 pow
er.  In
 each
 form
ulation
, th
e 
risk of adjudicatory error in
 decidin
g th
e perm
issibility of delegation
s 
is h
igh
 in
 th
e m
argin
al case.  A
n
d, th
e political bran
ch
es h
ave lon
g 
been
 regarded as h
avin
g superior in
stitution
al capacity on
 im
m
igra-
tion
 largely because of im
m
igration
’s con
n
ection
 w
ith
 foreign
 rela-
tion
s. 112  A
ccordin
gly, courts m
igh
t reason
ably con
clude th
at th
e best 
w
ay to im
plem
en
t SPT
 is w
ith
 a rule th
at coun
sels deferen
ce to th
e 
political bran
ch
es’ decision
s regardin
g th
e con
stitution
al perm
issibil-
ity of delegated state auth
ority—
e.g., w
h
eth
er th
e action
 falls outside 
th
e exclusive part of federal im
m
igration
 pow
er or, if th
at part, too, is 
 107 
See W
ish
n
ie, supra n
ote 56, at 532–49 (explorin
g th
e possibility of n
on
-delegable federal 
im
m
igration
 pow
er). 
108 
Sch
olars h
ave in
creasin
gly n
oted th
at federal im
m
igration
 pow
er h
as been
 delegated to 
both
 private actors an
d th
e states.  For an
 overview
 of th
is discussion
, see gen
erally A
dam
 
B
. C
ox &
 E
ric A
. Posn
er, D
elegation in Im
m
igration L
aw
, 79 U
. C
H
I. L
. R
E
V. 1285 (2012). 
109 
I h
ave explored th
is argum
en
t—
th
at state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 exclusive federal pow
ers con
-
stitutes in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
e con
stitution
al structure—
at len
gth
 elsew
h
ere.  See Pursley, 
supra n
ote 9, at 514–16; see also B
row
n
 v. M
arylan
d, 25 U
.S. (12 W
h
eat.) 419, 447–49 
(1827) (h
oldin
g th
at state pow
er m
ay n
ot “be used so as to obstruct th
e free course of a 
pow
er given
 to C
on
gress”). 
110 
See supra n
otes 87–8 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text (n
otin
g th
e pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
). 
111 
See Spiro, supra n
ote 54, at 156. 
112 
See, e.g., N
egusie v. H
older, 555 U
.S. 511, 517 (2009); Im
m
igration
 &
 N
aturalization
 Serv. 
v. A
budu, 485 U
.S. 94, 110 (1988). 
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delegable, w
h
eth
er delegatin
g th
at auth
ority to states is desirable un
-
der th
e circum
stan
ces.  If th
ere is n
o exclusive federal im
m
igration
 
pow
er, th
e sam
e in
strum
en
tal con
sideration
s n
everth
eless coun
sel 
judicial deferen
ce to th
e political bran
ch
es on
 w
h
eth
er an
y given
 del-
egation
 of auth
ority to states w
ill in
terfere w
ith
 foreign
 affairs or th
e 
system
 of im
m
igration
 law
. 
Judicial atten
tion
 to th
ese com
parative in
stitution
al capacity con
-
sideration
s also m
ay support an
 SPT
-based explan
ation
 of th
e sh
ift in
 
recen
t decades from
 dorm
an
cy to preem
ption
 an
alysis in
 im
m
igra-
tion
 pow
er cases. 113  Just as a statutory delegation
 provision
 can
 be 
view
ed as a sign
al th
at a state action
 is n
o th
reat to structural stability 
from
 a better in
stitution
; a statutory preem
ption
 provision
 (or sub-
stan
tive provision
 th
at con
flicts w
ith
 th
e ch
allen
ged state action
) can
 
be view
ed as an
 expertise-backed sign
al th
at state action
 poses a struc-
tural th
reat.  Federal im
m
igration
 statutes an
d regulation
s, on
 th
is 
view
, fun
ction
 as an
oth
er kin
d of proxy for th
e m
ore difficult un
der-
lyin
g question
 of state action
’s effect on
 th
e stability of th
e system
. 
Positive federal im
m
igration
 law
 crystallizes th
e scope an
d con
-
tours of federal im
m
igration
 policym
akin
g discretion
.  In
 th
e ligh
t of 
C
on
gress’s in
stitution
al capacity advan
tage on
 im
m
igration
, courts 
usin
g federal im
m
igration
 statutes as a proxy for structural in
terfer-
en
ce is a form
 of deferen
ce th
at respon
ds to relevan
t in
strum
en
tal 
con
cern
s.  C
on
gress h
as n
ow
 legislated on
 so m
an
y im
m
igration
 is-
sues th
at preem
ption
 doctrin
e w
ill be an
 available altern
ative to 
straigh
tforw
ard application
 of SPT
 in
 m
ost cases, an
d preem
ption
 
doctrin
e—
detailed an
d predictable com
pared to th
e dorm
an
t im
m
i-
gration
 doctrin
e—
provides a n
arrow
er, m
ore determ
in
ate, an
d less 
con
troversial doctrin
al m
ech
an
ism
 for im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
 in
 th
is con
-
text.  A
n
d, on
 th
e SPT
 accoun
t, th
e broader dorm
an
t im
m
igration
 
rule could rem
ain
 a default rule th
at m
ay in
validate state law
s th
at af-
fect im
m
igration
 an
d survive preem
ption
 an
alysis.  If state in
terfer-
en
ce is gen
erally barred by SPT
, th
en
 it m
igh
t m
in
im
ize adjudicatory 
errors to h
old th
at it can
n
ot survive just because n
o federal statutory 
sign
al on
 its in
validity can
 be foun
d. 114  So, too, h
ow
ever, courts m
igh
t 
reason
ably com
e to view
 th
e absen
ce of preem
ptive federal law
 as a 
sign
al of im
plied perm
ission from
 th
e better-situated in
stitution
.  A
s 
federal 
im
m
igration
 
law
 
becom
es 
m
ore 
com
preh
en
sive, 
state 
in
-
volvem
en
t w
ith
 im
m
igration
 m
ore com
m
on
, an
d calculatin
g geopolit-
 113 
See infra n
otes 115–19 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
114 
Sim
ilar reason
in
g could explain
 w
h
y th
e Zschernig doctrin
e rem
ain
s on
 th
e books an
d is 
still occasion
ally in
voked in
 th
e foreign
 affairs con
text m
ore gen
erally.  See supra n
otes 31–
5 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
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ical im
pacts m
ore com
plicated, it seem
s in
creasin
gly justifiable in
 
term
s of error risks an
d costs for courts in
 im
m
igration
 pow
er cases to 
presum
e th
at con
gression
al silen
ce on
 state action
 affectin
g m
atters 
w
ith
 w
h
ich
 federal im
m
igration
 law
 regularly en
gages an
d th
at are of 
sign
ifican
t m
om
en
t to n
ation
al stability con
n
otes perm
ission
. 
A
n
 SPT
-based accoun
t of im
m
igration
 doctrin
e is th
us preferable 
for several reason
s.  First, it dissolves th
e n
eed for th
e kin
d of com
-
plex explan
ation
s of th
e scope of federal exclusivity in
 im
m
igration
 
an
d th
e correspon
din
g scope of states’ capacity in
 th
e field th
at is re-
quired to sh
ow
 th
at th
e distin
ction
 betw
een
 im
m
igration
 selection
 
an
d regulation
 is con
stitution
ally m
an
datory on
 th
e con
ven
tion
al ac-
coun
t of th
e doctrin
e’s con
stitution
al foun
dation
.  It also explain
s th
e 
exception
s to th
e gen
eral preclusion
 as in
corporatin
g reliable proxies 
for violation
s of SPT
.  T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t un
ites im
m
igration
 pow
er 
doctrin
es w
ith
 th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause, adm
iralty, an
d foreign
 
affairs doctrin
es as judicial rules design
ed to im
plem
en
t a sin
gle, 
sim
ply con
stitution
al n
orm
 in
 differen
t w
ays depen
din
g on
 th
e prag-
m
atic adjudicatory con
sideration
s in
 each
 con
text.  Fin
ally—
an
d un
-
like view
s th
at explain
 exception
s to th
e gen
eral preclusion
 by h
y-
poth
esizin
g th
at states possess som
e con
curren
t im
m
igration
 pow
er—
th
e SPT
 accoun
t does n
ot require disregardin
g a cen
tury of judicial 
rh
etoric about th
e exclusivity of federal im
m
igration
 pow
er or th
e 
Suprem
e C
ourt’s repeated rejection
 of precisely th
e proposition
 th
at 
states possess con
curren
t auth
ority over im
m
igration
.  It requires on
ly 
th
at w
e recogn
ize, as w
e alw
ays h
ave, th
at states m
ay affect im
m
igra-
tion
 an
d im
m
igran
ts in
 legitim
ate exercise of th
eir police pow
ers an
d 
th
at th
e pow
er m
atch
in
g problem
 m
akes it difficult to distin
guish
 le-
gitim
ate state police pow
er action
s from
 illegitim
ate en
croach
m
en
ts 
on
 federal im
m
igration
 pow
er. 
C
.  O
bstacle Preem
ption 
Im
m
igration
 is a useful case study for in
quirin
g m
ore broadly 
about th
e con
ceptual con
n
ection
s betw
een
 differen
t structural con
-
stitution
al doctrin
es—
it is a field in
 w
h
ich
 a broad backgroun
d rule 
of dorm
an
cy h
as been
 for th
e m
ost part supplan
ted in
 practice by th
e 
application
 of preem
ption
 doctrin
es as positive federal im
m
igration
 
law
 h
as expan
ded.  From
 w
h
at seem
s to h
ave been
 a straigh
tforw
ard 
application
 of dorm
an
cy rules in
 cases decided in
 th
e n
in
eteen
th
 
cen
tury, 115 th
e C
ourt seem
s to h
ave sh
ifted to a preem
ption
-first ap-
 115 
See, e.g., C
h
ae C
h
an
 Pin
g v. U
n
ited States, 130 U
.S. 581, 606–10 (1889); H
en
derson
 v. 
M
ayor of N
ew
 York, 92 U
.S. 259, 273 (1875). 
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proach
 
begin
n
in
g 
w
ith
 
th
e 
sem
in
al 
1941 
decision
 
in
 
H
ines 
v. 
D
avidow
itz, an
d con
tin
uin
g th
rough
 im
portan
t decision
s in
 G
raham
 v. 
R
ichardson, D
e C
anas v. B
ica, an
d M
athew
s v. D
iaz
116 th
rough
 th
e m
ost 
recen
t en
coun
ter w
ith
 an
 im
m
igration
 pow
er question
 in
 C
ham
ber of 
C
om
m
erce v. W
hiting. 117  T
h
e dorm
an
cy an
d preem
ption
 doctrin
es ac-
com
plish
 m
uch
 th
e sam
e th
in
g—
both
 buttress th
e stability of th
e 
con
stitution
al system
 by precludin
g state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 w
h
at is 
taken
 to be eith
er an
 exclusively federal pow
er or, if federal exclusivi-
ty is n
ot a con
stitution
al n
ecessity, at least a regulatory subject in
 
w
h
ich
 th
e existen
ce of com
preh
en
sive federal regulation
 m
ean
s th
at 
state forays in
to th
e field raise th
e specter of in
terferen
ce w
ith
 federal 
policym
akin
g discretion
 in
 an
 area tigh
tly boun
d up w
ith
 in
tern
a-
tion
al relation
s. 118  K
eep in
 m
in
d th
e con
ceptual distin
ction
 betw
een
 
preem
ption
 
an
d 
dorm
an
cy 
th
at 
I 
explored 
at 
len
gth
 
elsew
h
ere:  
D
orm
an
cy rules iden
tify state action
s th
at are beyon
d th
e states’ con
-
stitution
al pow
er ex an
te; preem
ption
 rules, by con
trast, iden
tify state 
action
s th
at, w
h
ile oth
erw
ise w
ith
in
 states’ con
stitution
al auth
ority ex 
an
te, are n
everth
eless contingently precluded in
 virtue of th
e en
act-
m
en
t of a con
flictin
g federal law
. 119 
It turn
s out th
at th
e con
troversial obstacle preem
ption
 doctrin
e 
m
ay be ch
aracterized as im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
, usin
g state law
s’ con
flicts 
w
ith
 con
gression
al purpose as a proxy for structural in
terferen
ce w
ith
 
federal statutes th
at eith
er play a sign
ifican
t rule in
 structurin
g th
e 
govern
m
en
t, establish
 im
portan
t an
d lon
g-vested legal righ
ts, or th
at 
h
ave oth
erw
ise ach
ieved w
h
at w
e m
igh
t call quasi-con
stitution
al sta-
tus.  T
h
us, obstacle preem
ption
, like th
e im
m
igration
 pow
er doc-
trin
es, is deeply related to th
e stan
dard dorm
an
cy doctrin
es.  T
h
is 
n
ew
 justificatory accoun
t resolves a prom
in
en
t critique of obstacle 
preem
ption
—
th
at it can
n
ot be properly groun
ded on
 th
e Suprem
acy 
C
lause. 120 
T
h
is accoun
t also gives us n
ew
 leverage on
 tw
o broader con
trover-
sies in
 th
e literature on
 preem
ption
:  First, courts h
ave n
ever m
ade 
clear 
th
e 
con
stitution
al 
foun
dation
 
for 
ch
aracterizin
g 
judicial 
 116 
See H
in
es v. D
avidow
itz, 312 U
.S. 52, 65–66 (1941); D
e C
an
as v. B
ica, 424 U
.S. 351, 355 
(1976); G
rah
am
 v. R
ich
ardson
, 403 U
.S. 365, 378 (1971); M
ath
ew
s v. D
iaz, 426 U
.S. 67, 81 
(1976). 
117 
131 S. C
t. 1968, 1973–74 (2011). 
118 
See supra n
otes 57–62, 105–111 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
119 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 561–65 (distin
guish
in
g dorm
an
cy an
d preem
ption
 w
h
ile also 
discussin
g con
tin
gen
t un
con
stitution
ality). 
120 
See, e.g., W
yeth
 v. L
evin
e, 555 U
.S. 555, 583 (2009) (T
h
om
as, J., con
currin
g) (arguin
g th
at 
“th
is C
ourt’s [en
tire body of] ‘purposes an
d objectives’ pre-em
ption
 jurispruden
ce” is in
-
h
eren
tly flaw
ed). 
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preem
ption
 h
oldin
gs th
at h
ave th
e effect of fully n
ullifyin
g state law
 
or, even
 m
ore extrem
e, displacin
g state regulatory auth
ority rath
er 
th
an
 sim
ply ren
derin
g th
e ch
allen
ged state law
 in
applicable in
 a par-
ticular case
121—
as on
e m
igh
t expect on
 an
 in
tuitive readin
g of th
e Su-
prem
acy C
lause as a ch
oice-of-law
 rule th
at w
ould m
erely ren
der th
e 
preem
pted state law
 in
applicable in
 th
e particular case
122—
an
d th
at 
foun
dation
 is n
ot obvious. 123  C
all th
is th
e “displacem
en
t” problem
. 124  
Second, com
m
en
tators h
ave been
 frustrated by th
e C
ourt’s h
aph
azard 
application
 
of 
th
e 
presum
ption
 again
st 
preem
ption
—
a 
rule 
th
at, 
w
h
en
 applied, requires an
 especially salien
t m
an
ifestation
 of con
gres-
sion
al preem
ptive in
ten
t before federal law
 m
ay be con
strued to 
preem
pt state law
. 125  W
h
ile th
e C
ourt h
as stated th
at th
e presum
ption
 
is 
groun
ded 
on
 
con
stitution
al 
federalism
 
con
sideration
s 
an
d 
h
as 
h
in
ted on
 occasion
—
con
sisten
t w
ith
 th
e gen
erality of its ration
ale
126—
th
at it applies in
 every preem
ption
 case; 127 it h
as n
ot applied th
e pre-
sum
ption
 in
 every preem
ption
 case an
d th
e reason
s for its n
on
-
application
 in
 som
e cases h
ave n
ot been
 explain
ed. 128 
W
e sh
ould begin
 w
ith
 som
e backgroun
d on
 preem
ption
, its pro-
posed con
stitution
al groun
din
g, an
d th
e n
ature of th
e con
troversies 
 121 
See, e.g., L
orillard T
obacco C
o. v. R
eilly, 533 U
.S. 525, 541–52 (2001) (issuin
g stan
dard 
displacem
en
t 
rh
etoric); 
see 
also 
Steph
en
 
A
. 
G
ardbaum
, 
T
he 
N
ature 
of 
Preem
ption, 
79 
C
O
R
N
E
L
L
 L
. R
E
V. 767, 770–71 (1994) (discussin
g preem
ption
’s effects). 
122 
For discussion
s of th
is readin
g of th
e Suprem
acy C
lause, see V
iet D
. D
in
h
, R
eassessing the 
L
aw
 of Preem
ption, 88 G
E
O
. L
.J. 2085, 2088–90 (2000); G
ardbaum
, supra n
ote 121, at 770–
73; C
aleb N
elson
, Preem
ption, 86 V
A. L
. R
E
V. 225, 251–52 (2000); G
arrick B
. Pursley, 
Preem
ption in C
ongress, 71 O
H
IO
 S
T. L
.J. 511, 524–26 (2010). 
123 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 122, at 524–29 (can
vassin
g form
ulation
s of th
is criticism
). 
124 
T
om
 M
errill called th
is effect of preem
ption
 decision
s “displacem
en
t,” as distin
guish
ed 
from
 cases in
 w
h
ich
 th
e preem
ption
 h
oldin
g is essen
tially a ch
oice of law
 h
oldin
g th
at 
does n
ot in
validate th
e state law
 beyon
d th
e particular case.  See T
h
om
as W
. M
errill, 
Preem
ption and Institutional C
hoice, 102 N
W
. U
. L
. R
E
V. 727, 730–31 (2008). 
125 
R
ice v. San
ta Fe E
levator C
orp., 331 U
.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describin
g exam
ples of federal 
law
 preem
ptin
g state law
, con
cludin
g th
at “[i]t is often
 a perplexin
g question
 w
h
eth
er 
C
on
gress h
as precluded state action
”). 
126 
See Youn
g, supra n
ote 43, at 1834–35, 1849–50 (discussin
g h
ow
 th
e “courts w
ere n
ot en
vi-
sion
ed [by th
e Fram
ers] as th
e prim
ary lin
e of defen
se” for en
forcin
g federalism
 an
d sepa-
ration
 of pow
ers). 
127 
See, e.g., W
yeth
 v. L
evin
e, 555 U
.S. 555, 565 (2009) (callin
g th
e presum
ption
 “a corn
er-
ston
e[] of our pre-em
ption
 jurispruden
ce”); A
ltria G
rp., In
c. v. G
ood, 555 U
.S. 70, 77 
(2008) (in
dicatin
g th
at th
e presum
ption
 applies in
 all preem
ption
 cases). 
128 
See, e.g., A
T
&
T
 M
obility v. C
on
cepcion
, 131 S. C
t. 1740, 1751 (2011) (ign
orin
g th
e pre-
sum
ption
 in
 preem
ption
 an
alysis); W
illiam
son
 v. M
azda M
otor of A
m
., In
c., 131 S. C
t. 
1131 (2011) (sam
e); see also M
errill, supra n
ote 124, at 728 (n
otin
g th
e C
ourt’s varyin
g 
m
eth
ods of application
 regardin
g presum
ption
); E
rn
est A
. Youn
g, “T
he O
rdinary D
iet of the 
L
aw
”:  T
he Presum
ption A
gainst Preem
ption in the R
oberts C
ourt, 2011 S
U
P. C
T. R
E
V. 253, 307–
08 (2012) (n
otin
g th
e C
ourt’s un
reliable use of th
e presum
ption
). 
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surroun
din
g its developm
en
t an
d application
. 129  Preem
ption
 doc-
trin
es in
validate state action
s th
at con
flict w
ith
 positive federal law
 in
 
on
e of several w
ays.  E
xpress preem
ption
 occurs w
h
ere federal law
 
con
tain
s a provision
 expressly barrin
g certain
 existin
g state law
s or 
categories of existin
g an
d poten
tial state law
s. 130  Field preem
ption
—
rare but applicable in
 som
e n
arrow
 circum
stan
ces—
occurs w
h
ere 
federal law
 is clearly m
ean
t to be th
e sole source of regulation
 on
 a 
subject or category of activity. 131  T
w
o form
s of im
plied preem
ption
 
m
ay occur even
 absen
t express preem
ption
 lan
guage or eviden
ce th
at 
th
e federal govern
m
en
t sough
t to occupy th
e en
tire field of regula-
tion
. 132  First, state law
s m
ay be im
pliedly preem
pted w
h
ere th
ey direct-
ly con
flict w
ith
 on
e or m
ore provision
s of positive federal law
. 133  T
h
e 
exact test for direct con
flicts rem
ain
s un
clear; 134 popular recen
tly h
as 
been
 th
e form
ulation
 th
at state law
 directly con
flicts w
ith
 federal law
 
w
h
ere it is im
possible for a regulated party to com
ply w
ith
 both
 th
e 
state an
d federal requirem
en
ts (h
en
ce, th
is h
as in
 recen
t cases been
 
called “im
possibility” preem
ption
). 135  B
ut h
ere, I focus on
 th
e oth
er 
form
 
of 
im
plied 
con
flict 
preem
ption
—
th
e 
so-called 
“obstacle 
preem
ption
” rule, w
h
ich
 requires th
e in
validation
 of state law
s th
at 
“stan
ds as an
 obstacle to th
e . . . full purposes an
d objectives of C
on
-
gress.”
136  In
terestin
gly, th
is obstacle preem
ption
 doctrin
e w
as born
 in
 
th
e im
m
igration
 con
text—
it w
as first articulated in
 H
ines, an
 im
m
i-
gration
 pow
er case. 137 
 129 
See 
generally 
E
rn
est 
A
. 
Youn
g, 
Federal 
Preem
ption 
and 
State 
A
utonom
y, 
in 
F
E
D
E
R
A
L
 
P
R
E
E
M
P
T
IO
N
:  S
T
A
T
E
S’ P
O
W
E
R
S, N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 IN
T
E
R
E
ST
S 251–52 (R
ich
ard A
. E
pstein
 &
 M
i-
ch
ael S. G
reve eds., 2007). 
130 
See, e.g., R
iegel v. M
edtron
ic, In
c., 552 U
.S. 312, 323–24 (2008) (con
struin
g express 
preem
ption
 provision
s); W
atters v. W
ach
ovia B
an
k, N
.A
., 550 U
.S. 1, 20–21 (2007) 
(sam
e). 
131 
See, e.g., R
ice v. San
ta Fe E
levator C
orp., 331 U
.S. 218, 230 (1947) (precludin
g en
force-
m
en
t of state law
s w
h
ere th
e federal in
terest is dom
in
an
t); T
extile W
orkers U
n
ion
 of A
m
. 
v. L
in
coln
 M
ills of A
la., 353 U
.S. 448, 515 (1957) (appen
dix to Fran
kfurter, J., dissen
tin
g) 
(referen
cin
g a n
arrow
 field of legislative action
). 
132 
E.g., C
oncepcion, 131 S. C
t. at 1747–48 (h
oldin
g th
at because of th
e preem
ptive effect of 
th
e Federal A
rbitration
 A
ct, th
e court could n
ot affect w
h
at th
e state legislature can
n
ot); 
G
eier v. A
m
. H
on
da M
otor C
o., 529 U
.S. 861, 874–86 (2000) (statin
g th
at preem
ption
 is a 
“question
 of con
gression
al in
ten
t”). 
133 
See R
ice v. N
orm
an
 W
illiam
s C
o., 458 U
.S. 654, 659 (1982) (statin
g th
at a “party m
ay suc-
cessfully en
join
 th
e en
forcem
en
t of a state statute on
ly if th
e statute on
 its face irrecon
cil-
ably con
flicts w
ith
 federal an
titrust policy”). 
134 
See W
yeth, 555 U
.S. at 590 (T
h
om
as, J., con
currin
g) (can
vassin
g form
ulation
s). 
135 
See, e.g., Pliva, In
c. v. M
en
sin
g, 131 S. C
t. 2567, 2577 (2011) (“W
e h
ave h
eld th
at state an
d 
federal law
 con
flict w
h
ere it is im
possible for a private party to com
ply w
ith
 both
 state an
d 
federal requirem
en
ts.” (in
tern
al quotation
 m
arks om
itted)). 
136 
H
in
es v. D
avidow
itz, 312 U
.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
137 
See id. at 59–60. 
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 O
n
e prom
in
en
t objection
 is th
at th
e obstacle preem
ption
 doc-
trin
e is atextual.  In
 articulatin
g preem
ption
 rules, th
e Suprem
e 
C
ourt un
errin
gly cites th
e Suprem
acy C
lause as th
e relevan
t con
stitu-
tion
al foun
dation
. 138  T
h
e C
lause provides th
at th
e “C
on
stitution
, an
d 
th
e L
aw
s of th
e U
n
ited States w
h
ich
 sh
all be m
ade in
 Pursuan
ce 
th
ereof, an
d all T
reaties m
ade . . . un
der th
e A
uth
ority of th
e U
n
ited 
States” are “th
e suprem
e L
aw
 of th
e L
an
d; an
d th
e Judges in
 every 
State sh
all be boun
d th
ereby, an
y T
h
in
g in
 th
e C
on
stitution
 or L
aw
s 
of 
an
y 
State 
to 
th
e 
C
on
trary 
n
otw
ith
stan
din
g.”
139 
 
T
h
ere 
is 
a 
lon
gstan
din
g debate about w
h
eth
er th
e obstacle preem
ption
 doctrin
e 
can
 be justified by th
e Suprem
acy C
lause—
it is un
clear at best th
at 
con
gression
al “purposes an
d objectives” can
 ren
der state law
 “con
tra-
ry” to federal law
 an
d, for th
at m
atter, th
at “purposes an
d objectives” 
are “law
s of th
e U
n
ited States.”
140 
W
e can
 place th
e m
ore con
troversial preem
ption
 doctrin
es—
especially th
e obstacle preem
ption
 rule—
on
 firm
er con
ceptual foot-
in
g by ch
aracterizin
g th
em
 as im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
 rath
er th
an
 th
e Su-
prem
acy C
lause; but to do so w
e m
ust adopt a som
ew
h
at broader 
con
ception
 of th
e con
stitution
al structure th
at SPT
 protects again
st 
state in
terferen
ce. 141  First, w
e m
igh
t argue th
at obstacle preem
ption
 
is justified w
h
ere a federal statute is en
acted pursuan
t to arguably ex-
clusive, or at least im
portan
tly discretion
ary, federal auth
ority.  Fed-
eral im
m
igration
 statutes, for exam
ple, arguably crystallize federal 
im
m
igration
 policym
akin
g discretion
—
w
h
ich
 m
ay be an
 exclusively 
federal discretion
—
an
d th
us are part of th
e con
stitution
al structure 
in
 th
e sen
se th
at th
ey con
stitute w
h
at th
e federal govern
m
en
t h
as de-
cided to do w
ith
 its im
m
igration
 pow
er.  State in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
ese 
federal statutes, th
en
, m
ay be ch
aracterized as in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
e 
con
stitution
al structure in
sofar as it un
derm
in
es th
e exercise of fed-
eral discretion
.  B
ut th
is proves far too m
uch
.  O
n
 th
is view
, h
ow
ever, 
 138 
See, e.g., L
orillard T
obacco C
o. v. R
eilly, 533 U
.S. 525, 540–41 (2001); C
ipollon
e v. L
iggett 
G
rp., In
c., 505 U
.S. 504, 516 (1992).  M
ore gen
erally, th
e m
odern
 preem
ption
 doctrin
e 
began
 w
ith
 R
ice v. Santa Fe Elevator C
orp.  See 331 U
.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
139 
U
.S. C
O
N
ST. art. V
I, cl. 2. 
140 
For exem
plary articulation
s of th
is critique, see W
yeth
 v. L
evin
e, 555 U
.S. 555, 587–88 
(2009) (T
h
om
as, J., con
currin
g) (statin
g th
at “C
on
gression
al an
d agen
cy m
usin
gs, h
ow
-
ever, do n
ot satisfy th
e A
rt. I, § 7, requirem
en
ts for en
actm
en
t of federal law
 an
d, th
ere-
fore, do n
ot pre-em
pt state law
 un
der th
e Suprem
acy C
lause”); B
radford R
. C
lark, Putting 
the Safeguards B
ack Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism
, 80 T
E
X
. L
. R
E
V. 327, 337–38 
(2001) (arguin
g th
at by perm
ittin
g agen
cies to resolve statutory am
biguity sh
ifts th
e pow
-
er to preem
pt state law
 aw
ay from
 C
on
gress an
d th
e Presiden
t). 
141 
C
f. Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 500, 539 (n
otin
g th
at un
der th
e State Preclusion
 T
est, “[s]tate 
govern
m
en
ts m
ay n
ot take action
s th
at un
derm
in
e th
e con
stitution
ally establish
ed struc-
ture of govern
m
en
t of w
h
ich
 th
ey are a part”). 
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n
early every positive federal law
 can
 be ch
aracterized as part of th
e 
con
stitution
al structure—
w
e n
eed criteria for lim
itin
g w
h
at qualifies 
as part of th
e con
stitution
al structure to preven
t SPT
 from
 becom
in
g 
a gen
eral proh
ibition
 on
 states doin
g an
yth
in
g at all. 
W
e m
igh
t lim
it th
e ran
ge of positive federal law
s th
at coun
t by in
-
troducin
g som
e kin
d of sign
ifican
ce criterion
—
assessin
g eith
er th
e 
sign
ifican
ce of state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 a given
 law
 for th
e stability of 
federal policy or th
e sign
ifican
ce of th
e h
ead of federal auth
ority un
-
der w
h
ich
 th
e law
 w
as en
acted.  A
n
oth
er ready-to-h
an
d criterion
 of 
sign
ifican
ce is foun
d in
 recen
t con
stitution
al th
eory w
ork suggestin
g 
th
at broad, com
preh
en
sive federal statutes m
ay becom
e part of th
e 
con
stitution
al structure in
 som
e sen
se. 142  Statutes th
at create righ
ts 
an
d em
pow
er govern
m
en
t in
stitution
s to elaborate an
d en
force th
ose 
righ
ts th
rough
 legislative an
d adjudicatory processes disch
arge quin
-
tessen
tially con
stitution
al fun
ction
s.  W
h
at’s m
ore, lon
g-lived con
sti-
tutive 
or 
righ
ts-bearin
g 
statutes 
of 
th
is 
sort 
also 
seem
 
quasi-
con
stitution
al because th
ey are en
tren
ch
ed in
 a sen
se, n
ot by A
rticle 
V
, but by th
e pragm
atic factors—
in
cludin
g, for exam
ple, in
stitution
al 
settlem
en
t an
d in
cen
tives to m
ain
tain
 status quo allocation
s of ad-
m
in
istrative jurisdiction
, an
ti-reform
 pressures from
 pow
erful status-
quo stakeh
olders, regulatory en
dow
m
en
t effects, an
d so forth
—
th
at 
m
ake alterin
g sign
ifican
t federal statutes m
ore difficult an
d costly. 143  
T
h
e IN
A
, for exam
ple, displays som
e of th
ese features—
it creates 
righ
ts an
d rem
edies; it h
as been
 aroun
d for a lon
g tim
e an
d h
as gen
-
erated a large body of in
stitution
s an
d im
plem
en
tin
g regulation
s, re-
sultin
g in
 stron
g en
dow
m
en
t effects, an
d so forth
.  Sin
ce SPT
 is sup-
ported in
 large part by th
e desire to avoid th
e practical con
sequen
ces 
of destabilization
, it is a n
atural n
ext step to argue th
at SPT
’s defin
i-
tion
 of in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
e con
stitution
al structure sh
ould be capa-
cious an
d flexible en
ough
 to in
clude in
terferen
ce w
ith
 statutes th
at 
display th
ese ch
aracteristics. 
Preem
ption
 doctrin
e th
us m
ay be view
ed as im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
 in
 
som
e in
stan
ces.  State action
s’ con
flicts or in
terferen
ce w
ith
 federal 
statutes can
 serve as proxies for in
terferen
ce w
ith
 federal sen
sitive or 
exclusive federal auth
ority—
im
portan
t features of th
e con
stitution
al 
structure.  O
bstacle preem
ption
 in
 particular seem
s better explain
ed 
on
 th
is accoun
t; w
h
ile th
e doctrin
e’s focus on
 C
on
gress’s policy ob-
jectives m
ay seem
 odd because th
ose objectives are n
ot by law
 w
ith
in
 
 142 
See generally W
illiam
 N
. E
skridge &
 Joh
n
 Ferejoh
n
, Super-Statutes, 50 D
U
K
E
 L
.J. 1215 
(2001); E
rn
est A
. Youn
g, T
he C
onstitution O
utside the C
onstitution, 117 Y
A
L
E
 L
.J. 408 (2007). 
143 
E
skridge &
 Ferejoh
n
, supra n
ote 142, at 1230–46 (listin
g features of statutes w
ith
 quasi-
con
stitution
al status); Youn
g, supra n
ote 142, at 415–18 (sam
e). 
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th
e m
ean
in
g of th
e Suprem
acy C
lause, th
at focus is con
sisten
t w
ith
 an
 
SPT
-based doctrin
e in
sofar as C
on
gress’s objectives are directly rele-
van
t to determ
in
in
g th
e exten
t to w
h
ich
 state action
 th
reaten
s to de-
rail a federal policy process crucial for system
ic stability.  O
r, if w
e 
w
an
t to take th
e super-statutes idea m
ore literally, w
e m
igh
t say th
at 
certain
 statutes becom
e elem
en
ts of th
e con
stitution
al structure in
 a 
fun
ction
al sen
se in
 virtue of th
eir con
stitution
al ch
aracteristics.  D
oc-
trin
e is (ideally) respon
sive to pragm
atic con
cern
s; th
us it m
akes 
sen
se for courts to select doctrin
es th
at treat certain
 federal statutes 
as quasi-con
stitution
al.  O
n
 eith
er view
 of federal statutes’ role in
 th
e 
an
alysis, SPT
 im
proves upon
 th
e con
ven
tion
al Suprem
acy C
lause ex-
plan
ation
 of preem
ption
 doctrin
e, w
h
ich
 does n
ot straigh
tforw
ardly 
suggest th
ese con
sideration
s.  T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t is th
us preferable in
 
th
e sen
se th
at it provides a n
ew
 solution
—
in
 th
e form
 of a n
ew
 n
or-
m
ative groun
din
g—
for th
e “atextuality” critique of obstacle preem
p-
tion
. Distin
guish
in
g federal statutes by th
eir sign
ifican
ce or con
n
ection
 
w
ith
 system
ic stability as is suggested by th
e SPT
 ration
ale also better 
explain
s th
e presum
ption
 again
st preem
ption
’s seem
in
gly h
aph
azard 
application
 in
 som
e cases but n
ot oth
ers—
sh
iftin
g th
e focus of th
e 
doctrin
e from
 con
flict to in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
e larger system
 suggests 
a m
ore n
uan
ced in
quiry balan
cin
g system
ic in
terests w
ith
 th
ose of th
e 
states.  It stan
ds to reason
 th
at state action
s con
flictin
g w
ith
 structural-
ly sign
ifican
t statutes are on
 balan
ce m
ore likely to violate SPT
, th
us 
th
e presum
ption
 m
ay be in
apposite if th
e balan
ce of structural stabil-
ity again
st th
e federalism
 values th
e presum
ption
 prom
otes w
ill relia-
bly favor preem
ption
 in
 such
 cases.  W
h
ere th
e federal statute at issue 
is less sign
ifican
t on
 som
e m
easure, h
ow
ever, it m
igh
t be reason
able 
to presum
e th
at federalism
 values w
ill h
ave substan
tial w
eigh
t in
 th
e 
an
alysis, m
akin
g application
 of th
e presum
ption
 pragm
atically justifi-
able. 
T
h
e SPT
 view
 also poin
ts out a n
ew
 clarifyin
g solution
 to th
e 
com
m
on
 con
flation
 of th
e “preem
ption
” an
d “displacem
en
t” effects 
of preem
ption
 h
oldin
gs.  D
isplacem
en
t fin
ds at best con
testable justi-
fication
 in
 th
e Suprem
acy C
lause; but full displacem
en
t of destabiliz-
in
g state action
 is exactly w
h
at you w
ould expect from
 decision
 rules 
im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
.  T
h
e poten
tial for structural in
terferen
ce, after 
all, w
ill typically be a quality of th
e state law
 in
 all application
s, n
ot 
just its application
 to a particular set of facts.  A
n
d even
 if a gen
erally 
h
arm
less state law
 appears to th
reaten
 structural stability on
ly in
 on
e 
or a few
 particular application
s, courts could reason
ably opt for a 
proph
ylactic approach
 attach
in
g th
e displacem
en
t effect to every in
-
stan
ce of preem
ption
.  If courts occasion
ally m
oderate preem
ption
’s 
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effect to som
eth
in
g closer to th
e ch
oice-of-law
 m
odel, th
e SPT
 ac-
coun
t suggests th
at in
 th
ose in
stan
ces, th
e state law
’s gen
eral applica-
tion
 could be fairly clearly pron
oun
ced h
arm
less.  O
r, th
ose decision
s 
m
igh
t be explain
ed as im
plem
en
tin
g th
e Suprem
acy C
lause, w
h
ich
 
reads as a ch
oice-of-law
 rule, provided th
at th
e federal law
 at issue 
falls relatively clearly w
ith
in
 th
e C
lause’s lan
guage.  A
ll preem
ption
 
doctrin
es th
us m
ay im
plem
en
t SPT
 in
 a sen
se—
th
at is, SPT
 can
, if it 
form
s part of th
e n
orm
ative backgroun
d for preem
ption
 doctrin
e, fi-
n
ally justify th
e displacem
en
t effects.  It’s easy to view
 preem
ption
 as a 
decision
 rule th
at leverages a useful proxy—
th
e con
ten
t of positive 
federal law
—
to replace a h
arder in
quiry in
to state law
s’ effects on
 th
e 
con
stitution
al structure.  If all preem
ption
 doctrin
e is, in
 th
is sen
se, 
aim
ed at preven
tin
g state in
terferen
ce, th
en
 it’s a form
 of SPT
 im
-
plem
en
tation
.  T
h
e Suprem
acy C
lause precludes on
e particular form
 
of state in
terferen
ce, but th
ere are m
an
y oth
er w
ays states can
 un
-
derm
in
e th
e structure. 
 
T
h
e super-statute idea is sim
ply an
oth
er w
ay of ch
aracterizin
g 
w
h
at appears to be a judicial in
quiry in
to th
e im
portan
ce of eith
er 
th
e federal statute as a policy m
atter, th
e specificity of th
e federal in
-
terest in
 un
iform
ity or in
 th
e statute’s particular subject relative to 
oth
er regulatory subjects, or th
e sign
ifican
ce of th
e obstacle posed by 
state law
, balan
ced again
st th
e degree of state in
terest in
 th
e putative-
ly preem
pted law
.  A
 judicial fin
din
g th
at th
e statute im
plicates sign
if-
ican
t federal in
terests w
ill in
 m
ost cases em
ph
asize statutory ch
arac-
teristics th
at w
ould lead th
eorists to ch
aracterize it as a super-statute.  
A
n
d th
at fin
din
g (or th
e sch
olarly ch
aracterization
), on
 m
y view
, is in
 
turn
 a proxy for th
e th
reat to structural stability posed by state in
ter-
feren
ce.  T
h
us, th
e super-statute accoun
t fun
ction
s h
ere as little m
ore 
th
an
 a sim
plifyin
g explan
atory fram
ew
ork th
at w
e m
igh
t superim
pose 
on
 th
e typical an
alysis in
 obstacle preem
ption
 cases.  T
h
e case for ob-
stacle preem
ption
 doctrin
e im
plem
en
tin
g SPT
 does n
ot, in
 an
y sen
se, 
turn
 on
 th
e plausibility of th
e super-statute accoun
t. 
*
  *
  *
  *
  *
  * 
T
h
ese SPT
 exam
ples dem
on
strate th
e poten
tial fruitfuln
ess of 
con
structin
g explan
atory accoun
ts th
at ch
aracterize com
plex con
sti-
tution
al doctrin
e as predicated on
 n
orm
ative proposition
s th
at are 
sign
ifican
tly m
ore gen
eral an
d abstract th
an
 are th
ose proposed in
 
con
ven
tion
al accoun
ts, an
d th
at are th
us likely to be m
atters of sub-
stan
tial an
d durable con
sen
sus am
on
g legal officials an
d th
e public.  
N
ow
 suppose th
at such
 an
 accoun
t could be expan
ded, w
ith
 th
e addi-
tion
 of n
o m
ore th
an
 a h
an
dful of oth
er SPT
-like n
orm
s, to explain
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m
ost structural con
stitution
al doctrin
e. 144  In
 Parts II an
d III, I assum
e 
th
at such
 an
 accoun
t—
th
e SN
 accoun
t of structural con
stitution
al 
doctrin
e—
is possible an
d explore th
e im
plication
s; first developin
g a 
th
eoretical fram
ew
ork for assessin
g th
e m
erits of SN
 relative to con
-
ven
tion
al explan
atory accoun
ts an
d th
en
 arguin
g th
at pursuin
g ac-
coun
ts like SN
 m
ay advan
ce con
stitution
al th
eory by recon
cilin
g it 
w
ith
 legal positivism
 an
d m
ovin
g it past th
e preoccupation
 w
ith
 de-
bates about con
stitution
al in
terpretation
. 
Im
portan
tly, th
e claim
s th
at con
stitution
al n
orm
s can
 be iden
ti-
fied in
 th
is w
ay, an
d (as I argue in
 th
e n
ext Part) th
at th
e aptn
ess of 
such
 iden
tification
s can
 be evaluated by n
orm
atively in
ert criteria, do 
n
ot require th
e con
clusion
 th
at oth
er n
orm
ative criteria are in
appli-
cable to th
e n
orm
s.  It is n
ot, in
 oth
er w
ords, an
 argum
en
t in
 favor of 
th
e n
orm
s’ m
oral validity, th
eir com
patibility w
ith
 dem
ocracy, or 
th
eir com
patibility w
ith
 con
ven
tion
al rule-of-law
 values. 145  T
h
ose de-
bates can
—
an
d sh
ould!—
still be h
ad, th
ey are just n
ot th
e debates 
th
at I take up h
ere. 146  In
stead, m
y argum
en
t is in
 favor of th
ese 
n
orm
s’ legal validity—
th
at is, th
eir status as legal n
orm
s qua legal.  So, 
too, m
y approach
 to iden
tifyin
g certain
 con
stitution
al n
orm
s does n
ot 
en
tail or im
ply an
y th
eory of adjudication
.  In
deed, th
e un
derlyin
g 
distin
ction
 betw
een
 con
stitution
al operative proposition
s an
d con
sti-
tution
al decision
 rules, 147 an
d to corollary observation
 th
at decision
 
rules are in
fluen
ced by in
strum
en
tal as w
ell as legal con
sideration
s, 148 
h
igh
ligh
ts th
e possibility th
at m
ultiple categories of n
on
-legal reason
s 
m
igh
t be legitim
ately relied on
 by courts in
 con
stitution
al adjudica-
tion
.  O
n
e m
igh
t respon
d to th
is view
 by adoptin
g a th
eory of adjudi-
cation
 th
at in
structs courts to prioritize or deprioritize deep con
sen
-
sus n
orm
s, but an
y reason
 to do so—
even
 if it is som
e reason
 directly 
related to th
e fact th
at th
ey are m
atters of deep con
sen
sus (such
 as, 
for exam
ple, an
 argum
en
t th
at deep con
sen
sus is m
ore con
sisten
t 
w
ith
 dem
ocratic values th
an
, say, origin
al in
ten
t as a criteria of legal 
 144 
I am
 leavin
g th
e righ
ts side of con
stitution
al doctrin
e an
d practice aside for n
ow
.  W
h
ile I 
believe th
at sim
ilar recon
ceptualization
s of con
stitution
al righ
ts doctrin
es are possible, 
th
ey w
ill be h
arder, m
ore con
troversial, an
d perh
aps less useful on
 th
e righ
ts side.  T
h
e 
structural focus seem
s prelim
in
arily m
ore fruitful, sin
ce th
ere are very few
 specific struc-
tural proh
ibition
s in
 th
e con
stitution
al text. 
145 
B
ut cf. R
ich
ard H
. Fallon
, Jr., L
egitim
acy and the C
onstitution, 118 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. 1787, 1803–
06 (2005) (arguin
g th
at sociological acceptan
ce of con
stitution
al n
orm
s supports th
eir 
m
oral legitim
acy). 
146 
Joh
n
 G
ardn
er, L
egal Positivism
:  5 1/2 M
yths, 46
 A
M
. J. JU
R
IS. 199, 209–10 (2001) (“A
gree-
in
g th
at a n
orm
 is legally valid is n
ot in
com
patible w
ith
 h
oldin
g th
at it is en
tirely w
orth
less 
. . . .”). 
147 
See supra n
otes 10–24 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
148 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 504. 
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validity) is an
alytically distin
ct from
 th
e reason
s I offer for th
in
kin
g 
th
at th
ese n
orm
s are, in
 fact, valid con
stitution
al n
orm
s of our sys-
tem
. 149 
II.  E
V
A
L
U
A
T
IN
G
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 T
H
E
O
R
Y C
L
A
IM
S 
T
h
is kin
d of explan
atory accoun
t of con
stitution
al doctrin
e raises 
a n
um
ber of secon
d-order question
s.  In
 th
is Part I address question
s 
of th
eory classification
 an
d evaluation
.  T
h
ere are m
ultiple com
petin
g 
con
stitution
al th
eories an
d th
ere is room
 for debate about h
ow
 w
e 
sh
ould categorize th
eir various th
eses.  T
w
o im
portan
t question
s th
at 
bear directly on
 th
is project are (1) h
ow
—
by w
h
at criteria—
sh
ould 
w
e assess com
petin
g con
stitution
al th
eories an
d, relatedly, (2) are 
th
ere categories of con
stitution
al th
eories th
at sh
ould be subjected to 
differen
t sets of evaluative criteria?  B
oth
 question
s arise from
 an
 
even
 m
ore basic on
e—
“w
h
ich
 th
eory is best?”
150  T
o address th
ese 
question
s, I first propose a rough
 taxon
om
y of con
stitution
al th
eo-
ries—
divided in
to th
eories of law
 an
d th
eories of adjudication
, follow
-
in
g th
e tradition
al distin
ction
 in
 jurispruden
ce; 151 an
d in
to positive 
an
d n
orm
ative th
eories follow
in
g th
e con
ven
tion
 of m
ost disciplin
es.  
T
h
ese distin
ction
s illum
in
ate th
e difficult question
 of h
ow
 w
e sh
ould 
evaluate com
petin
g th
eories of various kin
ds.  I argue th
at w
h
ile th
e 
con
ven
tion
al w
ay of assessin
g a con
stitution
al th
eory, w
h
ich
 in
volves 
n
orm
ative criteria of political m
orality an
d th
e like, is apt for th
eories 
of adjudication
, but problem
atic for positive th
eories of law
. 152  T
h
eo-
ries of law
 sh
ould be evaluated accordin
g to criteria th
at h
elp us 
ch
oose betw
een
 com
petin
g claim
s about w
h
at is th
e case.  A
ccordin
g-
ly, I propose a set of evaluative criteria for positive con
stitution
al th
e-
 149 
See G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 146, at 211–12. 
150 
Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 540. 
151 
See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 552 (n
otin
g th
is distin
ction
’s com
m
on
ality in
 juris-
pruden
ce); see also S
C
O
T
T
 J. S
H
A
PIR
O
, L
E
G
A
L
IT
Y 247–48 (2011) (sam
e).  N
o categorization
 
is airtigh
t.  See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra, at 553–54 (arguin
g th
at “n
ew
 origin
alism
” advan
ces 
claim
s belon
gin
g to both
 a th
eory of law
 an
d a th
eory of adjudication
); Fallon
, supra n
ote 
14, at 544–45 (n
otin
g th
at categorizin
g con
stitution
al th
eories is n
ot to “defin
e polar op-
posites so m
uch
 as region
s alon
g a con
tin
uum
”).  T
h
e test of a con
ceptual distin
ction
 is 
its utility.  C
f. M
itch
ell N
. B
erm
an
, C
onstitutional C
onstructions and C
onstitutional D
ecision 
R
ules:  T
houghts on the C
arving of Im
plem
entation Space, 27 C
O
N
ST. C
O
M
M
. 39, 45–47 (2010) 
(rejectin
g certain
 argum
en
ts th
at could be m
ade to defen
d th
e “tw
o output th
esis” be-
cause th
ey w
ould result in
 den
yin
g its utility). 
152 
See, e.g., Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 538 (arguin
g gen
erally th
at th
e criteria for selectin
g 
am
on
g com
petin
g con
stitution
al th
eories “m
ust reflect a judgm
en
t about w
h
ich
 th
eory 
w
ould yield th
e best outcom
es, as m
easured again
st relevan
t criteria”). 
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ory-of-law
 claim
s th
at tracks th
e dom
in
an
t view
s about th
eory assess-
m
en
t an
d selection
 in
 jurispruden
ce an
d th
e ph
ilosoph
y of scien
ce. 153 
T
h
is taxon
om
y m
akes clear th
at th
e view
 I am
 defen
din
g h
ere is a 
th
eory-of-law
 th
esis w
h
ose com
patibility w
ith
 legal positivism
 is an
oth
-
er of its th
eoretical virtues.  I explore th
is in
 Part III.A
.  A
n
d in
 Part 
III.B
, I argue th
at a con
stitution
al th
eory of law
 of th
is kin
d can
 h
elp 
us avoid th
e im
plication
s of th
e in
escapably n
orm
ative an
d seem
in
gly 
un
resolvable con
test am
on
g propon
en
ts of com
petin
g th
eories of 
con
stitution
al in
terpretation
. 
A
.  C
onstitutional T
heory T
axonom
y 
C
on
stitution
al th
eories are m
an
y an
d varied. 154  For our purposes, 
it is m
ost useful to first distin
guish
 theories of law
 from
 theories of adjudi-
cation. 155  B
y a th
eory of law
, I m
ean
 an
 accoun
t of th
e con
ten
t of th
e 
law
—
th
at is, an
 accoun
t th
at an
sw
ers th
e question
 “w
h
at is th
e law
” in
 
jurisdiction
 X
 or w
h
y is it th
e case th
at is a legal n
orm
 an
d n
ot som
e 
oth
er kin
d of n
orm
 (a m
oral rule, a rule of etiquette, etc.). 156  B
ecause 
law
 is a socially con
structed artifact of h
um
an
 practice, 157 n
ot a n
atural 
kin
d w
ith
 a “distin
ctive m
icro-con
stitution
[ ]”—
w
ater or gold, for ex-
am
ple, h
ave distin
ctive m
olecular structures by w
h
ich
 w
e can
 distin
-
guish
 th
em
 from
 oth
er n
atural ph
en
om
en
a
158—
it is difficult to give an
 
 153 
A
ccord L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1239 (borrow
in
g from
 th
is literature to assess legal th
eory 
claim
s). 
154 
For a broad sam
plin
g of th
e larger w
orks, see gen
erally L
arry A
lexan
der, C
onstitutional 
T
heories:  A
 T
axonom
y and (Im
plicit) C
ritique (M
adison
 L
ecture), U
n
iv. of San
 D
iego Sch
. of 
L
aw
 
L
egal 
Studies 
R
esearch
 
Paper 
Series, 
Paper 
N
o. 
13-120 
(Jun
e 
2013), 
h
ttp://ssrn
.com
/abstract=2277790 (last view
ed Jan
. 31, 2014). 
155 
See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 550–52 (explorin
g th
is distin
ction
); see also M
ich
ael 
Steven
 G
reen
, L
egal R
ealism
 as T
heory of L
aw
, 46 W
M
. &
 M
A
R
Y L
. R
E
V. 1915, 1917–18 (2005) 
(distin
guish
in
g th
eories of law
 from
 th
eories of adjudication
); L
eiter, supra n
ote 8, at 
866–67 (categorizin
g jurispruden
tial claim
s on
 th
is dim
en
sion
 an
d discussin
g at len
gth
 
w
h
y th
e distin
ction
 m
atters). 
156 
See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 550 (n
otin
g th
at th
eories of in
terpretation
 m
ust “pre-
suppose an
 accoun
t of w
h
at th
e law
 is or con
sists of”); id. at 552 (defin
in
g th
eories of law
 
as “th
eories of th
e ultim
ate criteria of legal validity, or of th
e ultim
ate determ
in
an
ts of le-
gal con
ten
t—
i.e., th
eories regardin
g w
h
at it is th
at gives th
e law
 in
 an
y given
 jurisdiction
 
th
e con
ten
t th
at it h
as”). 
157 
L
an
glin
ais &
 L
eiter, supra n
ote 13, at 5; see also L
eslie G
reen
, T
he C
oncept of L
aw
 R
evisited, 
94 M
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 1687, 1691 (1996) (review
in
g H
.L
.A
. H
A
R
T, T
H
E
 C
O
N
C
E
PT
 O
F L
A
W
 (2d. 
ed. 1994)) (“A
ccordin
g to [H
art], th
at th
ere is law
 at all follow
s w
h
olly from
 th
e devel-
opm
en
t of h
um
an
 society, a developm
en
t th
at is in
telligible to us, an
d th
e con
ten
t of par-
ticular legal system
s is a con
sequen
ce of w
h
at people in
 h
istory h
ave said an
d don
e.”). 
158 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 4 (con
trastin
g “n
atural kin
ds” an
d “h
um
an
 artifacts” by sh
ow
in
g 
th
at n
atural kin
ds h
ave in
h
eren
t ch
aracteristics, w
h
ile h
um
an
 artifacts “can
 be m
ade of 
alm
ost an
yth
in
g”); see also B
rian
 L
eiter, T
he D
em
arcation Problem
 in Jurisprudence:  A
 N
ew
 
C
ase for Skepticism
, 31 O
X
FO
R
D
 J. O
F L
E
G
A
L
 S
T
U
D
IE
S 663, 666–67 (2011) [h
erein
after D
e-
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accoun
t of th
e n
ecessary or essen
tial con
dition
s th
at m
ust be presen
t 
in
 order to be a proposition
 of law
. 159  A
m
on
g oth
er problem
s, th
e 
con
dition
s un
der w
h
ich
 th
e proposition
 w
ill in
 fact be a proposition
 
of law
 w
ill vary by jurisdiction
 an
d, perh
aps, by area of legal practice 
w
ith
in
 a given
 jurisdiction
. 160  A
ccordin
gly, th
e focus of th
eories of law
 
is on
 th
e criteria of legal validity—
th
e con
dition
s un
der w
h
ich
 Θ
 w
ill 
be a proposition
 of law
 an
d n
ot som
eth
in
g else—
th
at obtain
 w
ith
in
 a 
jurisdiction
 Y. 161  O
r, m
ore am
bitiously, som
e th
eorists aim
 for a gen
-
eral th
eory of law
 th
at tells us som
eth
in
g gen
erally true about criteria 
of legal validity, an
d th
us about th
e con
ten
t of th
e law
, in
 every juris-
diction
.  C
laim
s belon
gin
g to th
eories of law
 ten
d to take th
e follow
-
in
g form
: 
Proposition
s w
h
ose con
ten
t satisfies con
dition
s α an
d φ are proposition
s 
of law
 in
 jurisdiction
 Y. 
T
h
e prim
ary con
tribution
 of th
eories of law
 is to describe, an
d th
ere-
by illum
in
ate, th
e criteria of legal validity—
con
dition
s X
 an
d Z
. 
Professors M
itch
ell B
erm
an
 an
d K
evin
 T
oh
 ch
aracterize som
e 
“n
ew
” origin
alist claim
s as belon
gin
g to a th
eory of law
162—
for exam
-
ple, Steven
 C
alabresi an
d Sai Prakash
’s claim
 th
at “[o]rigin
alists do 
n
ot give priority to th
e plain
 diction
ary m
ean
in
g of th
e C
on
stitution
’s 
text because th
ey like gram
m
ar m
ore th
an
 h
istory.  T
h
ey give priority 
to it because th
ey believe th
at it an
d it alon
e is law
.”
163  O
n
 th
is view
, 
“in
sofar as judges sh
ould follow
 or en
force som
e fixed origin
al aspect 
of th
e con
stitution
al text, th
ey sh
ould do so because th
at fixed as-
 
m
arcation] (distin
guish
in
g law
 as an
 artifact th
at “can
n
ot be in
dividuated by [its] n
atural 
properties,” in
 con
trast w
ith
 “n
atural ph
en
om
en
a like ‘w
ater,’ w
h
ich
 just is H
20”). 
159 
See L
an
glin
ais &
 L
eiter, supra n
ote 13, at 5–7, 9 (ch
aracterizin
g law
 as socially con
struct-
ed); L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 4–9 (con
siderin
g an
d rejectin
g th
e idea th
at an
 artifact’s es-
sen
tial or n
ecessary con
dition
s m
ay con
sist in
 som
e description
 of th
eir fun
ction
s (be-
cause fun
ction
s are variable accordin
g to th
e observer’s in
ten
tion
s, etc.) or th
e in
ten
tion
s 
of th
eir creators (sin
ce law
, on
 th
e positivist accoun
t, n
eeds n
o creator or, w
h
ere it h
as a 
creator, n
eeds n
o creator in
ten
tion
s to be law
)). 
160 
E
. Ph
ilip Soper, L
egal T
heory and the O
bligation of a Judge:  T
he H
art/D
w
orkin D
ispute, 75 
M
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 473, 487 (1977) (distin
guish
in
g “th
e verbal form
ulation
 of a stan
dard” from
 
“th
e stan
dard’s purpose” an
d con
tem
platin
g w
h
ich
 is actually th
e law
); Jules L
. C
olem
an
 
&
 B
rian
 L
eiter, L
egal Positivism
, in A
 C
O
M
PA
N
IO
N
 T
O
 P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y O
F L
A
W
 A
N
D
 L
E
G
A
L
 
P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y 228, at 237 (D
en
n
is Patterson
 ed., 1996) (n
otin
g th
at th
e con
ten
t of rules of 
recogn
ition
 m
ay an
d alm
ost certain
ly do vary from
 on
e legal system
 to an
oth
er). 
161 
B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 552 (em
ph
asizin
g th
e cen
trality of criteria of legal validity 
to th
eories of law
); L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 2 (ch
aracterizin
g legal positivism
, a gen
eral 
th
eory of law
, as “a view
 th
at explain
s th
e crucial question
 th
at arises about law
:  n
am
ely, 
h
ow
 do w
e determ
in
e w
h
ich
 n
orm
s in
 an
y society are n
orm
s of th
e legal system
, th
at is, 
n
orm
s th
at are ‘legally valid’”). 
162 
See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 558–59 (n
otin
g certain
 origin
alist claim
s in
 w
h
ich
 
“origin
alism
 clearly serves as a th
eory of law
”). 
163 
C
alabresi &
 Prakash
, supra n
ote 15, at 552. 
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pect—
‘th
e plain
 diction
ary m
ean
in
g’ in
 [C
alabresi an
d Prakash
’s 
form
ulation
]—
is th
e law
.”
164  Perh
aps th
e m
ost fam
ous gen
eral th
eory 
of law
 is th
e positivist accoun
t th
at H
.L
.A
. H
art articulated in
 h
is sem
-
in
al w
ork T
he C
oncept of L
aw
. 165  I set out H
art’s core claim
s in
 m
ore 
detail in
 th
e n
ext Part; for n
ow
, sum
m
arizin
g H
art’s core th
esis is 
en
ough
 to sh
ow
 th
at h
is is a th
eory of law
—
viz.: 166 
In
 an
y legal system
, th
e legal valid
ity of an
y given
 n
orm
 depen
ds on
 
w
h
eth
er it com
ports w
ith
 criteria of legal th
at a con
sen
sus of th
e system
’s 
legal officials accept as obligatory. 167 
T
h
is is aptly called H
art’s “social fact” or “con
ven
tion
ality” th
esis be-
cause th
e operative criteria of legal validity in
 an
y system
, w
h
ich
 con
-
stitutes th
at system
’s ultim
ate “R
ule of R
ecogn
ition
” in
 H
art’s term
s, 
m
ay be iden
tified by pattern
s of con
vergen
t official practice suggest-
in
g criteria th
at are accepted by broad con
sen
sus as obligatory. 168  
H
art ch
aracterized h
is view
 as on
e of “descriptive” sociology
169—
h
e 
sough
t to give a gen
eral accoun
t of law
 on
 w
h
ich
 th
e con
cept of law
 is 
exh
austed by facts about th
e practices of participan
ts in
 m
un
icipal le-
gal system
s. 170 
C
on
trast th
eories of law
 w
ith
 th
eories of adjudication, w
h
ich
 de-
scribe or prescribe h
ow
 officials—
usually judges—
do or sh
ould re-
solve disputes un
der law
. 171  T
h
e A
m
erican
 L
egal R
ealists’ th
eory of 
adjudication
, developed in
 th
e first part of th
e T
w
en
tieth
 C
en
tury, 
w
as th
at “judges respon
d prim
arily to th
e facts of th
e case” such
 th
at 
legal reason
s h
ave less to do w
ith
 causin
g judicial outcom
es th
an
 w
as 
 164 
B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 559 (em
ph
asis added). 
165 
See H
A
R
T, supra n
ote
 16, at vi (describin
g h
is goal for th
e book as “furth
er[in
g] th
e un
der-
stan
din
g of law
, coercion
, an
d m
orality as differen
t but related social ph
en
om
en
a”). 
166 
See also L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 3 (listin
g th
is as on
e of positivism
’s core claim
s). 
167 
See H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 32, 94–95, 100–10.  R
az argues th
at legal system
s can
 h
ave 
m
ore th
an
 on
e rule of recogn
ition
, an
d th
at on
ly th
e “ultim
ate” rule of recogn
ition
 n
eed 
be a social rule.  JO
SE
PH
 R
A
Z, T
he Identity of L
egal System
s, in T
H
E
 A
U
T
H
O
R
IT
Y O
F L
A
W
 78, 
95–96 (1979); see also infra n
ote 267 (discussin
g positivism
’s oth
er core claim
, th
e “source 
th
esis”). 
168 
H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 92. 
169 
Id. at 240. 
170 
See L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 9–11 (discussin
g positivism
’s objectives). 
171 
B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 552 (explain
in
g th
at th
eories of law
 “are th
eories of th
e 
ultim
ate criteria of legal validity,” w
h
ile th
eories of con
stitution
al adjudication
 “are th
eo-
ries of w
h
at judges sh
ould do in
 a course of resolvin
g legal disputes”); B
rian
 L
eiter, Posi-
tivism
, Form
alism
, R
ealism
, 99 C
O
L
U
M
. L
. R
E
V. 1138, 1144 (1999) (review
in
g A
N
T
H
O
N
Y 
S
E
B
O
K, L
E
G
A
L
 P
O
SIT
IV
ISM
 IN
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
N
 JU
R
ISPR
U
D
E
N
C
E (1998)) (“W
h
ereas positivism
 is a 
theory of law
, form
alism
 is a theory of adjudication, a th
eory about h
ow
 judges actually do de-
cide cases an
d/or a th
eory about h
ow
 th
ey ought to decide th
em
.”). 
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con
ven
tion
ally assum
ed. 172  Political an
d legal th
eorists in
volved in
 
m
odern
 projects like th
e con
struction
 of th
e attitudin
al m
odel of 
judgin
g th
at m
easures th
e exten
t to w
h
ich
 judicial decision
s can
 be 
predicted accordin
g to observable proxies for th
e judges’ political 
lean
in
gs. 173  N
orm
ative th
eories of adjudication
 are m
ore com
m
on
—
tw
o w
ell-recogn
ized exam
ples are R
on
ald D
w
orkin
’s view
 th
at judges 
sh
ould en
gage in
 “con
structive in
terpretation
,” ren
derin
g decision
s 
th
at both
 fit existin
g legal m
aterials an
d ren
der th
em
 m
orally justifia-
ble; 174 
an
d 
Joh
n
 
H
art 
E
ly’s 
view
 
th
at 
con
stitution
al 
adjudication
 
sh
ould focus on
 sh
orin
g up failin
gs of th
e political process so th
at th
e 
latter can
 do th
e lion
’s sh
are of th
e govern
in
g. 175 
A
 th
eory of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
 is a particular kin
d of 
th
eory of adjudication
—
a sort of “th
eory of legal or con
stitution
al 
epistem
ology” th
at “aim
[s] to give guidan
ce regardin
g h
ow
 to con
-
duct a particular in
quiry” to discover th
e legally effective m
ean
in
g of 
th
e 
con
stitution
al 
law
 
applicable 
to 
som
e 
dispute. 176 
 
C
lassical 
origin
alism
, for exam
ple, in
structs courts h
ow
 to go about determ
in
-
in
g w
h
at th
e auth
ors of con
stitution
al provision
s in
ten
ded to say; 177 
th
eir backgroun
d assum
ption
 about th
e con
ten
t of law
 bein
g th
at th
e 
con
ten
t of “th
e con
stitution
al law
 in
 a case of first judicial im
pression
 
is fully determ
in
ed by w
h
at th
e auth
ors of th
e con
stitution
al text in
-
 172 
See 
B
R
IA
N
 
L
E
IT
E
R, 
R
ethinking 
L
egal 
R
ealism
: 
 
T
ow
ard 
a 
N
aturalized 
Jurisprudence, 
in 
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 JU
R
ISPR
U
D
E
N
C
E:  E
SSA
YS O
N
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
N
 L
E
G
A
L
 R
E
A
L
ISM
 A
N
D
 N
A
T
U
R
A
L
ISM
 IN
 
L
E
G
A
L
 P
H
IL
O
SO
P
H
Y 15, 21–25 (2007). 
173 
See L
eiter, supra n
ote 8, at 873–74 (ch
aracterizin
g th
e attitudin
al m
odel a positive th
eory 
of adjudication
).  See generally L
E
E
 E
PST
E
IN
 &
 JA
C
K
 K
N
IG
H
T, T
H
E
 C
H
O
IC
E
S JU
D
G
E
S M
A
K
E
 
(1998) (n
otin
g 
th
e lim
ited in
fluen
ce 
of strategic accoun
ts 
of th
e C
ourt’s decision
-
m
akin
g); 
JE
FFR
E
Y 
A
. 
S
E
G
A
L
 
&
 
H
A
R
O
L
D
 
S
PA
E
T
H
, 
T
H
E
 
S
U
PR
E
M
E
 
C
O
U
R
T
 
A
N
D
 
T
H
E
 
A
T
T
IT
U
D
IN
A
L
 M
O
D
E
L (1993) (usin
g th
e scien
tific m
odel to an
alyze th
e Suprem
e C
ourt).  
174 
D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, ch
. 10; L
eiter, supra n
ote 8, at 876 (ch
aracterizin
g D
w
orkin
’s 
con
structive in
terpretation
 as a theory of adjudication—
“[a]lth
ough
 D
w
orkin
 claim
s to be 
describin
g w
h
at judges actually do—
‘th
e h
idden
 structure of th
eir judgm
en
ts,’ as h
e 
says—
h
is th
eory is quite explicitly driven
 by a n
orm
ative vision
 . . . . [U
]n
less judges are 
decidin
g cases on
 th
e D
w
orkin
ian
 m
eth
od of con
structive in
terpretation
, th
eir decision
s 
could n
ot supply a m
oral justification
 for coercin
g th
e losin
g party before th
e court”). 
175 
See JO
H
N
 H
A
R
T
 E
L
Y, D
E
M
O
C
R
A
C
Y A
N
D
 D
IST
R
U
ST 87 (1980). 
176 
See B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 550–52.  It is w
orth
 n
otin
g th
e distin
ction
 betw
een
 th
e 
sem
an
tic an
d legal m
ean
in
g of a text, w
h
ich
 is of som
e im
portan
ce in
 in
tern
ecin
e debates 
am
on
g origin
alists.  M
ost ackn
ow
ledge th
at legal m
ean
in
g m
ay n
ot be iden
tical w
ith
 se-
m
an
tic m
ean
in
g; see id. at 548–49 (discussin
g th
is distin
ction
 an
d “th
e ten
den
cy of legal 
th
eorists to con
flate sem
an
tic facts w
ith
 legal facts”). 
177 
See, e.g., H
om
e B
ldg. &
 L
oan
 A
ss’n
 v. B
laisdell, 290 U
.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Suth
erlan
d, J., 
dissen
tin
g) (arguin
g th
at th
e goal of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
 is to “discover th
e 
m
ean
in
g, to ascertain
 an
d give effect to th
e in
ten
t of its fram
ers an
d th
e people w
h
o 
adopted [th
e C
on
stitution
]”). 
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ten
ded to say.”
178  T
h
is is distin
ct from
 a th
eory of law
—
to in
struct 
courts h
ow
 to discover th
e proper legal m
ean
in
g of th
e govern
in
g law
 
presupposes “an
 accoun
t of w
h
at th
e law
 is or con
sists of”—
as it m
ust, 
in
 order to guide courts tow
ard th
e proper legal m
ean
in
g of th
e con
-
stitution
al law
 an
d n
ot som
e oth
er set of n
orm
s. 179  Som
e th
eories of 
in
terpretation
 arguably n
ow
 in
clude, alon
gside th
eir epistem
ological 
guidan
ce, “th
eory of law
” claim
s—
as w
ith
 N
ew
 O
rigin
alism
 m
en
-
tion
ed above
180—
but w
h
ile th
ey m
ay be loosely grouped un
der th
e 
sam
e h
eadin
g for h
an
gin
g togeth
er as a m
ore or less th
em
atically re-
lated set of view
s, th
ese kin
ds of claim
s are con
ceptually distin
ct. 181  
T
h
e tw
o-output th
esis, 182 for exam
ple, belon
gs to a th
eory of adjudica-
tion
 but n
ot to a th
eory of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
; th
e process 
of gen
eratin
g con
stitution
al operative proposition
s m
ay but n
eed n
ot 
in
volve th
e application
 of a th
eory of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
, 183 
an
d th
e form
ulation
 of con
stitution
al decision
 rules in
volves a dis-
tin
ct operation
, w
h
ich
 h
as com
e to be called con
stitution
al “con
struc-
tion
.”
184 
A
 secon
d im
portan
t distin
ction
 is betw
een
 positive an
d n
orm
ative 
th
eoretical claim
s.  Positive th
eories aim
 to explain
 or reveal w
h
at is 
th
e case in
 th
e actual w
orld; prescriptive th
eories aim
 to dem
on
strate 
th
at som
e set of facts or som
e con
dition
 sh
ould be th
e case or w
ould 
be th
e case in
 som
e possible w
orld th
at is m
ore desirable th
an
 th
e ac-
tual w
orld.  H
art’s th
eory of law
 is positive—
“[i]t does n
ot provide 
 178 
B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 6, at 551. 
179 
Id. at 550. 
180 
See supra n
otes 162–64 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
181 
B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, supra n
ote 151, at 553.  O
n
 “n
ew
” origin
alism
, see gen
erally K
E
IT
H
 E
. 
W
H
IT
T
IN
G
T
O
N
, C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 IN
T
E
R
P
R
E
T
A
T
IO
N
:  T
E
X
T
U
A
L
 M
E
A
N
IN
G
, O
R
IG
IN
A
L
 IN
T
E
N
T, 
A
N
D
 JU
D
IC
IA
L
 R
E
V
IE
W
 (1999); M
itch
ell B
erm
an
, O
riginalism
 Is B
unk, 84 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 1 
(2009); D
an
iel A
. Farber, T
he O
riginalism
 D
ebate:  A
 G
uide for the Perplexed, 49 O
H
IO
 S
T. L
.J. 
1085 (1989); L
aw
ren
ce B
. Solum
, D
istrict of C
olum
bia v. H
eller and O
riginalism
, 103 N
W
. 
U
. L
. R
E
V. 923, 944 (2009). 
182 
See supra n
otes 10–24 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text; see also B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 21, at 221 (label-
in
g th
is claim
 th
e “tw
o output th
esis”). 
183 
See B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 10, at 57–58 &
 n
.192 (em
ph
asizin
g th
at th
e tw
o-output th
esis pre-
supposes n
o particular th
eory of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
); see also B
erm
an
 &
 T
oh
, 
supra n
ote 6, at 553 (n
otin
g th
at n
ew
 origin
alists h
ave latch
ed on
 to con
stitution
al deci-
sion
 rules but th
at advan
cin
g th
e tw
o output th
esis does n
ot com
m
it on
e to origin
alism
). 
184 
B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 151 (can
vassin
g uses of th
e term
 “con
stitution
al con
struction
” an
d 
con
cludin
g th
at it in
creasin
gly refers to decision
 rule form
ulation
); see also R
an
dy E
. B
ar-
n
ett, Interpretation and C
onstruction, 34 H
A
R
V. J.L
. &
 P
U
B. P
O
L’Y 65, 66 (2011) (adoptin
g 
th
e n
otion
 of con
struction
); L
aw
ren
ce B
. Solum
, O
riginalism
 and C
onstitutional C
onstruc-
tion, 82 F
O
R
D
H
A
M
 L
. R
E
V. 453, 490–92 (2013) (discussin
g origin
alists’ view
 of con
stitu-
tion
al con
struction
 in
 relation
 to B
erm
an
’s n
otion
 of decision
 rules); K
eith
 E
. W
h
ittin
g-
ton
, C
onstructing a N
ew
 A
m
erican C
onstitution, 27 C
O
N
ST. C
O
M
M
E
N
T. 119, 120–21 (2010) 
(describin
g con
stitution
al con
struction
). 
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an
y guidan
ce at all on
 w
h
at an
yon
e sh
ould do about an
yth
in
g on
 an
y 
occasion
.”
185  M
oralistic th
eories of law
—
e.g., n
atural law
 th
eories like 
th
at of Joh
n
 Fin
n
is
186—
are n
orm
ative in
sofar as th
ey claim
 th
at w
e can
 
iden
tify w
h
at th
e law
 actually is on
ly by evaluatin
g putative legal 
proposition
s on
 som
e m
oral criterion
.  M
ost th
eories of adjudication
 
are n
orm
ative—
alth
ough
 th
ere are som
e n
otable exception
s such
 as 
th
e positive claim
s of th
e A
m
erican
 L
egal R
ealists an
d, m
ore recen
tly, 
th
e attitudin
al m
odelers
187—
but n
ot all n
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eo-
ries are exclusively th
eories of adjudication
.  Som
e also m
ake claim
s 
belon
gin
g to a th
eory of law
, such
 as th
e origin
alist claim
 m
en
tion
ed 
above; 188 
E
rn
est 
Youn
g’s 
con
ten
tion
 
th
at 
som
e 
statutes 
gain
 
(or 
sh
ould be said to gain
) con
stitution
al status w
h
en
 th
ey disch
arge con
-
stitution
al fun
ction
s; 189 or popular con
stitution
alist claim
s th
at con
sti-
tution
al law
 correspon
ds in
 som
e w
ay w
ith
 public view
s. 190 
T
h
e State Preclusion
 T
h
esis accoun
t an
d Skeletal N
orm
s depen
d 
on
 th
e tw
o-output th
esis as a positive claim
 about con
stitution
al adju-
dication
, but m
y cen
tral claim
 is th
at w
e sh
ould con
sider w
h
eth
er pat-
tern
s of con
vergen
t official practice in
 con
stitution
al m
atters are evi-
den
ce of th
e n
orm
s th
at are valid con
stitution
al n
orm
s in
 our system
, 
an
d perh
aps of part of th
e con
ten
t of our rule of recogn
ition
.  T
h
is 
claim
 belon
gs to a positive th
eory of law
; th
us in
 discussin
g criteria 
for evaluatin
g con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s, I w
ill focus on
 developin
g 
evaluative criteria th
at w
ill be useful for assessin
g claim
s of th
is sort. 
 185 
G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 146, at 202 (ch
aracterizin
g legal positivism
’s core claim
 as “n
orm
a-
tively in
ert”). 
186 
See JO
H
N
 F
IN
N
IS, N
A
T
U
R
A
L
 L
A
W
 A
N
D
 N
A
T
U
R
A
L
 R
IG
H
T
S (2d ed. 2011) (in
troducin
g eth
ics, 
political ph
ilosoph
y, an
d jurispruden
ce). 
187 
O
n
 th
e R
ealists, see B
R
IA
N
 L
E
IT
E
R, R
ethinking L
egal R
ealism
:  T
ow
ard a N
aturalized Jurispru-
dence, 
in 
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
IZ
IN
G
 JU
R
ISPR
U
D
E
N
C
E: 
 E
SSA
YS 
O
N
 A
M
E
R
IC
A
N
 L
E
G
A
L
 R
E
A
L
ISM
 
A
N
D
 
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
ISM
 IN
 L
E
G
A
L
 P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y 15, 23 (2007) (describin
g th
e A
m
erican
 L
egal R
eal-
ists’ “core claim
”—
th
at “judges respon
d prim
arily to th
e stim
ulus of th
e facts of th
e case” 
in
 decidin
g outcom
es—
as a positive, social scien
tific th
esis about adjudication
).  For ex-
am
ples of m
odern
 positive th
eories of adjudication
, see F
R
A
N
K
 B
. C
R
O
SS, D
E
C
ISIO
N
 
M
A
K
IN
G
 IN
 T
H
E
 U
.S. C
O
U
R
T
S O
F A
P
PE
A
L
S 3–4 (2007) (surveyin
g m
odern
 em
pirical w
ork on
 
th
e real causes of judicial decision
s); S
E
G
A
L
 &
 S
PA
E
T
H
, supra n
ote 173, at 123 (eviden
cin
g 
th
e proposition
 th
at judicial decision
s are better explain
ed an
d predicted by rough
 prox-
ies for judges’ political attitudes th
an
 an
alysis of th
e legal reason
s at issue in
 th
e cases). 
188 
See supra n
otes 162–64 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
189 
See Youn
g, supra n
ote 142, at 416. 
190 
See, 
e.g., 
B
A
R
R
Y F
R
IE
D
M
A
N
, 
T
H
E
 W
IL
L
 
O
F 
T
H
E
 P
E
O
PL
E: 
 H
O
W
 P
U
B
L
IC
 O
PIN
IO
N
 H
A
S 
IN
FL
U
E
N
C
E
D
 T
H
E
 S
U
PR
E
M
E
 C
O
U
R
T
 A
N
D
 S
H
A
PE
D
 T
H
E
 M
E
A
N
IN
G
 O
F T
H
E
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 367–
68 (2009); L
A
R
R
Y D
. K
R
A
M
E
R, T
H
E
 P
E
O
PL
E
 T
H
E
M
SE
L
V
E
S:  P
O
PU
L
A
R
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
ISM
 
A
N
D
 JU
D
IC
IA
L
 R
E
V
IE
W
 7–8 (2004); M
A
R
K
 T
U
SH
N
E
T, T
A
K
IN
G
 T
H
E
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 A
W
A
Y FR
O
M
 
T
H
E
 C
O
U
R
T
S 181–82 (1999). 
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B
.  C
riteria for T
heory Evaluation 
C
on
stitution
al th
eory does n
ot h
ave m
uch
 of a literature on
 th
eo-
ry assessm
en
t, 191 an
d w
h
at th
ere is prim
arily proposes assessin
g com
-
petin
g th
eories accordin
g to values th
at are at stake in
 con
stitution
al 
debates.  R
ich
ard Fallon
, for exam
ple, argues th
at “th
e ch
oice am
on
g 
th
eories sh
ould be based on
 w
h
ich
 th
eory w
ill best advan
ce sh
ared, 
th
ough
 vague an
d som
etim
es com
petin
g, goals of:  (1) satisfyin
g th
e 
requirem
en
ts of th
e rule of law
, (2) preservin
g fair opportun
ity for 
m
ajority rule un
der a sch
em
e of political dem
ocracy, an
d (3) prom
ot-
in
g substan
tive justice by protectin
g a m
orally an
d politically accepta-
ble set of in
dividual righ
ts.”
192  T
h
is is sim
ply a differen
t question
 to 
ask about con
stitution
al th
eories, on
e w
ith
 n
o n
ecessary relation
sh
ip 
to m
y question
 about explan
atory accuracy.  A
n
d applyin
g n
orm
ative 
criteria in
tern
al to con
stitution
al practice to ch
oose betw
een
 positive 
th
eories of law
 is question
-beggin
g; after all, th
e goal of such
 th
eories 
is to provide an
 accurate picture of w
h
at th
e con
stitution
al law
 is, an
d 
th
eorists ten
d to claim
 th
at som
eth
in
g in
 our con
stitution
al law
 is th
e 
source of th
e values th
at form
 th
e basis for th
ese proposed n
orm
ative 
assessm
en
ts. 193  T
h
is kin
d of n
orm
ative assessm
en
t m
ay be un
avoida-
ble in
 con
stitution
al th
eory (th
e disciplin
e is, after all, dom
in
ated by 
n
orm
ative w
ork), 194 but I doubt it.  T
h
e relative paucity of positive 
con
stitution
al th
eory in
 th
e legal literature m
igh
t tell us som
eth
in
g 
about th
e sch
olarly com
m
un
ity’s im
plicit assessm
en
t of such
 w
ork’s 
value; but m
ore likely, I th
in
k, it tells us som
eth
in
g about w
h
at con
sti-
tution
al sch
olars fin
d interesting, 195 an
d in
 an
y case it does n
ot establish
 
th
at positive th
eory is eith
er im
possible or un
desirable. 
 191 
See, e.g., L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 3–5 (deployin
g a set of th
eory selection
 criteria for as-
sessin
g com
petin
g claim
s in
 gen
eral jurispruden
ce); W
. B
radley W
en
del, Explanation in 
L
egal Scholarship:  T
he Inferential Structure of D
octrinal L
egal A
nalysis, 96 C
O
R
N
E
L
L
 L
. R
E
V. 
1035, 1041–42 (2011) (explorin
g th
eory selection
 criteria for legal th
eory gen
erally). 
192 
Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 538–39. 
193 
See id. at 551 (“Q
uestion
s about appropriate evaluative criteria for con
stitution
al th
eories 
arise w
ith
in
 th
e sam
e debates in
 w
h
ich
 th
ose criteria are in
voked.”); see also M
ich
ael C
. 
D
orf, C
reate Your O
w
n C
onstitutional T
heory, 87 C
A
L
IF. L
. R
E
V. 593, 598 (1999) (“A
n
y claim
 
th
at som
e set of [n
orm
ative] priorities an
d [relative] w
eigh
ts [am
on
g such
 priorities] is 
best is itself a h
igh
ly con
testable claim
 of con
stitution
al th
eory.”). 
194 
See Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 540–41 (arguin
g th
at ch
oosin
g a con
stitution
al th
eory “re-
quires appeal to n
orm
ative criteria”). 
195 
C
f. G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 146, at 203 (“W
h
en
 a ph
ilosoph
er of law
 asserts a proposition
 th
at 
n
eith
er en
dorses n
or criticizes w
h
at th
ey do, but on
ly iden
tifies som
e n
ecessary feature of 
w
h
at th
ey do, law
yers an
d law
 teach
ers are often
 frustrated.  T
h
ey autom
atically start to 
search
 for h
idden
 n
otes of en
dorsem
en
t or criticism
, secret n
orm
s th
at th
ey are bein
g 
asked to follow
.”). 
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 N
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eory is clearly distin
ct from
 scien
tific 
th
eory—
th
e latter purports to explain
 w
h
at is th
e case w
h
ile th
e for-
m
er purports to dem
on
strate w
h
at sh
ould be m
ade th
e case.  Positive 
con
stitution
al th
eory, w
h
ich
 does purport to reveal w
h
at is th
e case, is 
also distin
ct from
 scien
tific th
eory:  L
aw
 is n
ot a n
atural kin
d, it is an
 
artifact created by h
um
an
 practice. 196  A
m
on
g oth
er th
in
gs, h
um
an
 
practices an
d th
eir artifacts m
ay ch
an
ge over tim
e w
h
ile ph
ysical 
ph
en
om
en
a (for th
e m
ost part an
d exceptin
g quan
tum
 m
ech
an
ical 
ph
en
om
en
a) rem
ain
 fixed regardless of h
um
an
 observation
 or ac-
tion
. 
 
M
oreover, 
th
e 
object 
of 
positive 
con
stitution
al 
th
eory—
con
stitution
al practice—
is a n
otoriously difficult, m
ovin
g target; for 
exam
ple, “a n
um
ber of in
terpretive paradigm
s can
 coexist peacefully 
in
 con
stitution
al practice, an
d n
o on
e paradigm
 is likely to force th
e 
oth
ers out of busin
ess.”
197  E
ven
 if som
e of our con
stitution
al n
orm
s 
can
 be clearly iden
tified, th
en
, it is very difficult to use th
at in
for-
m
ation
 to predict practical outcom
es in
 th
e ligh
t of th
e w
idely varyin
g 
approach
es observable in
 con
stitution
al practice un
der w
h
ich
 con
sti-
tution
al n
orm
s m
ay be given
 legal effect in
 con
stitution
al disputes.  
For th
ese reason
s, am
on
g oth
ers, tw
o typical scien
tific th
eory evalua-
tion
 criteria—
falsifiability
198 an
d predictive pow
er
199—
seem
 in
apt for 
ch
oosin
g am
on
g positive con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s. 200 
 196 
See supra n
otes 158–59 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
197 
Ian
 B
artrum
, C
onstitutional Value Judgm
ents and Interpretive T
heory C
hoice, 40 F
L
A. S
T. U
. L
. 
R
E
V. 259, 272 (2013). 
198 
A
 scien
tific proposition
 is falsifiable if a statem
en
t about som
e occurren
ce is in
com
patible 
w
ith
 th
e proposition
.  See K
A
R
L
 R
. P
O
PPE
R, T
H
E
 L
O
G
IC
 O
F S
C
IE
N
T
IFIC
 D
ISC
O
V
E
R
Y 44, 86–87 
(1968); K
A
R
L
 R
. P
O
PPE
R, O
B
JE
C
T
IV
E
 K
N
O
W
L
E
D
G
E:  A
N
 E
V
O
L
U
T
IO
N
A
R
Y A
PPR
O
A
C
H
 150–75 
(1972). 
199 
See, e.g., M
IL
T
O
N
 F
R
IE
D
M
A
N
, T
he M
ethodology of Positive Econom
ics, in E
SSA
YS IN
 P
O
SIT
IV
E
 
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
S 7–9 (1953) (arguin
g th
at th
e prin
cipal, perh
aps on
ly, proper test of a positive 
econ
om
ic th
eory sh
ould be its predictive pow
er). 
200 
A
lth
ough
 th
ey are routin
ely referen
ced in
 legal th
eory literature, see Jean
n
e L
. Sch
roed-
er, Just So Stories:  Posnerian M
ethodology, 22 C
A
R
D
O
Z
O
 L
. R
E
V. 351, 355 n
.17 (2001), th
ere is 
debate in
 th
e ph
ilosoph
y of scien
ce about th
e propriety of predictive pow
er an
d falsifica-
tion
 as criteria for evaluatin
g scien
tific th
eories.  Popper’s view
s h
ave been
 for th
e m
ost 
part aban
don
ed by m
ain
stream
 ph
ilosoph
ers of scien
ce.  See, e.g., Susan
 H
aack, Federal 
Philosophy of Science:  A
 D
econstruction—
and a R
econstruction, 5 N
.Y.U
. J.L
. &
 L
IB
E
R
T
Y 394, 
415–16 (2010).  T
h
om
as K
uh
n
, for exam
ple, does n
ot in
clude falsifiability on
 h
is list of 
five criteria for ch
oosin
g am
on
g scien
tific th
eories.  See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 321–22.  
O
n
e problem
 w
ith
 falsifiability as a test for positive legal th
eory claim
s is th
e follow
in
g:  
A
ssum
in
g th
at con
stitution
al n
orm
s are m
ean
in
gfully con
stituted (validated) by pattern
s 
of con
vergen
t official practice of acceptan
ce; th
en
 for claim
s of th
e form
 “Θ
 is a con
stitu-
tion
al n
orm
 in
 legal system
 X
,” poten
tially falsifyin
g coun
terexam
ples (e.g., a judicial de-
cision
 in
 w
h
ich
 th
e court uph
olds som
e state action
 th
at pretty clearly th
reaten
s structural 
stability) could be in
terpreted as eith
er (1) proof th
at Θ
 is n
ot in
 fact a n
orm
 of th
e sys-
tem
; or (2) eviden
ce th
at Θ
 w
as (or perh
aps still is) a n
orm
 of th
e system
 but th
at th
e offi-
cial con
sen
sus th
at Θ
 is a n
orm
 is ch
an
gin
g or h
as ch
an
ged.  It is n
ot obvious h
ow
—
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 T
h
om
as K
uh
n
 argues th
at th
ere is n
ot an
 objectively correct set of 
scien
tific th
eory selection
 criteria—
because th
ere is debate about 
w
h
eth
er scien
tific th
eories actually disclose truth
s about th
e w
orld; w
e 
say th
at th
ey approxim
ate truth
s about reality, an
d th
ese th
eory selec-
tion
 criteria are m
ean
t to iden
tify th
e likely m
ore accurate approxi-
m
ation
 am
on
g com
petitors. 201  A
ccordin
gly, in
 scien
ce, th
eories are 
evaluated on
 criteria th
at are broadly con
sidered appropriate in
 th
e 
ligh
t of th
e gen
eral ch
aracteristics an
d aim
s of scien
ce as a practice. 202  
T
h
ere is som
e debate about w
h
at distin
guish
es scien
ce from
 oth
er 
form
s of in
quiry; 203 but it seem
s un
con
troversial to suggest th
at sci-
en
ce as a practice “avoids appeals to fin
al causes, vital forces, or gen
-
eral bun
kum
[,] . . . an
sw
er[s] to criteria of em
pirical adequacy[,]” 
an
d m
akes claim
s th
at are “gen
eral, capable of supportin
g coun
ter-
factuals, an
d above all . . . th
at purport to be true or false w
ith
 refer-
en
ce to som
eth
in
g extern
al; th
at is, scien
ce m
ust relate to th
e n
atural 
w
orld. . . .”
204  G
iven
 th
ese aim
s, it is un
surprisin
g th
at criteria for th
e-
ory 
selection
 
th
at 
en
joy 
broad 
an
d 
lon
g-lived 
con
sen
sus 
support 
am
on
g scien
tists in
clude accuracy, sim
plicity, con
silien
ce (or explan
-
atory pow
er/capacity), con
servatism
 (or con
sisten
cy w
ith
 oth
er w
ell-
accepted view
s about th
e w
orld), an
d poten
tial fruitfuln
ess for future 
research
. 205  T
h
ere appears to be n
o such
 con
sen
sus w
ith
 respect to 
th
e propriety of th
e various n
orm
ative criteria proposed for ch
oosin
g 
am
on
g con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s. 206  If robust con
sen
sus on
 th
eory 
selection
 is th
e best approxim
ation
 of objectivity available, th
ere is 
substan
tially m
ore robust con
sen
sus w
ith
 respect to th
e criteria I h
ave 
m
en
tion
ed for distin
guish
in
g scien
tific, social scien
tific, an
d positive 
 
absen
t explicit an
d credible judicial specification
—
w
e sh
ould decide betw
een
 th
ese tw
o 
in
terpretation
s.  E
ven
 an
 un
am
biguous judicial statem
en
t th
at it h
as n
ever been
 a valid 
n
orm
 w
ould n
ot decisively falsify th
e SPT
 claim
; curren
t judges can
n
ot be certain
 about 
w
h
at earlier judges accepted as obligatory. 
201 
T
h
is is a m
atter of serious debate in
 th
e scien
tific an
d ph
ilosoph
ical com
m
un
ities; I am
 
assum
in
g th
at our positive con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s can
 aspire to an
 accurate approx-
im
ation
 of reality.  See generally W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1060–62 (can
vassin
g th
is de-
bate). 
202 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 320–21; B
artrum
, supra n
ote 197, at 269; W
en
del, supra n
ote 
191, at 1051–52. 
203 
See supra n
ote 200 (discussin
g th
e con
troversy surroun
din
g Popper’s view
s). 
204 
W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1059–60 (citin
g R
O
B
E
R
T
 N
O
L
A
 &
 H
O
W
A
R
D
 S
A
N
K
E
Y, T
H
E
O
R
IE
S 
O
F S
C
IE
N
T
IFIC
 M
E
T
H
O
D
 55–56, 74–77, 341–42 (2007)); see also C
A
R
L
 G
. H
E
M
PE
L, T
he L
ogic 
of Functional A
nalysis, in A
SPE
C
T
S O
F S
C
IE
N
T
IFIC
 E
X
PL
A
N
A
T
IO
N
 A
N
D
 O
T
H
E
R
 E
SSA
YS IN
 T
H
E
 
P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y O
F S
C
IE
N
C
E 297, 304 (1965). 
205 
K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 320–22; see L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 9–13 (applyin
g som
e of th
ese 
criteria to legal th
eory ch
oice). 
206 
B
artrum
, supra n
ote 197, at 264; Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 538–39; see also B
arry Friedm
an
, 
T
he C
ycles of C
onstitutional T
heory, 67 L
A
W
 &
 C
O
N
T
E
M
P. P
R
O
B
S. 149, 149–50 (2004). 
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con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s—
en
ough
 con
sen
sus for K
uh
n
 to suggest 
th
at scien
tific th
eory selection
 decision
s on
 th
ese criteria can
, over 
tim
e, approach
 objectivity. 207  T
h
eories m
ay fare differen
tly alon
g dif-
feren
t dim
en
sion
s, an
d it th
ere is n
o con
sen
sus as to th
e w
eigh
t th
at 
sh
ould be accorded, say, sim
plicity relative to con
servatism
; but it 
seem
s reason
able at least to th
in
k th
at th
eories m
ay com
pen
sate for 
failure on
 som
e dim
en
sion
s w
ith
 success on
 oth
ers. 208 
Iden
tifyin
g w
h
at th
e law
 is m
ay require th
e application
 of som
e 
m
oral, econ
om
ic, h
istorical, or oth
er in
terpretive or evaluative crite-
rion
 curren
tly argued by som
e to be relevan
t to iden
tifyin
g th
e legal 
n
orm
s th
at w
e h
ave; but w
h
eth
er such
 criteria m
ust be so applied is 
on
e of th
e core disputes betw
een
 com
petin
g th
eories of law
. 209  If w
e 
w
an
t to evaluate positive con
stitution
al th
eory claim
s accordin
g to 
h
ow
 w
ell th
ey disch
arge th
e aim
 of disclosin
g w
h
at is th
e case about 
law
; th
en
 th
e gen
eral th
eory selectin
g criteria developed in
 th
e ph
i-
losoph
y of scien
ce for application
 to oth
er th
eories th
at aim
 to dis-
close w
h
at is th
e case are preferable. 210  T
h
is is n
ot to den
y th
at th
e 
 207 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 325 (n
otin
g th
at th
e ch
oice betw
een
 com
petin
g th
eories “de-
pen
ds on
 a m
ixture of objective an
d subjective factors”). 
208 
See id. at 327–29 (n
otin
g th
is relative w
eigh
tin
g problem
). 
209 
I w
an
t to m
ove aw
ay from
 th
e view
 th
at legal th
eory’s “ch
aracteristics an
d virtues,” 
W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1059–60, are exclusively boun
d up w
ith
 certain
 values of polit-
ical m
orality—
say dem
ocracy or justice.  See supra n
otes 192–195 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text.  
C
f. Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 538–41 (arguin
g th
at legalistic values bear on
 legal th
eory 
ch
oice); W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1061–64 (n
otin
g problem
s w
ith
 th
is view
). 
210 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 327–329 (arguin
g th
at th
eory selection
 criteria in
 scien
ce are 
properly draw
n
 by th
eorists based on
 th
eir perception
 of th
e objectives of th
e relevan
t in
-
quiry); B
artrum
, supra n
ote 197, at 269 (suggestin
g th
e K
uh
n
ian
 approach
 for legal th
eo-
ry selection
); see also L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 9–13 (applyin
g scien
tific th
eory selection
 cri-
teria to com
pare legal positivism
 to n
atural law
 th
eories an
d D
w
orkin
’s th
eory).  T
h
is is 
n
ot to assert som
eth
in
g like “L
an
gdell’s w
idely m
ocked claim
 th
at law
 can
 be treated as a 
scien
ce.” W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1064.  In
stead, I carefully qualify th
is an
alysis to re-
flect th
e deep un
certain
ty surroun
din
g th
e basic ideas of kn
ow
ledge an
d explan
ation
 in
 
scien
ce.  I am
 usin
g th
e lan
guage of th
e in
feren
ce to th
e best explan
ation
 approach
 to 
th
eory-buildin
g an
d explan
ation
, rath
er th
an
 an
yth
in
g like a h
ypoth
etico-deductivist ap-
proach
, to avoid vexed debates in
 th
e ph
ilosoph
y of scien
ce about th
e logical possibility 
of con
firm
ation
, w
h
eth
er scien
ce creates kn
ow
ledge, an
d so forth
.  For th
is reason
, I also 
set aside th
e ph
ilosoph
ically difficult question
 of w
h
at an
 “explan
ation
” really is.  For an
 
overview
 of th
ese debates, see H
E
M
PE
L, Studies in the L
ogic of C
onfirm
ation, in A
SPE
C
T
S O
F 
S
C
IE
N
T
IFIC
 E
X
PL
A
N
A
T
IO
N
, supra n
ote 204 (exam
in
in
g th
e h
ypoth
etico-deductivist m
eth
od 
of 
con
firm
in
g 
proposed 
explan
atory 
h
ypoth
eses 
w
ith
 
em
pirical 
eviden
ce); 
C
A
R
L
 G
. 
H
E
M
PE
L, P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y O
F N
A
T
U
R
A
L
 S
C
IE
N
C
E 5–8 (1966) (can
vassin
g problem
s w
ith
 deduc-
tive m
odels of scien
tific explan
ation
); N
O
L
A
 &
 S
A
N
K
E
Y, supra n
ote 204, at 335–45 (can
vass-
in
g th
e realism
/an
tirealism
 debate in
 ph
ilosoph
y of scien
ce); G
ilbert H
. H
arm
an
, T
he In-
ference to the B
est Explanation, 74 P
H
IL. R
E
V. 88, 88 (1965); Paul R
. T
h
agard, T
he B
est 
Explanation: C
riteria for T
heory C
hoice, 75 J. P
H
IL. 76, 76–77 (1978). 
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process of assessin
g com
petin
g th
eories is in
h
eren
tly n
orm
ative
211—
of 
course it is, but lim
itin
g n
orm
ative claim
s to th
e secon
d-order ques-
tion
 of w
h
ich
 th
eory selection
 criteria w
e sh
ould adopt (an
d n
ot, 
th
erefore, exten
din
g it to th
e first-order question
 of w
h
ich
 th
eory w
e 
sh
ould select) avoids con
flatin
g th
e question
 w
h
at m
akes a good th
e-
ory of law
 w
ith
 th
e question
 w
h
at values does law
 serve or reflect—
after all, th
e latter is on
e question
 th
at th
eories of law
 seek to an
-
sw
er. 212  T
h
e ch
oice h
ere is betw
een
 th
eories h
oldin
g th
at th
e con
ten
t 
of th
e law
 is on
ly th
at w
h
ich
 accords w
ith
 som
e value proposition
 or 
in
terpretive m
eth
odology, on
 th
e on
e h
an
d, an
d SN
, on
 w
h
ich
 w
e 
recogn
ize both n
orm
s con
stituted by deep pattern
s of con
vergen
t offi-
cial practice and n
orm
s validated accordin
g to value or in
terpretive 
criteria as parts of th
e C
on
stitution
, on
 th
e oth
er. 213 
First, sim
pler explan
ation
s are preferable to m
ore com
plex on
es, 
all else equal. 214  In
 arguin
g th
at legal positivism
 is preferable to alter-
n
ative th
eories of law
 in
cludin
g n
atural law
 th
eory an
d D
w
orkin
’s 
“law
 as in
tegrity” accoun
t, B
rian
 L
eiter h
igh
ligh
ts positivism
’s “on
to-
logical austerity,” or its capacity to explain
 ph
en
om
en
a “in
 w
ays th
at 
do n
ot in
volve un
n
ecessary, con
troversial or in
credible m
etaph
ysical 
com
m
itm
en
ts.”
215  SN
 is sim
pler th
an
 con
ven
tion
al th
eories in
 tw
o 
sen
ses illustrated by th
e SPT
 accoun
t of th
e stan
dard dorm
an
cy doc-
trin
es, 
im
m
igration
 
doctrin
e, 
an
d 
obstacle 
preem
ption
 
doctrin
e.  
First, positin
g a sin
gle structural n
orm
 to explain
 all th
ese doctrin
es is 
on
tologically sim
pler th
an
 con
ven
tion
al accoun
ts th
at posit m
ultiple 
distin
ctive n
orm
s, perh
aps on
e for each
 lin
e of doctrin
e. 216  In
 th
is 
sam
e sen
se, SPT
 explain
s im
m
igration
 doctrin
e m
ore sim
ply th
an
, 
say, th
e extern
al sovereign
ty ration
ale; 217 an
d obstacle preem
ption
 
 211 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 321–22; B
artrum
, supra n
ote 197, at 269; W
en
del, supra n
ote 
191, at 1064–65. 
212 
C
om
pare D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 190 (arguin
g th
at an
y accoun
t of th
e con
cept of law
 
m
ust “explain
 h
ow
 w
h
at it takes to be law
 provides a gen
eral justification
 for th
e exercise 
of coercive pow
er by th
e state”), w
ith H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 239–40 (arguin
g th
at a gen
-
eral th
eory of law
 n
eed “n
ot seek to justify or com
m
en
d on
 m
oral or oth
er groun
ds th
e 
form
s an
d structures w
h
ich
 appear in
 m
y gen
eral accoun
t of law
”). 
213 
A
ckn
ow
ledgin
g th
e possibility of both
 m
erit-based an
d m
erit-n
eutral criteria of legal va-
lidity is n
eutral as betw
een
 in
clusive an
d exclusive legal positivism
.  See infra n
ote 267 (dis-
cussin
g h
ard an
d soft positivism
). 
214 
K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 321–22. 
215 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 158, at 12. 
216 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 530–32 (discussin
g th
e sim
plicity advan
tage of th
e SPT
 ac-
coun
t of th
e dorm
an
cy doctrin
es). 
217 
See, e.g., C
h
ae C
h
an
 Pin
g v. U
n
ited States, 130 U
.S. 581, 604 (1889) (articulatin
g th
e ex-
tern
al sovereign
ty ration
ale for federal im
m
igration
 pow
er); see also C
levelan
d, supra n
ote 
57, at 253 (discussin
g an
d criticizin
g th
e “in
h
eren
t pow
ers” of sovereign
ty justification
 for 
im
m
igration
 doctrin
e). 
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doctrin
e m
ore sim
ply th
an
 th
e con
ven
tion
al Suprem
acy C
lause ex-
plan
ation
. 218  Secon
d, positin
g a con
sen
sus based con
stitution
al n
orm
 
like SPT
 is m
ore an
alytically austere th
an
, say, a value-based accoun
t 
th
at posits addition
al, con
testable rule-of-law
 or social justice prin
ci-
ples to justify th
e n
orm
s th
at groun
d th
ese doctrin
es, w
h
ich
 w
ould 
require a distin
ct n
orm
ative case to be m
ade for each
 lin
e of deci-
sion
s.  Sim
ilarly, SN
 is in
 th
is sen
se sim
pler th
an
 in
terpretive th
eory 
altern
atives—
SN
 posits n
orm
s acceptable across in
terpretive view
s 
an
d explain
s th
e sh
ape of doctrin
e accordin
g to pragm
atic factors; it 
does 
n
ot 
require 
th
e 
com
plex 
in
terpretive 
m
oves 
th
at, 
say, 
an
 
origin
alist accoun
t w
ould require. 
A
 secon
d gen
erally accepted criterion
 is con
silien
ce, w
h
ich
 is 
about h
ow
 m
uch
 of th
e relevan
t ph
en
om
en
a th
e com
petin
g th
eories 
are capable of explain
in
g: 219  “W
e prefer m
ore com
preh
en
sive expla-
n
ation
s—
explan
ation
s th
at m
ake sen
se of m
ore differen
t kin
ds of 
th
in
gs—
to explan
ation
s th
at seem
 too n
arrow
ly tailored to on
e kin
d 
of datum
.”
220  E
veryon
e agrees th
at th
eory m
ust fit th
e ph
en
om
en
a 
un
der con
sideration
—
it can
n
ot h
ave explan
atory pow
er if it does n
ot 
explain
 an
yth
in
g. 221  B
ut am
on
g com
petin
g th
eories th
at rough
ly fit 
som
e aspects of th
e relevan
t ph
en
om
en
a, th
e con
silien
ce in
quiry 
sh
ifts to how
 m
any ph
en
om
en
a th
e th
eories explain
, respectively. 222  
So, for exam
ple, “D
arw
in
’s th
eory of n
atural selection
 w
as able to ac-
coun
t for observation
s th
at in
itially seem
ed un
related, such
 as th
ose 
pertain
in
g to an
atom
y (th
e presen
ce of vestigial organ
s) an
d zoology 
(th
e observed differen
ces in
 related species);” an
d th
us is m
ore 
con
silien
t th
an
 altern
atives th
at can
n
ot explain
 th
ese ph
en
om
en
a. 223  
T
h
e SPT
 view
 explain
s at on
ce a variety of doctrin
es th
at altern
ative 
accoun
ts typically ch
aracterize as based on
 several different con
stitu-
tion
al n
orm
s (an
d th
us as in
 th
is sen
se un
related).  A
 built-out th
eory 
 218 
See supra n
otes 140–42 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text (reh
earsin
g critiques of existin
g justifica-
tion
s for preem
ption
 doctrin
e). 
219 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 322 (explain
in
g th
at good scien
tific th
eories can
 seem
 to con
-
flict w
ith
 on
e an
oth
er w
h
en
 applied); T
h
agard, supra n
ote 12, at 79; see also L
eiter, supra 
n
ote 19, at 1239–40 (applyin
g con
silien
ce to assess legal positivism
 versus com
petin
g th
e-
ories of law
). 
220 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1239. 
221 
See id. at 1239 (em
ph
asizin
g explan
atory pow
er as a desideratum
 for positive legal th
eo-
ries); see also D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 65–68 (em
ph
asizin
g th
e im
portan
ce of explan
a-
tory “fit” for accoun
ts of con
stitution
al law
 an
d practice); Fallon
, supra n
ote 14, at 549 
(“[I]t appears to be agreed all aroun
d . . . th
at on
e im
portan
t criterion
 is ‘fit.’  A
 good 
con
stitution
al th
eory m
ust fit eith
er th
e w
ritten
 C
on
stitution
 or surroun
din
g practice.”). 
222 
See T
h
agard, supra n
ote 12, at 79 (n
otin
g th
at a “th
eory is m
ore con
silien
t th
an
 an
oth
er if it 
explain
s m
ore classes of facts th
an
 th
e oth
er”). 
223 
W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1052. 
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like SN
 w
ould ex hypothesi explain
 a great deal m
ore, perh
aps m
ost 
structural doctrin
e.  M
oreover, th
e in
terpretive an
d value n
eutrality 
of SN
 m
ean
s th
at it explain
s doctrin
es an
d judicial decision
s th
at 
propon
en
ts of value-based or in
terpretive th
eories w
ould h
ave to 
ch
aracterize as n
on
-law
ful—
for exam
ple, it explain
s w
h
y, despite th
e 
protestation
s of origin
alists th
at th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause doc-
trin
e is n
ot legitim
ately derived from
 th
e origin
al m
ean
in
g of th
e 
C
on
stitution
, 224 courts con
tin
ue to apply th
e doctrin
e an
d oth
er gov-
ern
m
en
t officials system
atically beh
ave as th
ough
 it is valid law
. 225  
O
rigin
alists advan
cin
g a th
eory of law
 claim
226 w
ould h
ave to m
ain
tain
 
th
at 
th
e 
m
an
y 
judges 
w
h
o 
appear 
to 
accept 
th
e 
validity 
of 
th
e 
dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce C
lause doctrin
e in
 its curren
t form
 are eith
er 
m
istaken
 about w
h
at th
e con
stitution
al law
 is or are in
ten
tion
ally dis-
regardin
g th
e law
. 227  A
ccuracy—
a th
eory’s capacity to explain
 actual 
observation
s—
is a closely related criterion
. 228  T
h
e th
in
-n
orm
s view
 al-
so explain
s distin
ction
s th
at legal practition
ers an
d sch
olars m
ake in
 
everyday talk betw
een
, say, w
h
at th
e law
 is an
d w
h
at th
e law
 sh
ould 
be; value-based or in
terpretive th
eories of law
 can
n
ot capture th
is dis-
 224 
See, e.g., T
yler Pipe In
dus. v. W
ash
. State D
ep’t of R
even
ue, 483 U
.S. 232, 260, 263 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., con
currin
g in
 part an
d dissen
tin
g in
 part) (attackin
g th
e dorm
an
t C
om
m
erce 
C
lause doctrin
e because “[t]h
e h
istorical record provides n
o groun
ds for readin
g th
e 
C
om
m
erce C
lause to be oth
er th
an
 w
h
at it says—
an
 auth
orization
 for C
on
gress to regu-
late com
m
erce”). 
225 
Sim
ilarly, if w
e h
ypoth
esized a con
verse n
orm
—
th
e N
ation
al Preclusion
 T
h
esis (“N
PT
”), 
viz.:  th
e n
ation
al govern
m
en
t m
ay n
ot take action
s th
at un
derm
in
e th
e con
stitution
al 
structure—
to explain
 th
e an
ticom
m
an
deerin
g doctrin
e, N
ew
 York v. U
n
ited States, 505 
U
.S. 144, 161–63 (1992), an
d oth
er federalism
 doctrin
es, th
en
 strict textualists m
igh
t ob-
ject th
at th
ese doctrin
es h
ave n
o textual foun
dation
.  See, e.g., Joh
n
 F. M
an
n
in
g, Federalism
 
and the G
enerality Problem
 in C
onstitutional Interpretation, 122 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. 2003, 2067 
(2009).  T
h
e N
PT
 accoun
t, h
ow
ever, better explain
s th
e realities of practice in
 w
h
ich
 th
e-
se federalism
 doctrin
es con
tin
ue to be applied an
d are treated as legally valid by m
ost of-
ficials. 
226 
See supra n
otes 162–64 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
227 
Som
e origin
alists appear to em
brace th
is con
sequen
ce of th
eir view
s an
d argue th
at n
on
-
origin
alist preceden
t sh
ould be disregarded.  See generally G
ary L
aw
son
, T
he C
onstitutional 
C
ase A
gainst Precedent, 17 H
A
R
V. J.L
. &
 P
U
B. P
O
L’Y 23 (1994) (discussin
g differen
t ap-
proach
es to in
terpretin
g an
d usin
g preceden
t as a guide); M
ich
ael Stokes Paulsen
, T
he In-
trinsically C
orrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 C
O
N
ST. C
O
M
M
E
N
T. 289 (2005) (discussin
g th
e 
im
pact of stare decisis on
 origin
alist th
eory).  B
ut th
is is h
ardly a con
sen
sus position
 
am
on
g origin
alists.  See L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1225–26 (discussin
g error th
eoretic ac-
coun
ts in
 ph
ilosoph
y, an
d n
otin
g th
at “[a] stan
din
g puzzle about [such
] accoun
ts is w
h
y a 
particular discourse persists w
h
en
 all its judgm
en
ts are false”). See generally Joh
n
 O
. 
M
cG
in
n
is &
 M
ich
ael B
. R
appaport, R
econciling O
riginalism
 and Precedent, 103 N
W
. U
.L
. R
E
V. 
803 (2009) (can
vassin
g th
e debate an
d arguin
g th
at origin
alism
 can
 be recon
ciled w
ith
 
stare decisis). 
228 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 320 (explain
in
g th
e com
m
on
 scien
tific approach
 to adoptin
g 
a n
ew
 th
eory); see also W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1054 (callin
g th
e exten
t to w
h
ich
 com
-
petin
g th
eories “accoun
t for observed ph
en
om
en
a” th
eir “em
pirical adequacy”). 
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tin
ction
 in
sofar as th
ey h
old th
at th
e law
 is on
ly th
at w
h
ich
 is con
-
sisten
t w
ith
 th
e very in
terpretive th
eory or value criterion
 th
at an
sw
ers 
th
e “sh
ould” question
. 229  M
oreover, th
e th
in
-n
orm
s th
eory can
 ex-
plain
, in
 a m
an
n
er th
at com
petin
g th
eories can
n
ot, an
 even
 larger 
an
d in
 som
e sen
ses m
ore obvious ph
en
om
en
on
:  th
e stability an
d du-
rability of th
e con
stitution
al system
 despite various apparen
tly deep 
disagreem
en
ts of m
eth
od an
d value. 
A
n
oth
er accepted criterion
, con
servatism
, suggests th
at desirable 
positive 
th
eory 
sh
ould 
leave 
in
tact 
our 
oth
er 
w
ell-accepted 
view
s 
about th
e w
orld. 230  L
eiter m
ain
tain
s th
at legal positivism
 is m
ore de-
sirable th
an
 altern
atives on
 th
is dim
en
sion
 because, am
on
g oth
er 
th
in
gs, positivism
 is con
sisten
t w
ith
, supported by, an
d poten
tially 
gen
erative of em
pirical research
 program
s on
 related issues: 
A
 th
eory of law
 th
at m
akes explicit th
e tacit or in
ch
oate con
cept at play in
 scien
tific re-
search
 is probably to be preferred to its com
petitors.  Positivism
 is th
at th
eory.  If on
e 
surveys . . . th
e n
ow
 vast em
pirical literature on
 adjudication
, w
h
ich
 aim
s to explore th
e 
relative con
tribution
s of legal versus n
on
-legal n
orm
s to decision
-m
akin
g by courts, th
at 
literature alw
ays dem
arcates th
e distin
ction
 in
 positivist term
s. 231 
So, too, SN
’s capacity to distin
guish
 w
h
at th
e law
 is from
 w
h
at on
e 
th
in
ks th
e law
 sh
ould be facilitates em
pirical an
alysis of th
e relative 
in
fluen
ce of legal an
d n
on
-legal reason
s for decision
.  W
h
at m
atters 
on
 th
is view
 is th
at judges act as if th
ey accept SPT
 an
d sim
ilar n
orm
s 
as valid n
orm
s of th
e con
stitution
al system
, n
ot th
eir reason
s for th
at 
acceptan
ce; th
us SN
 is con
sisten
t w
ith
 an
y accoun
t of th
e real causes 
of judicial decision
s. 232  V
alue-driven
 an
d in
terpretive th
eory-of-law
 
claim
s, h
ow
ever, are in
con
sisten
t w
ith
 em
pirical w
ork like th
at on
 th
e 
attitudin
al m
odel—
th
ey claim
 th
at judges sh
ould decide cases based 
on
 som
e set of values or in
terpretive com
m
itm
en
ts, but th
e em
pirical 
eviden
ce suggests th
at such
 proposals are un
realistic in
 ligh
t of judg-
es’ persisten
t ten
den
cy to act in
 w
ays n
ot w
h
olly predicted by legal 
reason
s.  Its n
eutrality regardin
g reason
s for acceptan
ce m
ean
s th
at 
SN
 is also con
sisten
t w
ith
 n
early every th
eory of adjudication
 or of 
con
stitution
al in
terpretation
.  A
n
d, im
portan
tly, it leaves in
tact our 
 229 
A
ccord L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 10 (m
akin
g a sim
ilar argum
en
t for favorin
g legal positiv-
ism
 over altern
atives). 
230 
See K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 321–22 (“[A
] th
eory sh
ould be con
sisten
t, n
ot on
ly in
tern
ally 
or w
ith
 itself, but also w
ith
 oth
er curren
tly accepted th
eories applicable to related aspects 
of n
ature.”); L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1239.  Som
e argue th
at th
is is m
ore of an
 ex an
te 
th
resh
old for distin
guish
in
g facially plausible th
eories from
 th
ose un
w
orth
y of serious 
con
sideration
.  See, e.g., W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1049. 
231 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 12. 
232 
See generally S
E
G
A
L
 &
 S
PA
E
T
H
, supra n
ote 173 (presen
tin
g th
e attitudin
al m
odel of judicial 
decision
-m
akin
g th
at tests for th
e causal pow
er of n
on
-legal reason
s in
 adjudication
). 
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w
ell-establish
ed belief th
at th
e con
stitution
al system
 is robust an
d sta-
ble despite observed disagreem
en
t. 
A
 related criterion
 is fruitfuln
ess—
th
e exten
t to w
h
ich
 a th
eory 
“en
able[s] us to say sign
ifican
t th
in
gs, gen
erate[s] in
sigh
ts, an
d h
a[s] 
im
plication
s for future research
.”
233  It is n
ot righ
t to say th
at legal 
th
eory can
n
ot gen
erate predictive h
ypoth
eses.  T
h
e literature on
 th
e 
attitudin
al m
odel of judicial decision
-m
akin
g, w
h
ich
 tests th
e h
ypoth
-
esis th
at proxies for judges’ political view
s (such
 as th
e party of th
e 
appoin
tin
g presiden
t), is w
idely view
ed as a robust an
d successful 
predictive research
 program
. 234  T
h
is sh
ow
s th
at legal th
eory can
 spur 
em
pirical research
—
th
e attitudin
al m
odel w
as prom
pted an
d sup-
ported by th
e th
eoretical claim
 of th
e A
m
erican
 L
egal R
ealists an
d 
oth
ers th
at legal reason
s alon
e are in
sufficien
t to explain
 m
an
y judi-
cial decision
s. 235  T
h
e abstractn
ess of n
orm
s like SPT
 m
ean
s th
at posit-
in
g th
em
 h
as little predictive pow
er in
 itself—
w
ith
out m
ore, th
e h
y-
poth
esis th
at SPT
 is accepted predicts som
e con
stellation
 of judicial 
action
s aim
ed at preven
tin
g state in
terferen
ce w
ith
 th
e con
stitution
al 
structure.  T
h
at is w
h
at w
e see, but th
ese observation
s are n
ot terribly 
surprisin
g an
d do n
ot crisply distin
guish
 th
e SPT
 view
 from
 oth
er ex-
plan
ation
s.  H
ow
ever, SN
 provides a fram
ew
ork for developin
g m
ore 
determ
in
ate an
d testable h
ypoth
eses.  For exam
ple, th
e argum
en
t 
th
at SPT
 is im
plem
en
ted by a variety of doctrin
es w
h
ose differen
ces 
are attributable to n
on
-legal con
sideration
s is m
ore fruitful:  W
e 
could, for exam
ple, design
 experim
en
ts to test th
e causal pow
er of 
various in
strum
en
tal or oth
er n
on
-legal factors in
 doctrin
al form
ula-
tion
; w
e w
ould just n
eed reliable proxies for judges’ con
cern
s about 
in
stitution
al capital, in
terbran
ch
 con
flicts, adjudicatory error rates, 
an
d so forth
. 
In
 th
e n
ext Part, I explore tw
o aspects of SN
’s th
eoretical desira-
bility—
its con
sisten
cy w
ith
 legal positivism
 an
d its capacity to advan
ce 
con
stitution
al th
eory past problem
s associated w
ith
 in
terpretive de-
bate. 
 233 
W
en
del, supra n
ote 191, at 1053; accord K
U
H
N
, supra n
ote 12, at 321; P
E
T
E
R
 L
IP
T
O
N
, 
IN
FE
R
E
N
C
E
 T
O
 T
H
E
 B
E
ST
 E
X
PL
A
N
A
T
IO
N
 34 (2004). 
234 
See  R
ob R
obin
son
, D
oes Prosecutorial Experience “B
alance O
ut” a Judge’s L
iberal T
endencies?, 32 
JU
ST. S
YS. J. 143, 144 (2011) (arguin
g th
at “th
e ‘attitudin
al m
odel’ h
as proven
 rem
arkably 
robust in
 explain
in
g m
uch
 of th
e aggregate varian
ce in
 appellate decision
s” com
pared to 
oth
er m
odels m
easurin
g th
e in
fluen
ce of social backgroun
d factors); cf. Paulin
e T
. K
im
, 
L
ow
er C
ourt D
iscretion, 82 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 383, 395–407 (2007) (arguin
g th
at th
e attitudin
al 
m
odel is in
com
plete, an
d articulatin
g various critiques an
d con
cludin
g th
at law
’s in
de-
pen
den
t n
orm
ative force explain
s m
an
y judicial decision
s).  See generally S
E
G
A
L
 &
 S
PA
E
T
H
, 
supra n
ote 173 
235 
See supra n
otes 172–75 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
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 III.  C
O
N
SE
N
SU
S N
O
R
M
S, L
E
G
A
L
 P
O
SIT
IV
ISM
, A
N
D
 IN
T
E
R
PR
E
T
IV
E
 
C
O
N
T
R
O
V
E
R
SY 
In
 th
is Part, I explore aspects of Skeletal N
orm
’s th
eoretical con
-
servatism
 in
 detail.  First, I argue th
at th
is kin
d of accoun
t is m
ore 
con
sisten
t th
an
 altern
atives w
ith
 our best goin
g gen
eral th
eory of law
, 
th
e legal positivism
 developed by H
an
s K
elsen
, given
 defin
itive for-
m
ulation
 by H
.L
.A
. H
art, an
d refin
ed over th
e last h
alf cen
tury by Jo-
seph
 R
az, L
eslie G
reen
, Joh
n
 G
ardn
er, an
d oth
ers. 236  E
xplain
in
g th
is 
con
sisten
cy also m
akes clear th
at th
is accoun
t is con
sisten
t w
ith
 cur-
ren
t, on
goin
g em
pirical research
 program
s in
 law
.  Secon
d, I address 
in
terpretive con
troversy.  T
h
e clash
 of rival th
eories of con
stitution
al 
in
terpretation
 h
as tw
o salien
t con
sequen
ces.  In
terpretive con
troversy 
is th
e ph
en
om
en
on
 th
at m
otivates D
w
orkin
’s “th
eoretical disagree-
m
en
t” objection
 to legal positivism
.  If Suprem
e C
ourt Justices’ disa-
greein
g about th
e proper th
eory of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
 con
-
stitutes disagreem
en
t about th
e criteria of legal validity, th
e argum
en
t 
goes, th
an
 eith
er w
e h
ave n
o settled rule of recogn
ition
 for con
stitu-
tion
al law
 or th
ere is som
eth
in
g w
ron
g w
ith
 H
art’s accoun
t of th
e rule 
of recogn
ition
 as a social rule. 237  SN
 gen
erates a n
ew
 refutation
 of th
e 
th
eoretical disagreem
en
t lin
e as it relates to con
stitution
al law
. 238  A
d-
dition
ally, in
terpretive con
troversy dom
in
ates con
stitution
al th
eory.  
SN
 creates a path
 aroun
d in
terpretive debate so th
at th
eorists m
ay 
proceed w
ith
 oth
er in
quiries w
ith
out so m
uch
 in
terpretive th
roat 
clearin
g.  O
r so I sh
all argue. 
From
 th
e taxon
om
y developed above w
e can
 group tw
o clusters of 
view
s th
at dom
in
ate m
odern
 con
stitution
al th
eory—
value-laden
 th
eo-
ries an
d in
terpretive th
eories. 239  B
oth
 are n
orm
ative:  V
alue-laden
 
th
eories are th
ose th
eories of law
 or adjudication
 in
 w
h
ich
 th
e con
sti-
 236 
See G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 146, at 199–200 (n
otin
g as a m
atter of in
tellectual h
istory th
at 
“[t]h
ose com
m
on
ly said to con
stitute th
e dom
in
an
t h
istorical figures of th
e ‘legal positiv-
ist tradition
’” in
clude “T
h
om
as H
obbes, Jerem
y B
en
th
am
, Joh
n
 A
ustin
, H
an
s K
elsen
, an
d 
H
erbert H
art”); B
rian
 L
eiter, T
he End of Em
pire:  D
w
orkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st C
en-
tury, 36 R
U
T
G
E
R
S L
.J. 165, 168 (2004) (n
otin
g th
at th
e cen
tral an
d m
ost abstract question
s 
of gen
eral jurispruden
ce h
ave been
 pursued after H
art by R
az, G
reen
, G
ardn
er, an
d oth
-
ers).  See generally R
A
Z, supra n
ote 167; G
reen
, supra n
ote 157 (discussin
g H
.L
.A
. H
A
R
T, 
T
H
E
 C
O
N
C
E
PT
 O
F L
A
W
 (2d. ed. 1994)). 
237 
See D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 4–6 (arguin
g th
at in
terpretive disagreem
en
t is disagree-
m
en
t about “law
’s groun
ds”); Scott J. Sh
apiro, T
he ‘H
art-D
w
orkin’ D
ebate:  A
 Short G
uide for 
the Perplexed, in R
O
N
A
L
D
 D
W
O
R
K
IN
 22, 49 (A
rth
ur R
ipstein
 ed., 2007) (updatin
g an
d re-
form
ulatin
g th
e “th
eoretical disagreem
en
t” objection
 in
 L
aw
’s Em
pire an
d distin
guish
in
g it 
from
 D
w
orkin
’s “sem
an
tic stin
g” objection
). 
238 
For oth
er respon
ses, see L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1215 (form
ulatin
g “disin
gen
uity” an
d 
“error th
eory” respon
ses to th
e objection
). 
239 
See supra Part II.A
.1 for m
y m
ore detailed taxon
om
y. 
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tution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e h
ave are said to be th
ose th
at best prom
ote 
som
e value (dem
ocracy, justice, etc.) or on
 w
h
ich
 proper con
stitu-
tion
al adjudication
 h
as courts w
orkin
g to m
axim
ize som
e value. 240  In
-
terpretive th
eories are n
orm
ative th
eories of adjudication
 accordin
g 
to w
h
ich
 courts sh
ould go about discoverin
g w
h
at th
e con
stitution
al 
law
 is th
rough
 som
e particular series of steps. 241  I argue th
at m
y view
 
is superior to value-driven
 th
eories because it is m
ore con
sisten
t w
ith
 
legal positivism
 an
d th
at m
y view
 is superior to in
terpretive th
eories 
because it diffuses th
e problem
 of th
eoretical disagreem
en
t in
 a 
m
an
n
er th
at in
terpretive th
eories can
n
ot. 
A
.  L
egal Positivism
 
L
egal 
positivism
 
is 
ch
aracterized 
by 
its 
tw
o 
core 
claim
s—
th
e 
“sources” th
esis an
d th
e “social rule” or “con
ven
tion
ality” th
esis. 242  
T
h
e sources th
esis is th
at n
orm
s m
ay be ren
dered legally valid solely 
in
 virtue of th
eir sources, w
ith
out recourse to th
eir m
erits. 243  In
 oth
er 
w
ords, a legal system
’s ultim
ate criteria of legal validity, viz. th
e con
-
ten
t of its rule of recogn
ition
, n
eed n
ot in
clude m
erits-based crite-
ria. 244  T
h
e social rule th
esis is th
at a legal system
’s ultim
ate rule of 
recogn
ition
 is a social rule th
at is establish
ed by em
pirical fact, n
am
e-
ly, th
e existen
ce of a pattern
 of con
vergen
t practice by legal officials 
dem
on
stratin
g th
at th
ey accept th
e relevan
t criteria of legal validity as 
obligatory. 245  T
h
e rule of recogn
ition
 is th
us n
ot a legal rule; it is n
ot 
itself validated by satisfyin
g criteria of legal validity—
to h
old oth
er-
w
ise is to risk in
fin
ite regress. 246  L
egal positivism
 is a th
eory of law
—
a 
“view
 th
at explain
s th
e crucial question
 th
at arises about law
:  N
am
ely, 
h
ow
 do w
e determ
in
e w
h
ich
 n
orm
s in
 an
y society are n
orm
s of th
e 
legal system
, th
at is, n
orm
s th
at are ‘legally valid.’”
247  It is our best go-
 240 
See, e.g., A
lexan
der, supra n
ote 154, at 3–5 (providin
g “m
oralist” th
eory exam
ples). 
241 
See supra n
otes 176–81 (listin
g in
terpretive th
eory sam
ples). 
242 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 2. 
243 
See supra n
ote 167; H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 269 (arguin
g th
at “th
e existen
ce an
d con
ten
t 
of th
e law
 can
 be iden
tified by referen
ce to th
e social sources of th
e law
”); cf. R
A
Z, supra 
n
ote 167, at 37, 47–48 (arguin
g th
at legal validity m
ust be based on
 a n
orm
’s sources, n
ot 
its m
erits); G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 149, at 200–01 (discussin
g version
s of th
e sources th
esis). 
244 
See H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 269 (discussin
g th
e differen
ce betw
een
 law
 an
d m
orality).  
T
h
is is an
 in
clusive positivist form
ulation
 of th
e sources th
esis an
d its im
plication
s, an
d I 
use it h
ere n
ot because it is n
ecessarily m
y view
 but because it w
as H
art’s view
 an
d because 
it facilitates th
e discussion
 to com
e.  For th
e “h
ard” positivist version
, see infra n
ote 272. 
245 
H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 32, 94–95, 100–10; see also supra n
otes 165–68 an
d accom
pan
yin
g 
text. 
246 
See Joh
n
 G
ardn
er, C
an T
here B
e a W
ritten C
onstitution?, in 1 O
X
FO
R
D
 S
T
U
D
IE
S IN
 P
H
IL. O
F 
L
A
W
 162–94 (B
rian
 L
eiter &
 L
eslie G
reen
 eds., 2011). 
247 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 16, at 2. 
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in
g positive th
eory of law
, alth
ough
 I w
on
’t defen
d th
at claim
 at 
len
gth
 h
ere because th
e defen
se h
as been
 m
ade at len
gth
 else-
w
h
ere. 248  I w
ill argue, h
ow
ever, th
at SN
 is m
ore con
sisten
t w
ith
 legal 
positivism
 th
an
 com
petin
g th
eories of con
stitution
al law
, such
 as th
e 
value-laden
 th
eories, an
d th
at th
is is an
 im
portan
t reason
 to prefer 
SN
.  So far, th
ere is n
o accoun
t of con
stitution
al n
orm
 iden
tification
 
th
at is w
h
olly com
patible w
ith
 legal positivism
. 
N
orm
s th
at com
port w
ith
 th
e criteria of legal validity con
tain
ed in
 
a legal system
’s rule of recogn
ition
 are law
 in
 th
e system
. 249  A
ccord-
in
gly, to iden
tify th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e h
ave, positivism
 
suggests th
at w
e look for th
e A
m
erican
 rule of recogn
ition
’s criteria 
of legal validity for con
stitution
al n
orm
s. 250  H
ow
ever, th
us far w
e h
ave 
n
o com
preh
en
sive accoun
t of our ow
n
 rule of recogn
ition
—
on
ly a 
h
an
dful of th
eorists h
ave attem
pted to m
ap its con
ten
t
251 an
d th
eir 
accoun
ts are in
com
plete. 252  G
ardn
er n
otes th
at rules of recogn
ition
, 
in
cludin
g th
e ultim
ate criteria of legal validity m
ay be “in
determ
in
ate 
in
 n
um
erous respects.”
253  T
h
is is especially likely for criteria of legal 
 248 
See, e.g., id. at 13–20 (con
siderin
g an
d h
igh
ligh
tin
g th
e sh
ortcom
in
gs of various altern
a-
tives to legal positivism
, in
cludin
g n
atural law
 th
eories, Scan
din
avian
 an
d A
m
erican
 legal 
realism
, an
d D
w
orkin
’s “law
 as in
tegrity”); G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 146, at 199 (defen
din
g 
positivism
’s core claim
s again
st a variety of objection
s or ch
aracterization
s predicated on
 
con
fusion
s about th
e core claim
s); see also R
A
Z, supra n
ote 167, at 47–48. 
249 
See H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 97–98 (arguin
g th
at n
orm
s of basically an
y source—
legislation
, 
judicial decision
s, custom
s, etc.—
can
 be law
 if officials treat th
em
 as law
 un
der th
e rule of 
recogn
ition
). 
250 
A
 legal system
 m
ay h
ave m
ultiple rules of recogn
ition
, but it m
ust h
ave an
 “ultim
ate” rule 
of recogn
ition
 by w
h
ich
 th
e m
ost fun
dam
en
tal legal rules of th
e system
 are validated an
d 
w
h
ich
 m
ust itself be a social rule.  See supra n
ote 167, at 100-110; R
A
Z, T
he Identity of L
egal 
System
s, in T
H
E
 A
U
T
H
O
R
IT
Y O
F L
A
W
, supra n
ote 167, at 95–96.  A
n
d, rules of recogn
ition
 
can
 be com
plex, com
prisin
g m
ultiple criteria of legal validity th
at m
ay be con
dition
ally 
applicable to on
e form
 of purported legal n
orm
 but n
ot oth
ers—
do n
ot be m
isled on
 th
is 
score by th
e idea th
at th
e criteria con
stitute a “rule” of recogn
ition
.  See H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 
16, at 110 (n
otin
g th
at rules of recogn
ition
 are establish
ed in
 a “com
plex” social prac-
tice); 
A
.W
.B
. 
Sim
pson
, 
T
he 
C
om
m
on 
L
aw
 
and 
L
egal 
T
heory, 
in 
O
X
FO
R
D
 
E
SSA
YS 
IN
 
JU
R
ISPR
U
D
E
N
C
E 77, 87 (A
.W
.B
. Sim
pson
 ed., 1973) (observin
g th
at rules of recogn
ition
, as 
collection
s of poten
tially ch
an
gin
g practices, are n
ot especially “rule-like” in
 th
e con
ven
-
tion
al sen
se; th
ey’re m
essier).  See also A
n
th
on
y J. Sebok, Is the R
ule of R
ecognition a R
ule?, 
72 N
O
T
R
E
 D
A
M
E
 L
. R
E
V. 1539, 1539–40 (1997) (suggestin
g th
at w
e better con
ceive of a set 
of practices of recogn
ition
). 
251 
See, e.g., K
en
t G
reen
aw
alt, T
he R
ule of R
ecognition and the C
onstitution, 85 M
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 621, 
625–32 (1987); K
en
n
eth
 E
in
ar H
im
m
a, Final A
uthority to B
ind w
ith M
oral M
istakes:  O
n the 
Explanatory Potential of Inclusive L
egal Positivism
, 24 L
A
W
 &
 P
H
IL. 1, 2 (2005); K
en
n
eth
 E
in
ar 
H
im
m
a, M
aking Sense of C
onstitutional D
isagreem
ent:  L
egal Positivism
, T
he B
ill of R
ights, and 
the C
onventional R
ule of R
ecognition in the U
nited States, 4 J.L
. S
O
C’Y 149, 153 (2003). 
252 
See Steph
en
 V
. C
arey, W
hat is the R
ule of R
ecognition in the U
nited States?, 157 U
. P
A. L
. R
E
V. 
1161, 1176–92 (2009) (can
vassin
g critiques of G
reen
aw
alt’s an
d H
im
m
a’s accoun
ts). 
253 
G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 246, at 32. 
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validity for con
stitution
al law
, given
 th
e debates betw
een
 con
stitu-
tion
al th
eory claim
s belon
gin
g to th
eories of law
. 254 
H
ow
, th
en
, sh
ould w
e approach
 th
e n
orm
 iden
tification
 question
?  
W
ith
out a com
plete accoun
t of our ultim
ate rule of recogn
ition
 w
ith
 
respect to con
stitution
al n
orm
s, w
e m
igh
t do w
ell to look for n
orm
s 
th
at appear to sit at th
e cen
ter of con
vergen
t official practice—
as I 
h
ave don
e above. 255  N
orm
s supported by such
 a con
sen
sus are m
ore 
likely to be legally valid in
sofar as th
ey are surroun
ded by th
e in
dicia 
of official acceptan
ce th
at are th
e h
allm
arks of a fun
ction
in
g rule of 
recogn
ition
—
th
at is, n
orm
s broadly accepted as legally valid seem
 
m
ore likely to be con
sisten
t w
ith
 con
sen
sus-supported criteria of legal 
validity
256 th
an
, say, n
orm
s advocated by origin
alist judges but disput-
ed by livin
g con
stitution
alist judges. 257  In
deed, th
ere is n
o th
eoretical 
obstacle to our (or an
y) rule of recogn
ition
 validatin
g som
e n
orm
s as 
law
 just in
 virtue of th
eir broad an
d durable acceptan
ce as legally 
bin
din
g by legal officials; all th
is w
ould require is a pattern
 of official 
acceptan
ce recogn
izin
g th
at in
 som
e circum
stan
ces pattern
s of offi-
cial acceptan
ce are sufficien
t for legal validity. 
Such
 n
orm
s are an
alogous to n
orm
s of custom
ary law
; th
at is, law
 
w
h
ich
 “in foro requires for its existen
ce a tem
porally exten
ded pattern
 
of relatively con
vergen
t beh
avior by m
ultiple law
-applyin
g officials” 
w
h
ich
 pattern
 suggests th
at th
e officials accept th
e custom
 as legally 
bin
din
g. 258  C
ustom
ary n
orm
s m
ay becom
e constitutional law
 n
orm
s 
upon
 a lon
g-term
 pattern
 of legal officials’ acceptin
g th
at th
e n
orm
s 
h
ave con
stitution
al status. 259  Im
portan
tly, w
h
ile th
e form
ation
 of a 
system
’s rule of recogn
ition
 requires a pattern
 of con
vergen
t official 
practice recogn
izin
g a set of validity criteria, legal obligation
s th
em
-
selves do n
ot require such
 a pattern
 to be operative legal obliga-
 254 
See supra n
otes 155–70 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
255 
C
f. G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 246, at 15–16 (arguin
g th
at “ultim
ate rules of recogn
ition
,” w
h
ich
 
h
e calls con
stitution
al rules th
at are “above th
e law
,” are m
atters of social fact, iden
tifiable 
accordin
g to th
eir place at th
e cen
ter of con
vergen
t practices). 
256 
C
f. L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1224 (suggestin
g th
at sin
cere debate am
on
g legal officials 
about th
e criteria of legal validity sh
ow
s th
at th
ere is n
o rule of recogn
ition
, an
d th
us n
o 
pre-existin
g legal an
sw
er on
 th
e disputed issue). 
257 
For a discussion
 of livin
g con
stitution
alism
, see gen
erally D
A
V
ID
 A
. S
T
R
A
U
SS, T
H
E
 L
IV
IN
G
 
C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 (2010); B
ruce A
ckerm
an
, T
he L
iving C
onstitution, 120 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. 1737 
(2007). 
258 
G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 246, at 34; see also H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 44–48, 97–98 (arguin
g th
at 
a rule of recogn
ition
 could validate custom
); Sch
auer, supra n
ote 18, at 531 (discussin
g 
th
e idea of custom
s becom
in
g law
 un
der a positivist rule of recogn
ition
). 
259 
See G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 246, at 5 (arguin
g th
at, on
 a positivist accoun
t, n
orm
s gain
 con
sti-
tution
al status from
 th
e con
vergen
t beh
avior of “th
e law
-applyin
g officials w
h
o . . . treat 
th
em
 as h
avin
g th
at status”). 
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tion
s. 260  T
h
e rule of recogn
ition
 m
ay recogn
ize duly en
acted legisla-
tion
, judicial decision
s, an
d so forth
, as legally bin
din
g in
 virtue of 
th
eir sources regardless of an
y official beh
avior or public attitudes 
about th
e specific legal n
orm
 em
bodied in
 th
e statute or decision
. 261  
B
ut th
is does n
ot rule out th
e possibility th
at som
e n
orm
s—
like cus-
tom
ary law
 n
orm
s—
m
ay be legally valid in
 virtue of pattern
s of con
-
vergen
t practice alon
e, or perh
aps in
 com
bin
ation
 w
ith
 th
e satisfac-
tion
 
of 
oth
er 
validity 
criteria 
if 
con
vergen
t 
practice 
alon
e 
is 
in
sufficien
t un
der th
e particular rule of recogn
ition
. 262  T
h
e State-
Preclusion
-T
h
esis-like n
orm
s I h
ypoth
esize h
ere m
ay be con
stitution
al 
n
orm
s of th
e form
 of custom
ary law
; 263 but w
h
ere th
e custom
 arises 
am
on
g legal officials rath
er th
an
 som
e segm
en
t of th
e gen
eral pub-
lic. 264  T
h
e Suprem
e C
ourt frequen
tly m
akes statem
en
ts of th
e form
 
 260 
See L
eiter, supra n
ote 236, at 171 (“D
w
orkin
 dem
on
strated quite persuasively th
at H
art w
as 
m
istaken
 to claim
 th
at th
e existen
ce of a duty alw
ays requires th
e existen
ce of . . . a prac-
tice of con
vergen
t beh
avior in
 w
h
ich
 th
ose en
gaged in
 th
e beh
avior accept a rule describ-
in
g th
eir con
duct as a stan
dard to w
h
ich
 th
ey felt boun
d to adh
ere.”). 
261 
H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 97–98. 
262 
T
h
is is n
ot to say eith
er th
at con
sen
sus on
 in
dividual n
orm
s’ legal validity is a gen
eral re-
quirem
en
t of an
y rule of recogn
ition
 or th
at th
e absen
ce of con
sen
sus on
 n
orm
s’ legal va-
lidity alw
ays dem
on
strates a putative n
orm
’s in
validity or th
e absen
ce of con
sen
sus validity 
criteria in
 th
e area.  N
eith
er is n
ecessarily true.  A
 rule of recogn
ition
 can
 in
 prin
ciple (1) 
validate con
sen
sus n
orm
s in
 virtue of th
e con
sen
sus alon
e; (2) validate legislated n
orm
s 
in
 virtue of th
eir h
avin
g been
 duly legislated alon
e; (3) validate con
stitution
al n
orm
s in
 
virtue of th
eir derivability accordin
g to som
e particular in
terpretive m
eth
od (or a set of 
approved in
terpretive m
eth
ods).  In
deed, a com
plex rule of recogn
ition
 m
igh
t con
tain
 all 
of th
ese criteria an
d m
ore. 
263 
H
ere, I am
 assum
in
g th
at judges an
d Justices tacitly accept SPT
-like n
orm
s ex an
te, before 
th
ey form
ulate im
plem
en
tin
g doctrin
es an
d ren
der decision
s con
sisten
t w
ith
 th
e n
orm
s.  
I h
ave elsew
h
ere explored a sligh
tly differen
t accoun
t of h
ow
 th
ese n
orm
s m
igh
t be ac-
cepted, see G
arrick B
. Pursley, Properties in C
onstitutional System
s, 92 N
.C
. L
. R
E
V. 547, 584–
89 (2014) (review
in
g A
drian
 V
erm
eule, T
H
E
 S
YST
E
M
 O
F T
H
E
 C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 (2011)), an
 
accoun
t th
at diverges sligh
tly from
 H
art’s view
 th
at acceptan
ce from
 “th
e in
tern
al poin
t of 
view
” requires a con
scious decision
 to abide by a n
orm
 view
ed as legally obligatory.  H
A
R
T, 
supra n
ote 16, at 255.  If, in
stead, n
orm
s sim
ply em
erge as durable pattern
s in
 con
stitu-
tion
al decision
s over tim
e—
as em
ergen
t properties of th
e con
stitution
al system
—
w
e 
m
igh
t exten
d H
art’s con
ception
 of h
ow
 criteria of legal validity becom
e part of a system
’s 
rule of recogn
ition
 to in
clude som
eth
in
g oth
er th
an
 stan
dard, con
scious adoption
.  See 
Pursley, supra, at 585–88. 
264 
M
y view
 is n
ot a form
 of popular con
stitution
alism
, alth
ough
 it is com
patible w
ith
 popular 
con
stitution
alist th
eories.  See supra, n
ote 190.  O
n
 H
art’s view
, th
e con
sen
sus of legal offi-
cials on
 th
e criteria of legal validity is a cen
tral feature of legal system
s, H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 
16, at 94–95, even
 if th
ere also m
ay be a public con
sen
sus, th
e tw
o are n
ot n
ecessarily 
con
n
ected an
d th
e latter is n
ot n
ecessarily required.  H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 60–61, 116.  
H
ow
ever, th
is view
 n
eith
er requires n
or precludes th
e possibility th
at our rule of recogn
i-
tion
 m
igh
t con
tain
 criteria th
at validate popularly accepted n
orm
s.  See G
ardn
er, supra 
n
ote 246, at 34 (discussin
g custom
ary law
); A
bn
er S. G
reen
, W
hat is C
onstitutional O
bliga-
tion, 93 B
.U
.L
. R
E
V. 1239, 1245–46 &
 n
.37 (2013) (“H
art says on
ly official acceptan
ce is 
n
ecessary, but h
e does n
ot say rules of recogn
ition
 m
ay n
ot in
clude citizen
 participa-
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“w
e h
ave lon
g accepted,” “it is w
ell-establish
ed,” or “courts accept,” 
w
h
ich
 suggest th
at our rule of recogn
ition
 m
igh
t w
ell in
corporate a 
criterion
 of legal validity for pattern
s of official con
sen
sus. 265 
N
ow
 con
trast, in
 term
s of con
sisten
cy w
ith
 legal positivism
, a value-
based th
eory of law
 on
 w
h
ich
 th
e con
stitution
al law
 con
sists in
 th
ose 
n
orm
s th
at best prom
ote a substan
tive value like social justice. 266  
T
h
ough
 a rule of recogn
ition
 on
 th
e “exclusive” legal positivist view
 
m
ay in
corporate on
ly source-based criteria of legal validity:  “in
clu-
sive” legal positivism
 h
olds th
at an
y given
 rule of recogn
ition
 m
ay in
-
clude evaluative criteria (alth
ough
 n
o rule of recogn
ition
 n
eed do 
so). 267  B
ut on
 eith
er positivist view
, w
h
ere a con
sen
sus of officials ac-
cepts criteria th
at validate th
e n
orm
 as bin
din
g, w
e n
eed n
ot be con
-
cern
ed w
ith
 th
e reason
s w
h
y th
ey decide in
 a m
an
n
er th
at suggests 
 
tion
”); cf. Steph
en
 Perry, W
here H
ave A
ll the Pow
ers G
one?   H
artian R
ules of R
ecognition, 
N
oncognitivism
, and the C
onstitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations of L
aw
, in T
H
E
 R
U
L
E
 O
F 
R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 A
N
D
 T
H
E
 U
.S. C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
 295, 300 (M
atth
ew
 D
. A
dler &
 K
en
n
eth
 E
in
ar 
H
im
m
a eds., 2009) (suggestin
g th
at H
art’s rules of recogn
ition
 m
igh
t exclude popular 
acceptan
ce as a validity criterion
); M
atth
ew
 D
. A
dler, Popular C
onstitutionalism
 and the R
ule 
of R
ecognition: W
hose Practices G
round U
.S. L
aw
?, 100 N
W
. U
. L
. R
E
V. 719, 720–33 (2006) 
(sam
e). 
265 
See, e.g., Sh
elby C
n
ty. v. H
older, 133 S. C
t. 2612, 2636 (2013) (“It is w
ell establish
ed th
at 
C
on
gress’ judgm
en
t regardin
g exercise of its pow
er to en
force th
e Fourteen
th
 an
d Fif-
teen
th
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts w
arran
ts substan
tial deferen
ce.”); O
lim
 v. W
akin
ekon
a, 461 U
.S. 
238, 249 &
 n
.12 (1983) (“[C
]ourts agree th
at an
 expectation
 of receivin
g process is n
ot, 
w
ith
out m
ore, a liberty in
terest protected by th
e D
ue Process C
lause.”). 
266 
See, 
e.g., 
L
A
W
R
E
N
C
E
 G
. S
A
G
E
R, JU
ST
IC
E
 
IN
 P
L
A
IN
C
L
O
T
H
E
S: 
 A
 T
H
E
O
R
Y 
O
F A
M
E
R
IC
A
N
 
C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 P
R
A
C
T
IC
E
 71
 (2004) (arguin
g th
at con
stitution
al n
orm
s sh
ould be iden
-
tified on
 an
 accoun
t of th
e C
on
stitution
 as a “justice seekin
g” collection
 of n
orm
s); cf. 
D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, 178 (arguin
g th
at th
e law
 is th
at w
h
ich
 best fits an
d m
orally justi-
fies th
e oth
er legal n
orm
s of th
e legal system
). 
267 
W
h
eth
er th
is is th
e best accoun
t of th
e gen
eral structure of rules of recogn
ition
 rem
ain
s 
open
 to debate.  T
h
is view
 is ch
aracteristic of in
clusive legal positivism
, an
d seem
s to be 
th
e view
 th
at H
art h
im
self accepted.  H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 253, 269 (m
ain
tain
in
g th
at 
“th
e existen
ce an
d con
ten
t of law
 can
 be iden
tified by referen
ce to th
e social sources of 
law
”); see also G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 149, at 200–01 (discussin
g various form
ulation
s of th
e 
source th
esis, w
h
ich
 h
e states as “(L
P*) In
 an
y legal system
, w
h
eth
er a given
 n
orm
 is legal-
ly valid, an
d h
en
ce w
h
eth
er it form
s part of th
e law
 of th
e system
, depen
ds on
 its sources, 
n
ot its m
erits (w
h
ere its m
erits, in
 th
e relevan
t sen
se, in
clude th
e m
erits of its sources)”).  
A
 stron
ger statem
en
t of th
e sources th
esis h
as it th
at a legal system
’s ultim
ate rule of 
recogn
ition
 can
n
ot in
corporate m
erits-based criteria.  See, e.g., R
A
Z, supra n
ote 167, at 45–
52 (discussin
g version
s of th
e th
esis an
d defen
din
g, in
 th
e en
d, a stron
ger version
, i.e. th
at 
law
s are valid solely in
 virtue of th
eir sources an
d n
ot th
eir m
erits).  D
efen
ders of th
e first 
form
ulation
 are “soft” or “in
clusive” positivists (because th
ey in
clude th
e possibility of 
som
e legal system
s w
ith
 m
erits-based validity criteria); defen
ders of th
e latter version
 are 
“h
ard” or “exclusive” positivists (because on
 th
eir view
 m
erits-based criteria can
n
ot be cri-
teria of legal validity).  G
ardn
er, supra n
ote 149, at 200–01.  O
n
 in
clusive legal positivism
, 
see generally W
IL
L
IA
M
 J. W
A
L
U
C
H
O
W
, IN
C
L
U
SIV
E
 L
E
G
A
L
 P
O
SIT
IV
ISM
 (1994); K
en
n
eth
 E
in
ar 
H
im
m
a, Inclusive L
egal Positivism
, in T
H
E
 O
X
FO
R
D
 H
A
N
D
B
O
O
K
 O
F JU
R
ISP
R
U
D
E
N
C
E
 A
N
D
 
P
H
IL
O
SO
PH
Y O
F L
A
W
 125 (Jules C
olem
an
 &
 Scott J. Sh
apiro eds., 2002). 
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acceptan
ce of th
e relevan
t criteria. 268  T
h
us a system
’s rule of recogn
i-
tion
 m
ay validate n
orm
s based on
 th
eir m
erits, validate custom
ary 
n
orm
s based on
 a con
sen
sus th
at th
ey are law
, or validate n
orm
s th
at 
both
 en
joy con
sen
sus acceptan
ce and com
ply w
ith
 m
erits criteria. 
V
alue-based th
eories of law
 are in
 ten
sion
 w
ith
 positivism
’s social 
fact th
esis.  T
h
ere is substan
tial debate about th
e proper value criteria 
on
 w
h
ich
 to assess com
petin
g claim
s about th
e con
ten
t of con
stitu-
tion
al n
orm
s.  In
 addition
 to th
e various claim
s th
at Φ
 or Ψ
 is th
e 
prin
cipal value a n
orm
 m
ust advan
ce to be properly con
sidered a val-
id n
orm
 of con
stitution
al law
; oth
er accoun
ts com
bin
e m
ultiple val-
ues in
 various w
ays. 269  T
h
is m
akes it difficult to square value-driven
 
th
eories w
ith
 legal positivism
, sin
ce th
e debate about values w
ould 
seem
 to forestall th
e possibility of official con
sen
sus on
 value-based 
criteria of legal validity. 270  In
 an
y case, m
y claim
 h
ere is n
ot th
at SPT
-
like n
orm
s exhaust th
e set of con
stitution
al n
orm
s—
th
at is, I am
 n
ot 
claim
in
g th
at our rule of recogn
ition
 is occupied solely by criteria 
th
at validate custom
ary n
orm
s as law
.  M
y m
odest claim
 is th
at SPT
-
like n
orm
s validated by cross-th
eoretical con
sen
sus m
ay be som
e of 
our con
stitution
al n
orm
s.  In
 oth
er w
ords, I am
 speculatin
g th
at w
h
ile 
value-based requirem
en
ts m
ay be part of our rule of recogn
ition
, th
ey 
are likely n
ot th
e only criteria, or m
an
datory criteria (th
at is, n
ecessary 
con
dition
s) for th
e validity of con
stitution
al n
orm
s.  N
orm
s m
igh
t be 
validated by satisfyin
g on
e of m
ultiple subsets of criteria of legal valid-
ity, som
e of w
h
ich
 m
igh
t in
corporate evaluative criteria an
d oth
ers 
n
ot. 271  T
h
e poin
t h
ere is just th
at on
e validity criterion
 m
igh
t be 
w
h
eth
er th
ere is a durable con
sen
sus as to th
e legal an
d con
stitution
-
al status of th
e relevan
t proposition
. 272 
O
n
 th
is view
 of our rule of recogn
ition
, w
e could categorize cer-
tain
 n
orm
s as part of th
e C
on
stitution
 by observin
g th
e fact of th
eir 
gen
eral acceptan
ce as illustrated by pattern
s of con
vergen
t official 
beh
avior w
ith
out regard to th
e officials’ reason
s for acceptin
g th
e 
n
orm
.  O
n
 a value-driven
 view
, w
e could n
ot m
ake sen
se of th
e idea 
of official acceptan
ce con
stitutin
g prim
a facie eviden
ce of legal validi-
ty—
w
e w
ould n
eed to kn
ow
 th
e officials’ reason
s for acceptan
ce, an
d 
 268 
See supra n
otes 231–33 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
269 
See supra n
ote 206; D
orf, supra n
ote 193, at 595–96 (discussin
g value disagreem
en
t). 
270 
See D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 4–6; L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1220–22 (discussin
g th
is kin
d 
of dispute an
d its effect on
 th
e social fact th
esis). 
271 
See supra n
ote 250 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text (discussin
g com
plex rules of recogn
ition
). 
272 
T
h
is seem
s to be th
e sim
plest form
 of validity criterion
 a system
’s legal officials m
igh
t 
adopt, at least in
sofar as it is sim
ilar to th
e criteria by w
h
ich
 w
e validate th
e rule of recog-
n
ition
 itself, n
am
ely a con
vergen
t pattern
 of acceptan
ce an
d th
e requisite attitude.  See 
H
A
R
T, supra n
ote 16, at 94–105 (discussin
g th
e process of social rule form
ation
). 
D
ec. 2015] 
SK
EL
ET
A
L
 N
O
R
M
S 
411 
 
on
ly if th
eir reason
s m
atch
 our basic value proposition
 an
d th
e n
orm
 
itself advan
ces th
e value could w
e explain
 w
h
y th
ey legitim
ately ac-
cept th
e n
orm
 as legally bin
din
g.  Such
 a view
 w
ill also frequen
tly re-
quire us to ch
aracterize som
e n
orm
s th
at clearly are accepted by a 
con
sen
sus of legal officials as n
ot legitim
ately part of th
e C
on
stitution
 
(th
at th
e officials’ acceptan
ce of th
e n
orm
s is in
 error) because th
e 
n
orm
 does n
ot satisfy our value criterion
.  B
oth
 possibilities are in
-
con
sisten
t w
ith
 th
e social fact th
esis; 273 but both
 are likely to arise fre-
quen
tly on
 a value-based con
stitution
al th
eory of law
 because of th
e 
deep disagreem
en
t am
on
g officials on
 question
s of political an
d 
m
oral value. 274  SN
, by con
trast, can
 recon
cile value criteria w
ith
 legal 
positivism
 by suggestin
g th
at both
 con
sen
sus n
orm
s an
d deep disa-
greem
en
t about values can
 obtain
 un
der a sin
gle, adm
ittedly com
-
plex, rule of recogn
ition
. 275  T
h
is approach
 h
elps explain
 h
ow
 w
e can
 
observe both deep disagreem
en
t on
 question
s of political m
orality an
d 
con
stitution
al in
terpretation
 an
d relatively robust stability an
d dura-
bility in
 our con
stitution
al system
. 
B
.  Interpretive C
ontroversy and T
heoretical D
isagreem
ent 
T
h
e State Preclusion
 T
h
esis an
d th
e oth
er h
ypoth
etical structural 
n
orm
s th
at I propose w
e use to augm
en
t our explan
atory accoun
t of 
structural doctrin
e are abstract for a variety of reason
s; but on
e im
-
portan
t ben
efit of th
eir abstractn
ess is th
at th
ey m
igh
t be affirm
ed by 
adh
eren
ts to m
ost m
ajor th
eories of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
. 276  
T
h
is suggests th
at som
e basic con
sen
suses survive th
e clash
 of in
ter-
pretive th
eories.  O
f course, m
y prim
ary goal h
ere is explan
atory—
I 
w
an
t to explain
 w
h
at courts are doin
g in
 structural cases an
d, accord-
in
gly, if th
ese n
orm
s are th
e best explan
ation
 of th
e doctrin
e an
d re-
sults w
e observe, I’m
 n
ot terribly con
cern
ed w
ith
 th
e exten
t to w
h
ich
 
in
terpretive th
eorists agree th
at th
e n
orm
s are validly derived from
 
 273 
See supra n
otes 245–46 an
d accom
pan
yin
g text. 
274 
See supra Part II.A
.1 (discussin
g com
petin
g value-based con
stitution
al th
eories of law
). 
275 
E
ven
 in
 con
sen
sus n
orm
 im
plem
en
tation
, value debates about h
ow
 to craft im
plem
en
tin
g 
rules to furth
er th
is or th
at value m
ay (an
d probably w
ill) occur. 
276 
See Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 514–528 (givin
g reason
s w
h
y adh
eren
ts of various in
terpretive 
th
eories could accept SPT
).  Strict con
stitution
al textualists m
igh
t den
y SPT
’s validity just 
because it is an
 un
w
ritten
 n
orm
, see for exam
ple Joh
n
 F. M
an
n
in
g, Federalism
 and the G
en-
erality Problem
 in C
onstitutional Interpretation, 122 H
A
R
V. L
. R
E
V. 2003, 2013–20 (2009) 
(den
yin
g th
e legitim
acy of un
w
ritten
 structural n
orm
s tout court).  B
ut in
ferrin
g SPT
 re-
quires on
ly th
e m
odest assum
ption
 th
at th
e obvious in
ten
tion
 to m
ake th
e C
on
stitution
 
durable, w
h
ich
 seem
s sufficien
tly fun
dam
en
tal to th
eir purpose of a C
on
stitution
 as to be 
a relatively un
con
troversial im
putation
, is relevan
t to in
terpretation
, an
 assum
ption
 th
at 
even
 strict textualists w
ould be h
ard pressed to den
y.  Pursley, supra n
ote 9, at 534–36. 
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JO
U
R
N
A
L
 O
F C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 L
A
W
 
[V
ol. 18:2 
 
th
e C
on
stitution
.  T
h
is is a breakth
rough
 in
 at least tw
o sen
ses:  It can
 
h
elp advan
ce con
stitution
al th
eory past in
terpretive debate an
d it can
 
provide a n
ew
 an
sw
er to th
e “th
eoretical disagreem
en
t” objection
 to 
legal positivism
. 
B
ut it is easy en
ough
, if it appears th
at all con
stitution
al question
s 
h
an
g in
 suspen
se un
til th
e in
terpretive th
eory debate is resolved, 
an
alysis of oth
er form
s of reason
in
g in
 con
stitution
al cases w
ill ten
d 
to take on
 secon
dary im
portan
ce.  Iden
tifyin
g certain
 basic con
sen
sus 
n
orm
s like SPT
, acceptable on
 m
ost th
eories of in
terpretation
, th
at 
are im
plem
en
ted in
 a variety of con
texts w
ith
 a w
ide ran
ge of doctri-
n
al m
ech
an
ism
s sh
ifts th
e focus of our n
orm
ative debates about struc-
tural doctrin
e from
 in
terpretive issues to th
e in
strum
en
tal reason
in
g 
issues th
at sh
ape doctrin
al rules on
ce th
e in
terpretive question
 is set-
tled in
 an
 operative proposition
. 277 
T
h
is is n
ot to say th
at in
terpretive debate is valueless.  It is of 
course ben
eficial to th
in
k carefully th
rough
 question
s of in
terpretive 
m
eth
od, develop coh
eren
t th
eories of in
terpretation
, an
d en
gage in
 
th
e broader n
orm
ative debates th
at often
 lurk in
 th
e backgroun
d of 
in
terpretive debates. 278  For exam
ple, on
e n
orm
ative debate th
at fre-
quen
tly goes h
an
d-in
-h
an
d w
ith
 th
e origin
alism
/n
on
-origin
alism
 de-
bate con
cern
s judicial con
strain
t:  O
rigin
alism
 in
itially w
as offered as 
a palliative for th
e coun
term
ajoritarian
 difficulty in
 virtue of its capac-
ity to con
strain
 judges an
d, by its un
yieldin
g in
sisten
ce on
 h
istorically 
fixed m
ean
in
g, preven
t th
em
 from
 “m
akin
g” law
, en
gagin
g in
 “poli-
cym
akin
g,” or revertin
g to “result-orien
ted judgin
g.”
279  L
ivin
g con
sti-
tution
alism
, by con
trast, is “juristocratic”
280—
its propon
en
ts evin
ce a 
w
ide-bodied trust in
 judges’ capacity to fairly update con
stitution
al 
m
ean
in
g in
 th
e ligh
t of ch
an
gin
g circum
stan
ces. 281  T
h
is debate is, in
 
oth
er w
ords, partly a debate about th
e actual bite of th
e coun
ter-
m
ajoritarian
 difficulty, a problem
 th
at h
as preoccupied con
stitution
al 
 277 
See B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 10, at 35–37, 61–72 (discussin
g pragm
atic con
cern
s sh
apin
g deci-
sion
 rules). 
278 
See K
erm
it R
oosevelt III, R
econstruction and R
esistance, 91 T
E
X
. L
. R
E
V. 121, 123–24 (2012) 
(review
in
g JA
C
K
 M
. B
A
L
K
IN
, L
IV
IN
G
 O
R
IG
IN
A
L
ISM
 (2011) [h
erein
after B
A
L
K
IN
, L
IV
IN
G
] an
d 
JA
C
K
 M
. B
A
L
K
IN
, C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 R
E
D
E
M
PT
IO
N
:  P
O
L
IT
IC
A
L
 F
A
IT
H
 IN
 A
N
 U
N
JU
ST
 W
O
R
L
D
 
(2011) [h
erein
after B
A
L
K
IN
, R
E
D
E
M
PT
IO
N
]). 
279 
R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 278, at 124; see, e.g., R
A
O
U
L
 B
E
R
G
E
R, G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 B
Y JU
D
IC
IA
R
Y: T
H
E
 
T
R
A
N
SFO
R
M
A
T
IO
N
 
O
F 
T
H
E
 F
O
U
R
T
E
E
N
T
H
 A
M
E
N
D
M
E
N
T
 415–20 
(1977); 
A
n
ton
in
 
Scalia, 
O
riginalism
:  T
he L
esser Evil, 57 U
. C
IN
. L
. R
E
V. 849, 863–64 (1989);. 
280 
A
lexan
der, supra n
ote 154, at 7. 
281 
See 
R
oosevelt, 
supra 
n
ote 
278, 
at 
124; 
see 
also 
A
L
E
X
A
N
D
E
R
 
M
. 
B
IC
K
E
L, 
T
H
E
 
L
E
A
ST
 
D
A
N
G
E
R
O
U
S B
R
A
N
C
H
: 
 T
H
E
 S
U
P
R
E
M
E
 C
O
U
R
T
 
A
T
 
T
H
E
 B
A
R
 
O
F P
O
L
IT
IC
S 24–26 (1962) 
(“Judges h
ave, or sh
ould h
ave, th
e leisure, th
e train
in
g, an
d th
e in
sulation
 to follow
 th
e 
w
ays of th
e sch
olar in
 pursuin
g th
e en
ds of govern
m
en
t.”). 
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th
eorists sin
ce th
e begin
n
in
g of th
e research
 program
; 282 un
til it is re-
solved th
e in
terpretive debates driven
 by con
cern
s about judicial con
-
strain
t w
ill con
tin
ue. 283  Perh
aps “n
on
e of th
e th
eories offered to ad-
dress 
th
e 
coun
term
ajoritarian
 
difficulty 
succeeds 
in
 
persuadin
g 
because th
e coun
term
ajoritarian
 difficulty an
d th
e prem
ises support-
in
g it do n
ot rest upon
 an
 accurate portrayal of th
e con
stitution
al sys-
tem
 w
e actually en
joy.”
284  A
lth
ough
 it is tan
gen
tial h
ere, th
is on
ce 
again
 poin
ts to th
e n
eed for a ren
ew
ed focus on
 positive con
stitution
-
al th
eory. 
In
 addition
, a case can
 be m
ade th
at som
e on
 both
 sides of th
e 
origin
alism
/n
on
-origin
alism
 debate are at least partly driven
 by polit-
ical m
otivation
s or a desire for certain
 substan
tive results. 285  T
h
is, too, 
suggests th
at th
e debate m
ay be irresolvable—
if th
e ch
oice of th
eories 
is a m
atter of determ
in
in
g w
h
ich
 is m
ost con
sisten
t w
ith
 on
e’s value-
related priors, 286 th
en
 Judge Posn
er w
as righ
t to suggest th
at in
terpre-
tive th
eories do n
ot h
ave “agreem
en
t-coercin
g” pow
er. 287  H
ere again
, 
th
e differen
ces betw
een
 n
orm
ative con
stitution
al th
eory an
d scien
-
tific th
eory bear em
ph
asizin
g—
people m
ay legitim
ately disagree on
 
question
s of political m
orality or oth
er con
stitution
al values; th
us th
e 
criteria for th
eory acceptan
ce in
 th
is con
text are n
ot sufficien
tly un
i-
versal to m
ake such
 coercion
 possible. 288  E
ven
 Jack B
alkin
’s gran
d ef-
 282 
T
h
e coun
term
ajoritarian
 difficulty is, accordin
g to som
e, “th
e cen
tral obsession
 of m
od-
ern
 con
stitution
al sch
olarsh
ip.”  B
arry Friedm
an
, T
he H
istory of the C
ounterm
ajoritarian D
if-
ficulty, Part O
ne:  T
he R
oad to Judicial Suprem
acy, 73 N
.Y.U
. L
. R
E
V. 333, 334 (1998); K
eith
 
W
h
ittin
gton
, Extrajudicial C
onstitutional Interpretation:  T
hree O
bjections and R
esponses, 80 
N
.C
. L
. R
E
V. 773, 777–78 (2002) (sim
ilar).  B
ickel coin
ed th
e term
 “coun
term
ajoritarian
 
difficulty” in
 1962.  B
IC
K
E
L, supra n
ote 281, at 16–18.  For an
 overview
 of th
e debate, see 
gen
erally 
B
arry 
Friedm
an
, 
T
he 
B
irth 
of 
an 
A
cadem
ic 
O
bsession: 
 
T
he 
H
istory 
of 
the 
C
ounterm
ajoritarian D
ifficulty, Part Five, 112 Y
A
L
E
 L
.J. 153 (2002). 
283 
See B
arry Friedm
an
, D
ialogue and Judicial R
eview
, 91 M
IC
H
. L
. R
E
V. 577, 584 (1993) (n
otin
g 
th
at th
e problem
 m
ay be “in
soluble”). 
284 
Id. 
285 
See R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 278, at 122–24 (“[A
]s a m
atter of actual h
istorical fact, th
e politi-
cal description
 [of th
e stakes an
d m
otivation
s in
 th
e in
terpretive th
eory debate], reduc-
tion
ist th
ough
 it m
ay be, is largely correct.”). 
286 
See R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 278, at 123 (suggestin
g th
at Presiden
t R
on
ald R
eagan
 an
d E
d 
M
eese, tw
o im
portan
t early propon
en
ts of m
odern
 origin
alism
, “w
ere n
ot abstract con
sti-
tution
al sch
olars; th
ey w
ere in
terested in
 political results like reign
in
g in
 judges”); see also 
Jam
al G
reen
e, Selling O
riginalism
, 97 G
E
O
. L
.J. 657, 680–82 (2009) (n
otin
g th
at durin
g 
Presiden
t R
eagan
’s first term
, R
epublican
s attem
pted to reign
 in
 federal judges). 
287 
Posn
er, supra n
ote 11, at 3. 
288 
See D
orf, supra n
ote 193, at 595 (“B
ecause n
o tw
o participan
ts in
 th
e debates about con
sti-
tution
al law
 an
d con
stitution
al th
eory w
ill h
ave iden
tical view
s about [question
s of con
sti-
tution
al value], th
ere w
ill be as m
an
y con
stitution
al th
eories as th
ere are people w
h
o care 
to th
in
k about con
stitution
al th
eory.”); see also B
artrum
, supra n
ote 197, at 263 (“K
uh
n
’s 
claim
 th
at un
derlyin
g value judgm
en
ts determ
in
e our th
eory ch
oices . . . rem
in
ds us th
at 
in
terpretive th
eory ch
oices are, in
 fact, ch
oices an
d suggests th
at w
e sh
ould be tran
spar-
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fort to recon
cile origin
alism
 w
ith
 livin
g con
stitution
alism
289 faces an
 
uph
ill battle so lon
g as in
ter-th
eoretical com
petition
 is driven
 by in
-
com
patible un
derlyin
g n
orm
ative agen
das. 290 
Fin
ally, on
e m
igh
t con
clude th
at both
 origin
alism
 an
d livin
g con
-
stitution
alism
 “as th
ey are con
ven
tion
ally un
derstood,” are “both
 ob-
viously defective th
eories th
at n
o sen
sible person
 w
ould h
old.”
291  A
s 
K
erm
it R
oosevelt explain
s: 
C
lassic livin
g con
stitution
alism
 is silly for all th
e reason
s con
servatives 
poin
t out.  T
h
e idea th
at judges m
ust som
etim
es, som
eh
ow
 “update” th
e 
C
on
stitution
 to keep it in
 step w
ith
 th
e tim
es is n
eith
er h
elpful to a judge 
tryin
g in
 good faith
 to disch
arger h
er role, n
or en
couragin
g to a citizen
 
w
an
tin
g to see h
im
self as a participan
t in
 th
e on
goin
g project of con
stitu-
tion
al self-govern
an
ce . . . . C
lassic origin
alism
 is n
o better, h
ow
ever.  It 
m
akes a profoun
d error in
 supposin
g th
at fidelity to th
e origin
al m
ean
-
in
g of th
e C
on
stitution
 requires th
at cases be decided, to th
e exten
t pos-
sible, as if th
ey h
ad been
 brough
t im
m
ediately after th
e ratification
 of th
e 
relevan
t con
stitution
al provision
 . . . . T
h
is view
 is obviously m
istaken
 be-
cause w
h
ile som
e con
stitution
al provision
s m
igh
t be in
ten
ded to fix out-
com
es in
 th
at w
ay, oth
ers m
igh
t n
ot. . . . D
eterm
in
ate rules, such
 as th
ose 
settin
g age-based qualification
s for office, dictate particular results re-
gardless of tim
e an
d circum
stan
ce . . . [but] [s]tan
dards, such
 as th
e 
Fourth
 A
m
en
dm
en
t’s proh
ibition
 on
 “un
reason
able” search
es, m
ay di-
rect differen
t results as tim
es an
d circum
stan
ces ch
an
ge. 292 
O
n
 top of everyth
in
g else, th
en
, th
eorists en
gaged in
 in
terpretive de-
bates m
igh
t be ch
asin
g a truly elusive prize.  T
h
ese observation
s sug-
gest th
at w
e sh
ould em
brace n
ew
 m
eth
ods for doin
g con
stitution
al 
th
eory w
ith
out th
e n
eed for th
roat clearin
g regardin
g in
terpretive 
priors 
an
d 
careful 
bracketin
g 
of 
possible 
in
terpretive 
objection
s 
again
st claim
s th
e th
eorists w
an
ts to defen
d. 
SN
 also suggests a n
ew
 refutation
 of th
e “th
eoretical disagree-
m
en
t” objection
 to legal positivism
.  T
h
e objection
 trades on
 th
e sup-
position
 th
at w
h
en
 judges disagree about in
terpretive m
eth
od, th
ey 
disagree about th
e criteria of legal validity. 293  N
ow
, disagreem
en
ts about 
 
en
t an
d explicit about th
e value judgm
en
ts th
at un
derlie th
ose decision
s.”).  B
ut see id. at 
264 (“[S]h
ared values can
 provide som
e objective groun
d to assess particular th
eory 
ch
oices.”); Fallon
, supra n
ote 150, at 549–50 (sam
e).  T
h
e idea of con
sen
sus-based value 
acceptan
ce reson
ates w
ith
 m
y claim
 about con
sen
sus n
orm
s, but th
e em
pirical question
 as 
to w
h
eth
er such
 value con
sen
suses exist is open
 an
d w
orth
 explorin
g. 
289 
See generally B
A
L
K
IN
, L
IV
IN
G
, supra n
ote 278. 
290 
See R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 278, at 125–26 (criticizin
g B
alkin
’s project on
 th
is groun
d). 
291 
Id. at 125. 
292 
Id. (footn
otes om
itted).  For a com
preh
en
sive catalogue of th
e problem
s w
ith
 origin
alism
 
both
 classical an
d n
ew
, see gen
erally B
erm
an
, supra n
ote 181. 
293 
D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 4–6.  D
w
orkin
’s exam
ples of th
eoretical disagreem
en
t arise in
 
th
e con
text of statutory, n
ot con
stitution
al, in
terpretation
; h
ow
ever th
e argum
en
t, m
utatis 
m
utandis, h
as th
e sam
e force in
 th
e con
text of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
. 
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law
 can
 arise despite h
avin
g a settled rule of recogn
ition
; for exam
-
ple, officials operatin
g un
der a con
sen
sus view
 of th
e criteria of legal 
validity m
ay n
everth
eless h
ave “em
pirical” disagreem
en
ts
294 about (1) 
w
h
eth
er th
ere is sufficien
t con
sen
sus on
 som
e validity criterion
 (e.g., 
a dispute about w
h
eth
er judges gen
erally accept custom
ary in
tern
a-
tion
al law
 as bin
din
g in
 th
e U
n
ited States); 295 or (2) w
h
eth
er settled 
criteria of legal validity are satisfied in
 a particular case (e.g., a dis-
pute about w
h
eth
er C
on
gress actually en
acted a statute). 296  B
ut if 
judges w
h
o say th
ey disagree about th
e proper m
eth
od of con
stitu-
tion
al in
terpretation
 do, at least in
 som
e cases, truly believe th
at th
ey 
are in
volved in
 a dispute about th
e criteria of legal validity, 297 th
en
 th
is 
kin
d of disagreem
en
t is difficult to recon
cile w
ith
 th
e positivist claim
 
th
at every legal system
 h
as a set of con
sen
sus-based criteria of legal va-
lidity.  T
h
at is, “th
e positivist th
eory . . . fails to explain
 . . . w
h
at it ap-
pears th
e judges are disputin
g . . . . T
h
ey w
rite as if th
ere is a fact of 
th
e m
atter about w
h
at th
e law
 is, even
 th
ough
 th
ey disagree about th
e 
criteria th
at fix w
h
at th
e law
 is.”
298  So, D
w
orkin
 argued, legal positiv-
ism
 is in
com
plete because it can
n
ot explain
 th
is ph
en
om
en
on
 of our 
legal system
. 299 
W
e saw
 above th
at value-based th
eories of law
 are in
con
sisten
t 
w
ith
 legal positivism
’s source th
esis; in
terpretive th
eories run
 in
to 
trouble w
ith
 legal positivism
 h
ere—
th
ey in
vite th
eoretical disagree-
m
en
t an
d th
us are in
con
sisten
t w
ith
 positivism
’s social fact th
esis as to 
con
stitution
al law
.  B
y w
ay of gen
eral respon
se to th
e th
eoretical disa-
greem
en
t objection
, L
eiter h
as correctly n
oted th
at legal positivism
 
explain
s perfectly w
ell th
e m
ost im
portan
t ph
en
om
en
on
 of our legal 
system
, th
e “m
assive an
d pervasive agreem
en
t about th
e law
 th
rough
-
out th
e system
.”
300  T
h
e vast m
ajority of legal issues are resolved w
ith
-
out th
e th
eoretical disagreem
en
ts D
w
orkin
 em
ph
asizes, w
h
ich
 arise 
on
ly in
 a sm
all subset of appellate cases w
h
ile m
ost judicial decision
s 
do n
ot in
volve such
 disputes an
d, m
oreover, th
e vast m
ajority of legal 
 294 
Id. at 5. 
295 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1222. 
296 
See id. at 1219 (“Som
e disagreem
en
ts are . . . m
erely ‘em
pirical’; th
at is, th
e parties agree 
about th
e criteria of legal validity . . . but disagree about w
h
eth
er th
ose criteria are satis-
fied in
 a particular case.”). 
297 
See id. at 1222 (“Judges en
gaged in
 D
w
orkin
ian
 th
eoretical disagreem
en
t are disagreein
g 
about th
e m
ean
in
g of th
e auth
oritative sources of law
 an
d th
us about w
h
at th
e law
 re-
quires th
em
 to do in
 particular cases . . . .”). 
298 
Id. at 1223. 
299 
See D
W
O
R
K
IN
, supra n
ote 14, at 6 (arguin
g th
at th
e debate as to w
h
eth
er “judges m
ake or 
fin
d law
” “could easily be settled . . . if th
ere w
ere n
o th
eoretical disagreem
en
t about th
e 
groun
ds of th
e law
”). 
300 
L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1227. 
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question
s are resolved by attorn
eys w
ith
out resort to th
e courts. 301  
T
h
us, D
w
orkin
’s seem
in
g in
sisten
ce th
at th
eoretical disagreem
en
t is a 
cen
tral ph
en
om
en
on
 of th
e legal system
 is m
isplaced.  T
h
is problem
 
of th
eoretical disagreem
en
t is, h
ow
ever, m
ore poin
ted w
h
en
 w
e focus 
on
 cases in
volvin
g substan
tial in
terpretive question
s, w
h
ere th
e “h
is-
tory of in
terpretive th
eory in
 A
m
erican
 courts is, above all, a h
istory 
of persisten
t an
d deep disagreem
en
t am
on
g judges an
d courts about 
th
e proper m
eth
ods an
d sources of legal in
terpretation
.”
302  Q
uestion
s 
of con
stitution
al in
terpretation
 provoke th
e m
ost th
eoretical disa-
greem
en
t; th
us th
e objection
 h
as th
e h
eigh
ten
ed force w
ith
 respect 
to con
stitution
al adjudication
 an
d poten
tially un
derm
in
es th
e exist-
en
ce of a settled rule of recogn
ition
 for con
stitution
al law
.  W
h
ile th
is 
affects on
ly a sm
all fraction
 of legal disputes, an
d th
us does n
ot 
th
reaten
 legal positivism
’s superiority as a gen
eral accoun
t of en
tire 
legal system
s; it is troublin
g because it m
igh
t un
derm
in
e positivism
’s 
capacity to accoun
t for th
e operation
 of a system
’s m
ost fun
dam
en
tal 
law
. Leiter offers tw
o straigh
tforw
ard positivist respon
ses to th
e objec-
tion
:  Judges en
gaged in
 th
eoretical disagreem
en
t act as th
ough
 th
ere 
is a fact of th
e m
atter about w
h
at th
e law
 is, but th
ey are eith
er bein
g 
disin
gen
uous or th
ey are in
 error in
sofar as th
e th
eoretical disagree-
m
en
t disproves th
e existen
ce of con
sen
sus validity criteria on
 th
e is-
sue. 303  H
e adm
its, h
ow
ever, th
at th
ese respon
ses on
ly “explain
[] 
aw
ay” th
e face value of th
e disagreem
en
t. 304  T
h
e SN
 accoun
t poin
ts 
up a n
ew
 rejoin
der:  E
ven
 our typically con
ten
tious con
stitution
al law
 
m
ay be ch
aracterized by sign
ifican
t official con
sen
sus on
 som
e of th
e 
m
ost basic an
d im
portan
t n
orm
s—
structural n
orm
s th
at stabilize our 
system
 an
d create th
e fram
ew
ork in
 w
h
ich
 oth
er in
terpretive debates 
can
 take place w
ith
out th
e system
 breakin
g dow
n
.  In
terpretive th
eory 
of law
 claim
s—
m
ain
tain
in
g th
at th
e on
ly correct w
ay for courts to 
iden
tify th
e con
stitution
al n
orm
s th
at w
e h
ave is to adopt on
e of th
e 
in
terpretive th
eories th
at are so h
otly con
tested—
seem
 to feed in
to 
th
e th
eoretical disagreem
en
t problem
 an
d run
 h
eadlon
g in
to con
flict 
w
ith
 th
e social fact th
esis by un
derm
in
in
g th
e idea of con
sen
sus crite-
ria of legal validity w
ith
 respect to con
stitution
al n
orm
s.  T
h
us con
sti-
 301 
See id. at 1226 (“[T
]h
eoretical disagreem
en
ts about law
 represen
t on
ly a m
in
iscule frac-
tion
 of all judgm
en
ts ren
dered about law
, sin
ce m
ost judgm
en
ts about law
 in
volve agree-
m
en
t, n
ot disagreem
en
t.”). 
302 
A
drian
 V
erm
eule, T
he Judiciary as a T
hey, N
ot an It:  Interpretive T
heory and the Fallacy of D
ivi-
sion, 14 J. C
O
N
T
E
M
P. L
E
G
A
L
 ISSU
E
S 549, 556 (2005). 
303 
See L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1224–25 (“[T
[h
e D
isin
gen
uity accoun
t claim
s on
ly th
at judges 
h
ave an
 un
con
scious or precon
scious aw
aren
ess th
at th
ere is n
o ‘law
’ to be foun
d.”) 
304 
Id. at 1223. 
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tution
al adjudication
 is n
o lon
ger a coun
terexam
ple, or even
 a par-
ticularly problem
atic case, for legal positivism
.  T
h
is respon
se does 
m
ore th
an
 just explain
 aw
ay th
eoretical disagreem
en
t in
 con
stitu-
tion
al cases—
it suggests th
at basic structural con
stitution
al n
orm
s 
m
ay durably exist despite th
eoretical disagreem
en
t on
 oth
er con
stitu-
tion
al issues, ren
derin
g th
e th
eoretical disagreem
en
t critique in
ter-
estin
g but n
ot disablin
g as it relates to con
stitution
al law
. 305 
*
  *
  *
  *
  *
  * 
T
h
e SPT
 accoun
t of structural doctrin
e an
d ex hypothesi SN
 track 
th
e core claim
s of legal positivism
 an
d focus on
 observed in
stan
ces of 
apparen
t con
sen
sus am
on
g legal officials; th
ey th
us explain
 a cen
tral 
ph
en
om
en
on
 of our con
stitution
al system
:  D
espite our h
eated an
d 
lon
g-lived in
terpretive, value, an
d th
eoretical debates, w
e have a stable 
constitutional system
. 306  V
alue-driven
 an
d in
terpretive th
eories of law
 
m
iss or dow
n
play th
is stability.  W
h
ile th
ere m
ay w
ell be in
stan
ces of 
gen
uin
e th
eoretical disagreem
en
t—
our rule of recogn
ition
 m
ay even
 
in
clude evaluative or in
terpretive criteria of legal validity
307—
th
ose are 
n
ot th
e only ph
en
om
en
a in
 th
e system
, an
d th
ey m
ay n
ot be am
on
g 
th
e m
ost im
portan
t. 308  In
 an
y case, w
e sh
ould prefer a th
eory th
at 
captures both th
e disagreem
en
ts an
d th
e con
sen
suses to altern
atives 
th
at do n
ot. 
C
O
N
C
L
U
SIO
N
 
W
h
ile on
e m
igh
t object th
at affirm
in
g th
e validity of n
orm
s like 
SPT
 is too com
m
on
sen
sical to yield an
y ben
efits; I offer th
e foregoin
g 
exploration
 of h
ow
 explain
in
g of m
ultiple lin
es of com
plex con
stitu-
tion
al doctrin
e as predicated on
 th
ese sim
ple, obvious proposition
s 
advan
ces con
stitution
al th
eory past difficult an
d persisten
t con
ceptual 
ch
allen
ges.  B
uildin
g out a broader th
eory of th
is form
 prom
ises sig-
n
ifican
t fruit, en
ablin
g en
tirely n
ew
 categories of n
orm
ative con
stitu-
tion
al th
eory w
ork focusin
g on
 th
e pragm
atic justification
s for various 
 305 
T
h
is m
irrors L
eiter’s argum
en
t th
at th
eoretical disagreem
en
t is n
ot a cen
tral feature of a 
legal system
 in
 w
h
ich
 th
e cen
tral ph
en
om
en
on
 is m
assive an
d pervasive agreem
en
t about 
th
e law
.  See id. at 1228. 
306 
C
f. 
id. 
(“O
n
e 
of 
th
e 
great 
th
eoretical 
virtues 
of 
legal 
positivism
 . . . is 
th
at 
it 
ex-
plain
s . . . th
e pervasive ph
en
om
en
on
 of legal agreem
ent.”). 
307 
See supra n
ote 272. 
308 
C
f. L
eiter, supra n
ote 19, at 1220 (“[E
]ven
 if w
e agreed . . . th
at legal positivism
 provided 
an
 un
satisfactory accoun
t of th
eoretical disagreem
en
t in
 law
, th
is w
ould be of n
o sign
ifi-
can
ce un
less w
e th
ough
t th
at th
is ph
en
om
en
on
 w
as som
eh
ow
 cen
tral to an
 un
derstan
d-
in
g of th
e n
ature of law
 an
d legal system
s.”). 
418 
JO
U
R
N
A
L
 O
F C
O
N
ST
IT
U
T
IO
N
A
L
 L
A
W
 
[V
ol. 18:2 
 
im
plem
en
tin
g doctrin
es an
d providin
g a n
ew
 set of param
eters for 
em
pirical study of th
e view
s of th
e public an
d legal officials th
at 
could, at last, lead to som
e falsifiable h
ypoth
eses.  In
 th
e en
d, I h
ope 
th
at th
is idea w
ill sh
are a “h
allm
ark of truly deep in
sigh
ts; th
ey seem
 
obvious in
 retrospect.”
309 
 309 
R
oosevelt, supra n
ote 278, at 121. 
